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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) prepared a Scoping Study on 
Securing Adequate Legal Defense in Proceedings under International Investment Agree-
ments (Scoping Study) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The primary 
research question that the Scoping Study was requested to address is: How can ade-
quate legal defense for parties in proceedings under International Investment Agree-
ments (IIAs) be better secured? The information provided in the Scoping Study is intend-
ed to contribute to discussions on the desirability and feasibility of creating or expanding 
an assistance mechanism or mechanisms to assist states and other users of the IIA and 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system to more effectively participate in and 
benefit from this system. Throughout the study, and reflecting our broad approach, which 
catalogues a wide range of issues and options, we refer to possibilities for support as 
“Assistance Mechanisms.” We use that term to encompass a broad range of potential 
models and options. The term is not meant to reflect any single approach. 
The Scoping Study provides a broad and inclusive 
overview of issues, concerns, empirical evidence, 
opinions, lessons learned, and proposed solutions 
as they relate to potential or expanded Assistance 
Mechanisms for international investment law. This 
Scoping Study reflects input received on a confidential 
basis from: government officials (of all World Bank 
Group economic development levels); individuals who 
have experience establishing or working for existing 
or attempted Assistance Mechanisms; individuals who 
have experience working for an arbitral institution; 
academics who have written on and/or advised states 
with respect to international investment law; private 
practitioners; representatives of non-governmental 
organizations; and representatives of private sector 
foreign investors. While this study captures the 
perspectives of each and all of these categories of 
individuals (but perspectives are naturally reflective 
only of individuals actually interviewed), it is the 
perspective of those who are experiencing and 
articulating capacity challenges that should serve 
as the primary guide for both identifying critical 
areas where assistance is needed, and in developing 
potential solutions. 
Identifying Challenges
CCSI’s consultations conducted for the Scoping Study 
revealed that the concerns about IIAs and ISDS are 
much more fundamental than only the financial costs 
of participation in this system. Interviewees relayed 
challenges from investment policy formulation at 
the domestic level through and including effective 
engagement in formal ISDS proceedings. As such, 
the Scoping Study considers the range of problems 
that states and other actors have in engaging with 
and benefiting from international investment law 
and in participating effectively in investor-state 
dispute settlement processes. The Scoping Study 
does so through the lens of “capacity challenges,” 
capturing different challenges related to: investment 
policy-making; IIA negotiation; implementation and 
management of their IIAs and associated policies; 
dispute prevention; and pre-dispute management and 
consultations. It then considers in depth the capacity 
challenges that arise in the context of managing actual 
ISDS disputes, including: case staffing; anticipating, 
and potentially resolving, ISDS cases at an early phase; 
High-Level Executive Summary
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appointing arbitrators; dealing with uncertainty and 
ambiguity; working with experts; and engaging in 
discovery of and managing information.
 
Some identified challenges are acknowledged and 
shared by all or many states, and some differ, based on 
a state’s economic development level, its experience 
with ISDS claims, and its role as a capital importer or 
exporter (or both) particularly vis-a-vis its investment 
treaty partners, among other factors. States expressed 
different priorities in addressing these challenges, 
some of which seem to be loosely held preferences 
in light of anticipated resource constraints, and some 
of which reflected more fundamentally held policy 
priorities or mandates.
Identifying Potential Ways of Easing 
Capacity Challenges 
Following the identification (and prioritization) of 
capacity challenges, it will be necessary to consider the 
model(s) that an Assistance Mechanism could take in 
order to help address them. The Scoping Study surveys 
a wide variety of models that Assistance Mechanisms, 
both with respect to international investment law as 
well as those employed in other legal fields, have taken 
and may take to address various concerns. Models that 
are explored in depth in the Scoping Study include: 
 
• Institutionalized, multi-service support 
including legal representation of client 
governments. Examples that are discussed in 
this category include the Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law, the African Legal Support Facility, 
and the International Development Law 
Organization’s Investment Support Programme 
for Least Developed Countries, as well as an 
investment law “hotline”.
• Institutionalized, multi-service support not 
including legal representation of client 
governments. Examples that are discussed 
in this category include the kinds of support 
provided by international organizations (such as 
UNCTAD, the OECD, and the World Bank Group), 
arbitration centers (such as ICSID, the PCA, and 
the SCC), and academic and non-profit centers 
(such as CCSI and IISD).
• Financial or in-kind inputs. Examples that are 
discussed in this category include arbitration trust 
funds (such as that provided by the PCA), third-
party funding, contingent fee representation, 
insurance products, and loans. 
• Pro bono, ad hoc legal and expert support. 
Examples that are discussed in this category 
include IDLO’s ISP/LDCs program along with 
other NGO and university-based programs (e.g. 
TradeLab) that deliver services to states on a no-
cost basis.
• Intergovernmental knowledge-sharing hubs. 
Examples that are discussed in this category 
include formal opportunities for government 
officials to share knowledge (e.g. IISD’s Annual 
Forum of Developing Country Investment 
Negotiators) as well as ad-hoc treaty-based or 
other networks. 
• Discrete capacity-building networks. Examples 
that are discussed in this section include trainings 
and discrete capacity building offered by various 
Assistance Mechanisms, academic and non-profit 
institutions, law firms, and other governments, as 
well as Massive Open Online Courses. 
• Legal assistance and resource clearinghouse. 
Finally, a very basic form of Assistance 
Mechanism may provide great value by simply 
compiling, organizing, and disseminating 
information about existing resources to relevant 
government officials.
 
Key Considerations in Identifying 
Feasible and Desirable Options
Various cross-cutting issues emerged from analysis of 
and experience with existing Assistance Mechanisms. 
These cross-cutting issues should be considered by 
policy-makers as they consider the breadth and depth 
of services as well as the model(s) that an Assistance 
Mechanism could follow. The cross-cutting issues that 
are explored in depth in the Scoping Study include: 
 
• Quality, reliability, reputation, and trust;
• Funding of an Assistance Mechanism and scope 
of services;
• Costs of support and who bears them;
• Stakeholder tensions;
• Identifying the client/beneficiary;
• Location, staffing, and remuneration;
• Institutionalized vs. ad hoc mechanisms; 
• “Politics” surrounding the role of an Assistance 
Mechanism; and
• Intersection with other reforms. 
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Interviews and desk research reflect a great diversity 
of perspectives as to how capacity challenges should 
be prioritized and addressed, and highlight how 
each of these categories of issues can have crucial 
implications for the buy-in regarding and viability of 
any potential Assistance Mechanism. 
Furthermore, interviews and research confirm the 
perhaps not unsurprising conclusion that capacity 
challenges in the ISDS system are often distinct 
from other legal systems, and that models used to 
address challenges in some systems are not readily 
transferrable to the ISDS context, at least as the 
ISDS system operates at present. For instance, 
features such as the asymmetrical nature of treaty-
based ISDS cases (with states always respondents), 
and the significant number of legal and expert hours 
typically spent on ISDS disputes, distinguish ISDS 
cases from those under the WTO. These differences 
in capacity challenges, priorities in addressing 
them, the practicality and feasibility of doing so, 
and at what cost, raise questions about the model 
of Assistance Mechanism that is best suited to the 
investment law context.
Notably, and as the Scoping Study discusses, there 
have been several previous attempts to establish an 
advisory center on international investment law. A 
key theme that emerged from interviews with those 
involved in or knowledgeable about these efforts 
was that policy-makers should not underestimate 
large (such as how a mechanism will be financed) 
and, perhaps moreso, small policy differences 
among and between states (such as the location 
of a mechanism), as an unanticipated difference of 
opinion can stall or halt efforts, even when the finish 
line seems near. Identifying such issues at an early 
stage is important for ensuring that paths pursued 
are possible and promising.
SME Capacity Challenges and Options 
for Addressing Them
Finally, the Scoping Study includes a section devoted 
to investors, with a focus on small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) as potential beneficiaries of any 
Assistance Mechanism. The Scoping Study revealed that 
although SMEs and states face some of the same issues 
with respect to their participation in ISDS, the rationales 
for, considerations regarding, and optimal modes of 
supporting each group may vary significantly. 
 
The Scoping Study explores evidence related to SME 
use of ISDS, as well as the hurdles that SMEs are having 
in effectively relying on IIAs and ISDS as a method to limit 
risk and resolve disputes. The Scoping Study explores 
how one might determine the scope of beneficiaries 
who may benefit from an Assistance Mechanism, and 
identifies how some Assistance Mechanisms that are 
or could be made available to states are, or could be, 
available to SMEs to a greater or lesser extent than 
government respondents. 
 
Overall, based on the hurdles experienced and concerns 
expressed, the Scoping Study considers the forms of 
an Assistance Mechanism that may best assist SMEs 
in overcoming ISDS access issues. These include an 
ombuds-type office, pre-dispute technical assistance, 
market-based Assistance Mechanisms, capacity-building 
models, and a model incorporating institutionalized 
defense and legal representation. Depending on the 
type of assistance that would be offered to investors, 
consultations suggested fairly widespread hesitation of, 
or even strong opposition to, also including investors as 
beneficiaries of an Assistance Mechanism that is created 
or expanded to benefit states, especially with respect to 
an Assistance Mechanism focused on supporting ISDS 
litigation. 
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Ways Forward in the Currently 
Evolving Context
International investment law and ISDS are evolving, 
and outcomes of that evolution remain uncertain. 
Those developments must be kept in mind when 
assessing needs, and the options for addressing them, 
as each may change in the short-, medium-, and long-
term. An Assistance Mechanism developed to be 
sustainable will need to be flexible to accommodate 
these developments. It will be important to consider 
whether and to what extent concerns regarding IIAs 
and ISDS are best resolved through reforms to treaties 
and dispute settlement mechanisms thereunder, and 
whether and to what extent the costs of concerns that 
are not addressed should be shifted from beneficiaries 
of an Assistance Mechanism (e.g. certain respondent 
states and/or SMEs) to an Assistance Mechanism’s 
funders (e.g. other states and their taxpayers).
With respect to both states and investors, this 
scoping study has set forth a wide variety of existing 
capacity challenges and detailed existing Assistance 
Mechanisms that are available. Depending on the 
issue, robust, some, or no assistance is currently 
available. Any creation or expansion of an Assistance 
Mechanism should take into account existing support, 
building upon and using it, and complementing it as 
necessary and desirable. 
In UNCITRAL’s most recent 38th Session, government 
delegates commenced a substantive discussion on 
the contours of an Assistance Mechanism (referred to 
in that context as an “advisory center”). While general 
support was expressed for establishing an Assistance 
Mechanism, particularly as such a mechanism could 
complement other reform options being developed 
by WGIII, preliminary thoughts and consideration 
of questions regarding the establishment of such 
a mechanism revealed much work yet to be done. 
Delegates discussed a wide range of possibilities as 
they relate to: potential beneficiaries of a mechanism, 
the potential scope of services that a mechanism could 
provide (with those outlined in Secretariat Note A/
CN.9/WG.III/WP.168 providing a good basis for further 
discussion), the possible structure of an Assistance 
Mechanism and how it could be financed, and other 
considerations and issues that must be born in mind 
(e.g. quality and reliability of services, staffing and 
remuneration, stakeholder tensions, a mechanism’s 
impact on the ISDS system as a whole, and long-term 
sustainability of an Assistance Mechanism).
The Working Group provided guidance to the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat in conducting certain 
preparatory work to assist the Working Group in 
these considerations. Requested information related 
to potential conflicts of interest and burdens on an 
Assistance Mechanism (particularly as they relate to 
the scope of its mandate), information on Assistance 
Mechanisms that are already providing services, 
criteria that may be applied to determine beneficiary 
states and services, how capacity building may apply 
to various elements of investment treaty practice 
and dispute settlement proceedings, and options for 
financing and staffing an Assistance Mechanism.
As the content and contours of any Assistance 
Mechanism take shape, the authors are grateful 
for the opportunity to contribute the evidence and 
perspectives in this Scoping Study to that discussion. 
The challenges are varied and issues complex, 
requiring a close and realistic look at the problems 
being articulated and the strengths and weaknesses 
of different options for ameliorating them.
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Section 1. Introduction
 1.1 Overview   12
 1.2 Methodology  13
     1.2.1 Interviews  13
     1.2.2 Desk research 13
This Scoping Study on Securing Adequate Legal Defense 
in Proceedings under International Investment Agreements 
(Scoping Study) has been prepared for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands. 
The primary research question that this Scoping Study was 
requested to address is: How can adequate legal defense 
for parties in proceedings under International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs) be better secured?
1.1 Overview
The question of adequate legal defense for 
respondent states in investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) proceedings is a timely and 
important one.1 The number of claims against states, 
and defense costs incurred by them, continue to 
grow, and absent serious and systemic changes 
to the underlying treaties and national investment 
laws, or the dispute settlement mechanism 
provided for therein, show no signs of abating. 
Even if structural interventions to attempt to control 
costs of ISDS proceedings succeed, the costs of 
participation in any IIA-based, international dispute 
settlement mechanism are likely to remain financially 
challenging for many states, claimants, and others 
who engage in and with ISDS disputes. The issue of 
cost is also closely linked with quality, control, and 
trust, three other criteria participants in this legal 
system prioritize. 
In undertaking this Scoping Study, CCSI has 
sought information that will assist policy-makers in 
understanding what is meant by “adequate legal 
defense” from the perspective of respondent states 
and other users of and stakeholders in the system 
of IIAs and ISDS, and the hurdles (financial and 
other) that respondent states and other users face in 
achieving this objective. 
The paper follows the outline of our inquiry: As a first 
step, the study unpacks and provides greater clarity on 
what challenges states face in developing, advancing, 
implementing, and enforcing their investment law 
policies. Next, the study analyzes how and where 
existing organizations or programs are available to 
assist, financially or otherwise, states and other users in 
more effectively engaging in and with the IIA system, 
including in and with the ISDS mechanism (each 
such organization or program is generally referred to 
herein as an Assistance Mechanism), and where there 
are or seem to be assistance gaps. This is followed 
by an analysis of the different models any Assistance 
Mechanism (or Assistance Mechanisms) that could 
be developed or expanded upon may follow, again 
using and building on existing Assistance Mechanisms 
supporting investment policies, but also drawing on 
mechanisms used in other substantive legal areas, such 
as international human rights and criminal law.2 This 
section is extensive as identifying what is needed first 
necessitates an analysis of what is already available, 
and benefits from an understanding of initiatives, 
considerations, and approaches in analogous contexts. 
The study then considers certain “cross-cutting” issues, 
or areas of consideration that apply to all models of 
Assistance Mechanism and should be considered and 
addressed during the process of creating (or expanding) 
any new Assistance Mechanism.
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Finally, a section is devoted to investors, namely small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as potential 
beneficiaries of any Assistance Mechanism. The 
Scoping Study revealed that although SMEs and states 
face some of the same issues with respect to their 
participation in ISDS, the rationales for, considerations 
regarding, and optimal modes of supporting each 
group may vary significantly. Moreover, much less is 
presently known about the particular experiences, 
needs, and priorities of SMEs with respect to ISDS 
than states. 
Throughout all sections, CCSI’s analysis draws heavily 
on advice and anecdotes provided during the course 
of consultations conducted for this Scoping Study, 





For purposes of this Scoping Study CCSI conducted 
in-person or phone consultations with a wide variety 
of individuals who engage in the IIA/ISDS system or 
who otherwise have experience relevant to Assistance 
Mechanisms available to states in international legal 
fora. CCSI prepared a consultation protocol and list 
of questions, attached as Annex A. This protocol 
served as the basis for each consultation, although 
depending on the nature and experience of the 
interviewee, certain questions were deemed more 
relevant and thus prioritized. In all cases, interviewees 
were encouraged to elaborate on responses beyond 
the scope of the question, and to provide information 
that the interviewee deemed relevant to the issue 
of potential Assistance Mechanisms even if such 
information did not respond to a specific question 
asked. The objective was to gain broad perspectives 
on the concerns that states and other stakeholders 
have regarding the ability of the current IIA/ISDS 
system to meet treaty-party objectives, broadly catalog 
what resources are currently available to address these 
concerns, identify where and to what extent there are 
gaps in support, and understand lessons learned from 
other Assistance Mechanisms (or failed attempts to 
establish Assistance Mechanisms). 
While all perspectives that were expressed during 
interviews were taken into account and are reflected 
in this Scoping Study, CCSI deemed it of particular 
importance to attempt to understand and reflect the 
concerns expressed by and from the perspective of 
potential users of a possible Assistance Mechanism. 
Such individuals or groups can best identify and 
articulate the concerns and hurdles experienced and 
are best placed to suggest or evaluate how a potential 
Assistance Mechanism may respond to any identified 
problem.
One or more members of CCSI staff conducted each 
consultation. Consultations ranged from bilateral, 
to small groups, to larger groups of up to roughly 
thirty individuals (although bilateral or small group 
interviews greatly predominated). All consultations 
were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, and 
thus while information received from consultations is 
included in this Scoping Study, neither the identity 
nor the affiliation of the interviewee is specified. CCSI 
has, however, identified interviewees by the following 
general categories:
• Government officials3
• Individuals who have experience establishing 
or working for existing or attempted Assistance 
Mechanisms
• Individuals who have experience working for an 
arbitral institution
• Academics who have written on and/or advised 
states with respect to international investment 
law
• Private practitioners4
• Representatives of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)5
• Representatives of private sector foreign 
investors. 
While consultations were conducted among a broad 
range of stakeholders, and the authors attempted 
to obtain input from a diverse range of individuals 
familiar with investment law and/or existing Assistance 
Mechanisms, the discussion below is reflective of the 
particular sample of interviewees, complemented by 
desk-based research.
1.2.2. Desk research 
In addition to interviews conducted for this Scoping 
Study, CCSI staff undertook desk-based research in 
the English language.
14 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
SCOPING STUDY
Section 2. 
Contours of the Current International Investment 
Agreement Regime
2.1 Identifying capacity challenges 15
2.2 Stocktaking: Identified concerns and existing Assistance  18
Mechanisms available to states in IIA-related areas other 
than disputes   
  2.2.1  Investment policy-making 18
  2.2.2  IIA negotiation   22
  2.2.3  Domestic implementation of IIA obligations 28 
   2.2.4  Ongoing engagement and treaty management 30
2.3 Stocktaking: Challenges in managing ISDS proceedings,  32
and existing mechanisms to overcome those challenges 
   2.3.1 Case staffing   32 
   2.3.2 Staffing of defense claims:  38
    Issues of cost, quality and control 
   2.3.3 Anticipating, and potentially resolving,  39
  ISDS cases at an early phase   
   2.3.4 Appointing arbitrators  42
  2.3.5 Handling cases - dealing with inconsistency,  42
  uncertainty and incorrectness  
   2.3.6 Handling cases - working with experts 44
  2.3.7 Handling cases - engaging in discovery,  44 
  managing information 
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 15
SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY
Many governments around the world are thinking 
critically about their IIAs, the ISDS mechanism that is 
frequently contained in them, and, more broadly, the 
role that IIAs are playing, and should be playing, in 
states’ broader investment policy and development 
objectives. This critical analysis has stemmed from 
a confluence of factors. In recent years ISDS claims 
have dramatically increased. The resolution of these 
cases, whether by pre-award settlement agreement 
or through issuance and payment of an award, can 
involve extremely high sums. These include costs of 
the arbitration proceedings (legal fees, expert fees, 
arbitrator fees, institutional fees, and other arbitration 
costs) and damages. 
In addition to direct costs that IIAs and ISDS claims 
can impose on states through claims and awards, 
other indirect costs can also pose challenges. For 
example, states may suffer reputational damage 
as a safe destination for foreign investment from 
the mere filing of an ISDS claim.6 In addition, states 
are increasingly aware of the value and necessity of 
keeping abreast of developments in investment law, 
participating as non-disputing state parties in claims 
involving a state’s treaties, and entering into joint 
interpretations regarding, or unilaterally clarifying, 
their treaty language and intent. These efforts create a 
resource burden for states, and in some cases remain 
insufficient to ensure that development of investment 
treaty law and practice align with states’ investment 
policy and legal preferences and intentions.
Efforts to better align IIAs with broader investment 
policy objectives are occurring in various fora and are 
based on uni-, bi-, pluri-, and multilateral efforts. For 
example, states have developed and are negotiating 
new model agreements, have entered into joint 
interpretations to clarify existing treaties, and have 
terminated treaties that no longer meet policy 
objectives or legal obligations. 
However, despite these efforts, fundamental disparities 
between and among states will likely persist, many 
stemming from the significant costs of the IIA regime 
and ISDS mechanism.7 ISDS remains a costly endeavor, 
and those costs are disproportionately felt by 
developing country states and the stakeholders within 
them. Developing countries are more commonly 
on the receiving side of claims than developed 
countries;8 and the same amount expended on 
defense and/or liability awards represents a greater 
share of government revenue and expenditures than 
for developed country respondents in absolute terms, 
on a per capita basis, and as a share of GDP.9 
It is against this background that Assistance Mechanisms 
to help countries that may find participation in the 
IIA/ISDS system difficult have been proposed and 
are currently being explored. In its 37th Session, 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group III (WGIII) the potential 
was raised for an advisory center to be established 
as part of the various solutions that it will develop to 
address concerns about ISDS, and in its most recent 
38th Session WGIII discussed in greater depth the ways 
in which the creation of an Assistance Mechanism may 
be advanced, and tasked the UNCITRAL Secretariat 
with conducting further research to assist the WGIII in 
further advancing this objective.10 
2.1 Identifying capacity challenges
A consistent and recurrent theme that emerged in 
Scoping Study consultations with government officials, 
in particular, and within all categories of interviewees 
more generally, was the issue of capacity; the lack of it, 
the desire for more of it, and, the potential role for an 
Assistance Mechanism to assist with its development. 
The lack of sufficient capacity was identified as a 
particular problem in the context of actual defense 
of ISDS claims – with respect to either managing the 
defense in-house or managing outside counsel – but 
was also a concern identified with respect to a wide 
spectrum of investment-law related areas, such as 
policy development, treaty negotiations, dispute 
prevention, and the management of and decisions 
required to be taken in the context of actual disputes. 
For example, many interviewees noted that some 
countries do not have a critical mass of officials who 
possess sufficient technical knowledge about treaties 
and disputes required for informed decision-making 
with respect to treaty negotiations,11 investment 
policy-making,12 or to effectively engage with and 
manage outside counsel during the course of ISDS 
disputes. They cite difficulties in inter-ministerial 
coordination and agreement. They are unaware 
of, or unable to effectively seize, opportunities to 
participate as non-disputing treaty parties. Even when 
a country has coherent investment policy objectives, 
implementation, at international and domestic levels, 
can present insurmountable hurdles. 
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Figure 1 Total Government Expenditure per capita ($PPP) 
Total government expenditures across all levels of government. Expenditures include inter-
mediate consumption, compensation of employees, subsidies, property income, and social 
benefits. 









Several interviewees stated that “capacity” is a vague 
term, and what is needed is actual knowledge transfer. 
Achieving actual knowledge-transfer in the context 
of legal assistance requires dedicated thought and 
planning, and a nuanced understanding of the 
context in which “capacity building” is intended to 
occur, and what the specific needs are of the intended 
beneficiaries.13 It was suggested in CCSI’s consultations 
that abstract and more general technical “capacity 
building” trainings may have a certain value but are 
insufficient, without more, to achieve even narrow 
capacity objectives.14 
Particularly with respect to disputes, several 
interviewees described the minimum desirable level of 
required capacity on the part of government officials 
engaged in investment law disputes as something 
beyond a general understanding of the substance of 
treaties and procedure of an arbitration. Rather, the 
minimum desired level of capacity was described as 
officials possessing the ability to effectively engage 
with outside counsel on a technical level, and, 
importantly, to have the confidence to “say no” to 
such outside counsel. In other words, the ability to 
take the advice of counsel to supplement an official’s 
own knowledge and ability to make informed decisions 
in the interest of the state was the minimum amount of 
capacity deemed to be sufficient. 
The ability to internalize knowledge sufficient to make 
informed decisions and effectively manage cases has 
both substantive and financial implications for a state. 
On the substantive side, states, as masters of their 
treaties, and whose practice and opinio juris contribute 
to customary international law, place a high value 
on controlling interpretation and application of their 
international legal obligations. On the financial side, 
“the less sophisticated the local government officials, 
the more work a private firm can and will bill because they 
have to do everything. A sophisticated team inside the 
government leaves less work to be done and less billing 
to be had for outside counsel.”15 In order to effectively 
manage outside counsel, government officials must fully 
understand substantive and procedural elements of 
disputes to ensure that the matter does not escape from 
their hands, “and even then, this is not easy.”16 Even if 
countries continue to rely on outside counsel and other 
experts to represent them in investment law issues, 
including disputes, internal capacity development 
required to be able to effectively engage with and 
manage outside counsel is a critical issue for states.
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However, many individuals consulted during the course 
of this Scoping Study described capacity challenges 
that went far beyond the technical ability to engage 
with outside counsel during the course of disputes. 
Thus, the question of what, exactly, is meant by 
capacity in different contexts, and how such capacity 
can be “built” is important to the consideration of an 
Assistance Mechanism for international investment 
law. While it may be that states decide that it is not 
the objective nor role of an Assistance Mechanism 
to address any or all capacity challenges, it is at least 
a purpose of this Scoping Study to identify them for 
consideration by policymakers when developing or 
expanding an Assistance Mechanism. 
Contributors to Pauwelyn and Wang’s 2019 edited 
volume, “Building Legal Capacity for a More Inclusive 
Globalization” perceive capacity in different yet 
interrelated ways, each of which has implication for 
the identification of capacity challenges, and for any 
potential efforts to foster capacity building.17 For 
example, capacity can be dichotomized into broad 
or narrow categories, where narrow capacity refers to 
technical expertise in a specific substantive area, and 
broad capacity considers the ability of governments 
to be aware of and promote their national interests 
and effectively participate in an international legal 
system.18 Capacity can also be temporally-categorized, 
looking at short- and long-term pillars, where a short-
term need may simply and urgently be prevailing in an 
ISDS dispute.19
Capacity can also be viewed through the lens 
of intersecting and interdependent levels of the 
professional development of individual government 
officials, as well as the capacity of organizational and 
institutional levels to effectively shape and manage 
investment policy objectives,20 or at the inter-related 
categories of international legal, political, and 
economic capacity necessary to participate in a rules-
based global economy.21
The capacity necessary for a state to effectively and 
efficiently participate in international, economic rules-
based systems is nuanced, context dependent, and 
multidimensional. In a 2009 study assessing capacity 
challenges in the trade context, Busch, Reinhart 
and Shaffer found that general proxies commonly 
used to categorize “capacity,” including per capita 
income and GDP, were inaccurate and generally did 
not correlate to a more rigorous assessment of state 
capacity in the WTO context, as those proxies did not 
capture or measure areas where governments actually 
have capacity challenges in participating effectively in 
the WTO system.22
Underscoring the unique contexts of sovereigns 
participating in an international legal system, Jeremy 
Sharpe has linked capacity directly to the legitimacy 
of the investment law system itself. The legitimacy of 
ISDS “rests in part upon states’ ability to understand 
and comply with their legal obligations, effectively 
defend against investor claims, and keep the law on 
a sensible track. Capacity thus is an integral part of 
the legitimacy and viability of international investment 
arbitration.”23 
Throughout this Scoping Study, concerns identified 
by states, and by other interviewees, are identified, 
and existing Assistance Mechanisms surveyed. 
Various forms that an Assistance Mechanism in 
international investment law may take are discussed. 
Depending on the desires of policy-makers in this 
context, any Assistance Mechanism may respond 
to narrow or broader needs of beneficiaries, and 
either approach may involve trade-offs, which ideally 
would be assessed and understood ex ante.24 Narrow 
approaches to addressing capacity challenges may 
be inadequate or irrelevant to address broader 
development needs in the context of investment 
policy.25 At the same time, a narrow approach may fill 
a gap or complement or build upon other Assistance 
Mechanisms, or may more effectively respond to an 
urgent and immediate need of the beneficiary. States 
may decide that capacity building should be a pillar 
of any Assistance Mechanism or may decide that 
an Assistance Mechanism is not intended to fill or 
develop all gaps in capacity, but to address limited 
areas of concern and narrow capacity challenges. 
The question of what is meant by capacity is thus 
critically important. The identified concerns of users 
of the IIA/ISDS system can be characterized in 
many ways by different conceptions of capacity. A 
nuanced consideration of the “capacity needs” from 
the perspective of intended Assistance Mechanism 
beneficiaries is thus critical to unpack and understand 
because it forms the basis for identifying the problem 
that any Assistance Mechanism might seek to remedy.26 
18 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
SCOPING STUDY
2.2 Stocktaking: Identified concerns 
and existing Assistance Mechanisms 
available to states in IIA-related areas 
other than disputes
Various existing Assistance Mechanisms provide 
legal and/or policy advice to states to support 
them in areas of: investment policy-making, IIA 
negotiation, implementation and management of 
their IIA policies, dispute prevention, pre-dispute 
management and consultations, management 
of notices of intent, and management of active 
disputes. Existing support available to states 
at each of these phases of investment policy-
making, short of management of notices of intent 
and active disputes are discussed in this section, 
whereas management of notices of intent and 
disputes, the more formalized steps in the dispute 
process, are discussed separately in the following 
section. Satisfaction, criticisms, or gaps identified 
by interviewees with respect to specific Assistance 
Mechanisms or general topical areas are also 
identified and discussed.
2.2.1 Investment policy-making
International investment law responds to, and 
raises, myriad policy questions: What do states want 
from international investment (inward and outward)? 
What are the policy tools they can use to achieve 
those objectives? What are the costs and benefits of 
different policy tools, and how are those costs and 
benefits distributed across stakeholders within and 
across countries? 
These issues are being discussed in different fora at 
national and international levels. The field is busy 
and multifaceted. The Financing for Development 
agenda is, for instance, bringing governments, the 
private sector and others together to identify ways 
to increase international investment (including 
FDI) in the places and with respect to activities 
necessary to advance sustainable development, 
and to prevent such capital movements and 
interests from undermining achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals;27 there are 
structured discussions on investment facilitation 
taking place at the WTO; there are national, 
regional, and international policy-assessment 
and -making initiatives on investment screening, 
with governments and other stakeholders examining 
and updating policies on whether and how to review 
inward and outward flows of capital; there are domestic 
reviews of IIA policies and practices, including efforts by 
legislatures/parliamentarians and others to investigate 
the aims and performance of those treaties; and there 
are corresponding discussions on IIA policy and reform 
taking place at United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), albeit with varying levels of 
formality, breadth, and inclusivity. With respect to policy-
formulation, as discussed below, these international 
organizations’ mandates are broad and there is high 
potential for any additional Assistance Mechanism to 
duplicate efforts or create other tensions with existing 
mandates.
It is important to recognize the multidimensional aspects 
of and interlinkages among these fora and issues, and 
the difficulties government officials and other actors 
may consequently encounter both in staying abreast of 
the developments that do or may affect them, and in 
ensuring policy coherence across relevant issue areas. 
The complications are substantive as well as logistical. 
Relevant discussions are taking place across issue areas 
and fora, meaning that they are not being exclusively 
handled by officials in government capitals, or permanent 
delegations sitting in one place, such as New York or 
Geneva. Governments with limited resources to staff 
investment policy teams and to travel to conferences, 
meetings, and negotiations may struggle to follow and 
engage in the relevant dialogues and processes, much 
less find the time and resources to proactively develop 
positions with other government officials, agencies, and 
stakeholders at home, and then articulate and advance 
(or defend) their country’s interests, concerns and 
priorities at the international level. 
The resources, knowledge, and skills required for 
these policy formulation and articulation activities are 
essential ingredients for the other activities discussed 
throughout this Scoping Study including IIA negotiation 
and ISDS defense. While there are various initiatives 
to support countries in these activities – reviewing, 
assessing, and developing investment policies – there 
are limitations and gaps. Content, for instance, may fail 
to reflect the diversity of perspectives on investment 
policy, options for policy-makers, or implications for 
different issues and actors. Additionally, support may 
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target some actors within government (e.g., treaty 
negotiators), but not reach others (e.g., civil society, 
parliamentarians, state and local officials, officials 
responsible for other relevant areas of domestic law 
and policy) with a stake in the content of investment 
(and IIA) policy, and whose understanding, buy-in, 
and acceptance of policy decisions may be crucial 
for ultimate policy effectiveness. Moreover, even if 
legal or other financial assistance is available, some 
governments have turned down offers of policy-
making support because of perceived conflicts of 
interests on the part of the service provider (i.e. that 
the advice would not necessarily be in the state’s best 
interest) or divergences in ideology between the state 
and service provider as to the role that investment 
policy-making should play in advancing the state’s 
development objectives.28
Some of the gaps in resources, knowledge and skills are 
partially filled by materials that academics and others 
have produced. Research and writing on investment 
law and policy has ballooned over roughly the last 15 
years in particular. But much of that remains behind 
paywalls,29 and much is produced only in English. 
Non-English-language sources are also infrequently 
translated, making it difficult to share resources, 
knowledge, and insights across language barriers. 
The subsection below profiles the major existing 
investment policy-making initiatives and publicly 
available resources identified through this Scoping 
Study that are most relevant to IIAs and ISDS.
2.2.1.1 Existing investment policy-making 
initiatives 
2.2.1.1.1 UNCTAD 
UNCTAD is an intergovernmental organization with 
key mandates related to investment policy-making. 
For example, the UN Financing for Development 
Conference has requested UNCTAD to continue its 
program of meetings and consultations with Member 
States related to investment agreements, and the 
UNCTAD 14 Conference (July 2016) mandated 
UNCTAD to develop and promote a new generation 
of investment promotion and facilitation strategies, 
institutions, and best-practice policies to align 
investment with inclusive and sustainable development 
objectives.30
UNCTAD’s work is based on three activity pillars: 
research and analysis, international consensus building, 
and technical assistance and advisory services. These 
services are discussed in greater depth here and in 
other sections of this Scoping Study.
UNCTAD has comprehensive resources available to 
all states with respect to investment law policymaking. 
UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development, launched in 2012 provides 
guidance for investment law policymakers moving 
toward a new generation of international investment 
agreements.31 
The Investment Policy Framework consists of Core 
Principles that frame three different action menus 
focused on: national investment policies, international 
investment agreements, and investment promotion 
for sustainable development.32  These Core Principles 
set forth a set of “design criteria” that can assist 
states in integrating investment policy into overall 
sustainable development strategies.33 The National 
Investment Policy Guidelines then translate the Core 
Principles into concrete guidelines applicable at the 
national level in order to ensure that investment policy 
is coherently integrated into other policy areas.34 
Finally, the Policy Options for IIAs translate the Core 
Principles into concrete options for those international 
instruments.35
Based on the Investment Policy Framework, UNCTAD 
provides on-demand reviews of a country’s model 
investment treaties and IIA network. Since 2012, 
seventy-five countries and regional economic 
organizations have benefitted from such reviews.36 
UNCTAD has also provided comments or inputs into 
the development of regional investment treaties, such 
as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement’s 
investment protocol and the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa Investment Area. 
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UNCTAD also has an Investment Policy Review (IPR) 
program that provides developing countries and 
countries with economies in transition concrete 
recommendations to improve policies, strategies 
and institutions for attracting and benefiting from 
FDI.37 The IPR process is country-specific and 
involves:
1. The review of the policy, regulatory and 
institutional environment for investment; 
2. The identification of strategic investment 
priorities consistent with the SDGs and in line 
with national development objectives; and 
3. A set of concrete recommendations.38
UNCTAD offers follow-up support with respect to 
implementing its recommendations.39 In the past 20 
years, UNCTAD has conducted IPRs in more than 
fifty countries.40
UNCTAD also supports policy engagement, 
dialogue, and knowledge sharing at its World 
Investment Forum, conferences, and other 
intergovernmental meetings,41 as well as in trainings 
it organizes and attends. As part of its technical 
assistance activities, UNCTAD has built on its policy 
research and analysis and has trained approximately 
500 government officials on key IIA and ISDS issues 
(mostly as a part of regional training courses).
UNCTAD makes publicly available a wealth of 
information on international investment law, 
including UNCTAD’s own work and analysis as 
well as publicly available investment laws, treaties, 
awards, and other related materials, through its 
Investment Policy Hub, which is described further in 
Section 4.2.1.42
Key to UNCTAD’s success is its unique ability to 
reinforce its work through its three interdependent 
pillars of research and analysis, technical assistance, 
and intergovernmental consensus building. 
Through expert meetings, workshops and regional 
conferences (all with capacity building elements), 
training materials, advisory services, and providing 
access to databases, best-practices, and online 
fora (e.g. blogs) UNCTAD has been successful in 
improving the institutional capacity of beneficiary 
countries, technical capacity of officials, and in 
raising the role that international investment can take 
in pursuit of the SDGs.43 Beneficiaries of UNCTAD’s 
support report high satisfaction rates, but acknowledge 
that for ensuring the sustainability of project activities, 
challenges lie in the level of institutional capacity, which is 
largely the responsibility of national governments.44 The 
sustainability of UNCTAD’s project results is impacted 
by the institutional capacity of the applicable country.45
Country beneficiaries of UNCTAD’s support have stated 
satisfaction with the UNCTAD policy-option menu 
and for the comprehensive guidance on investment 
policymaking for sustainable development.46
2.2.1.1.2 OECD 
Under the direction of its Investment Committee, 
the OECD advances investment policy reform and 
international co-operation in a number of ways with 
the unifying aim of improving the contribution of 
international investment to growth and sustainable 
development worldwide.
The OECD’s Policy Framework for Investment (PFI) forms 
the basis for national Investment Policy Reviews (IPRs).47 
IPRs reflect the OECD’s mission to help governments 
enhance their investment climate through peer learning 
and sharing best practices. Some IPRs are undertaken as 
a part of the adherence process to the OECD Declaration 
on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises.48 In other cases, non-member countries, 
including major emerging economies, undertake IPRs to 
benchmark their investment policy against OECD best 
practices. While it is possible for a country to undertake 
its own self-assessment based on the PFI, in practice the 
assessment is typically conducted by an inter-ministerial 
task force in coordination with the OECD.49 Completed 
IPRs involving around fifty countries are available on 
the OECD’s website.50 The OECD’s IPR unit is currently 
working on IPR projects with Egypt, Myanmar, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Georgia, Morocco, Uruguay and Bulgaria.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 21
SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY
The OECD’s PFI looks at twelve different domestic 
policy areas that have a particular impact on 
investment (including with respect to investment 
treaties): investment policy, investment promotion and 
facilitation, competition, trade, taxation, corporate 
governance, finance, infrastructure, developing human 
resources, policies to promote responsible business 
conduct, investment in support of green growth, 
and public governance.51 The PFI is structured as a 
checklist setting out key elements in each policy area 
permitting policy strands to be considered together in 
order to ensure policy coherence.52 
The PFI has been used for capacity building and 
private sector development strategies by bilateral and 
multilateral donors.53 It has also been used as a basis for 
dialogue at a regional level for countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, Southeast 
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.54 OECD 
regional programs on investment involve strategic 
partnerships between OECD-member and non-
member governments to share knowledge, expertise 
and good practices with the aim of contributing to the 
development of inclusive, sustainable and competitive 
economies across the regions involved.55
The OECD Investment Committee also hosts 
the Freedom of Investment (FOI) Roundtable, an 
intergovernmental forum that brings together sixty-
two economies from around the world together with 
representatives from the private sector, civil society 
and other stakeholders, to support countries’ efforts 
to maintain and extend open, transparent and non-
discriminatory policy frameworks for international 
investment. Through analysis and regular multilateral 
dialogue, the Roundtable promotes the sharing 
of experiences with investment policy design and 
implementation. It also helps countries to address 
policy concerns that international investment may 
raise. Policy monitoring by Roundtable participants 
promotes observance of countries’ international 
investment policy commitments, including those 
taken under the OECD investment instruments and 
in the context of the G20. The OECD Secretariat 
also produces extensive, technical research support 
and analysis for the FOI Roundtable – primarily on 
investment treaties and investment policies related to 
national security –  which is made publicly-available 
on a dedicated webpage together with summaries 
of discussion from meetings of the FOI Roundtable.56 
Recent FOI Roundtable discussions have focused on 
the balance of investor protection and governments’ 
right to regulate in investment treaties; arbitrators, 
adjudicators and appointing authorities; and the 
societal benefits and costs of investment treaties.
The OECD’s Investment Committee and its subsidiary 
bodies also provide fora for policy dialogue and 
analysis on a wide range of other topics related to 
investment policy, including responsible business 
conduct, green finance, investment promotion and 
facilitation, linkages between trade and investment, 
infrastructure investment, MNE divestment decisions, 
sustainable development indicators, and FDI statistics. 
The OECD Secretariat publishes all of its analytical 
work on investment policy on a dedicated webpage.57
2.2.1.1.3 World Bank Group 
The World Bank Group’s (WBG) Investment Policy 
& Promotion Team (part of the Investment Climate 
Practice Group under the Trade and Competitiveness 
Global Practice), supports client countries in attracting, 
facilitating, and retaining different types of FDI, as well 
as maximizing positive spillover effects.58 The WBG 
provides direct technical assistance to governments 
in developing an FDI strategy and reform map, 
improving the effectiveness of policies and efforts 
aimed at attracting and facilitating FDI, promoting 
good practices and improving the effectiveness of 
investment incentives, and promoting a legal and 
regulatory environment that reduces investment 
risk, including by focusing on reducing investor risk 
through IIAs and national investment laws.59 The 
World Bank also helps countries to establish dispute 
prevention policies and practices (discussed further in 
Section 2.3.3).60 
The WBG’s work on investment law forms a part of 
its broader approach of “Maximizing Finance for 
Development.”61 Pursuant to this initiative, WBG 
institutions including the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development,62 the International 
Development Association,63 the International Finance 
Corporation,64 and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency,65 work in concert to achieve the 
development objectives by improving the investment 
enabling environment, developing regulatory 
conditions, building domestic capacity, putting in 
place standards related to investment, financing initial 
investments (a first mover or innovator), and reducing 
risk.66 This represents a shift toward a much more 
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coordinated approach to the public and private 
sides of development, using four WBG institutions 
to consider a broader spectrum of solutions, 
consider public and private opportunities and risks, 
and facilitate financing opportunities.67 
2.2.1.1.4 Ad hoc Investment law trainings, 
workshops, and dialogues
While a multitude of trainings on investment 
law aimed at boosting technical knowledge and 
understanding are available to government officials, 
several of these trainings focus more specifically 
on investment law policymaking. Initiatives in this 
category include (among others): 
• International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) Annual Forum of 
Investment Negotiators68
• Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
(CCSI) Executive Training on Investment 
Treaties and Arbitration for Government 
Officials69
• Trainings held around and focused on specific 
treaty or policy negotiations
• UNCTAD’s various training workshops and 
other events focused on technical knowledge 
(see Section 4.2.1)
• OECD events, including Freedom of Investment 
(FOI) Roundtables, annual conferences on 
investment treaties and investment policies 
related to national security, Investment Treaty 
Dialogues and other events.70
2.2.1.1.5 Other ad hoc technical assistance 
Some technical ad hoc investment policy-making 
assistance provided directly or indirectly by several 
non-profit organizations is available to states at a 
no or low-cost basis. Certain organizations, such as 
the International Development Law Organization’s 
Investment Support Program for Least Developed 
Countries71 (described further in Section 4.2.3), and 
TradeLab72 (described further in Section 4.6.2) are 
available to address discrete or general policy issues 
or questions upon request by states or other parties 
or stakeholders by matching appropriate support 
providers with the requesting beneficiary. Other non-
profit and/or academic organizations, such as CCSI 
and IISD, among others, provide this kind of specific 
technical assistance directly to requesting governments. 
Unless a government is able to finance the time and 
expense of the non-profit service providers, these 
organizations require a sufficient level of outside grant 
funding. Even if the services provided are limited to 
matching governments with law firms or other service 
providers, funding is needed for staff and overhead 
necessary to perform those tasks.
2.2.2. IIA negotiation
Activities related to formulation of investment law 
and policy are a broad category and overlap with IIA 
negotiation activities. But negotiation activities represent 
a discrete subset imposing particular and often time-
sensitive demands on governments. Negotiation needs 
often involve translating policy objectives into specific 
language or reacting to specific language proposed 
by a negotiating counterparty. Adequate internal 
government policies and procedures must be in place 
to ensure a coherent and effective approach to these 
activities. 
Desk research and consultations conducted for this 
Scoping Study demonstrate that “capacity” in the 
context of treaty negotiation is multifaceted and hints at 
both gaps in ability to identify and articulate concerns, 
organizational hurdles to doing so, and systemic 
obstacles to overcome to ensure policy priorities are 
reflected in treaty outcomes. 
While narrow, in-house technical capacity is deemed 
insufficient to address all of these issues, it is nonetheless 
considered to be an important objective. A certain level 
of in-house capacity was deemed important because 
it was recognized by interviewees that in many cases 
negotiation assistance is not neutral assistance, but 
rather comes from the perspective of the assisting party 
(and its interests) and not necessarily the interests of the 
negotiating state. Treaty negotiation support offered 
by private sector law firms was specifically identified as 
cause for hesitation, although international organizations 
were also highlighted as having their own mandate that 
does not necessarily mirror the interests of the state. 
One interviewee who was involved in establishing an 
existing Assistance Mechanism stated bluntly “I will 
say this: firms are terrible at giving advice on treaties. 
Generally speaking, they are private litigants and that is 
a really big risk you run.”73 Another noted an automatic 
tendency of both private-sector as well as international 
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organization advisors to include standard arbitration 
provisions in treaties without considering the state’s 
broader investment policy interests or priorities.74 
Government officials interviewed for this Scoping 
Study who noted these issues stated that it was one 
distinct cause of concern when support is offered (or 
provided) that is not (or not perceived as) “neutral” 
or in the state’s interest, but that the mere availability 
of this kind of support can also cause separate but 
related concerns. It was stated that an official making 
the decision to turn down outside assistance (for this 
or other reasons) must then be personally accountable 
domestically for that decision, and all of its implications, 
and “many officials will not take that risk” and will 
accept assistance offered even if it is not perceived 
to be in the state’s best interest.75 These dynamics are 
important when considering where and from whom 
external assistance is offered, and it is thus important 
that potential users of an Assistance Mechanism 
manage decision-making over the structuring and 
placement of an Assistance Mechanism.76
However, it was stressed that even when advisors may 
have conflicts of interest, it cannot be assumed that 
the advice given will not be in the state’s interest, 
and more importantly, in many negotiations highly 
technical and skilled legal and/or policy advisors can 
be extremely valuable to the state and its decision-
making process. Therefore, at a basic level, it was 
expressed in consultations there must be a minimum 
level of technical capacity within the government to 
be able to evaluate the advice and determine whether 
it is in the interest of the state, and accept, reject, and/
or use it accordingly.77  
Some existing Assistance Mechanism models 
specifically focus on treaty negotiation support for 
government officials. These initiatives (which, as 
discussed below, are only available to a limited extent in 
the investment treaty context) include timely assistance 
to negotiators with legal and policy questions about 
issues under negotiation; and supporting negotiators’ 
travel to and attendance at negotiations.  
Other initiatives that in some cases extend support 
beyond treaty negotiators are also viewed as important 
for helping ensure that negotiators (and other officials) 
are able to effectively identify, and make the case to 
negotiating counterparties, what the country’s needs 
and priorities are, what is, and is not, negotiable, 
and what needs to be specially addressed through 
non-conforming measures provisions, annexes, and 
exceptions. 
While at least one high-income government official 
interviewed felt that existing Assistance Mechanisms 
provide sufficient investment law negotiation support 
for developing countries,78 this sentiment was not 
echoed among low and middle-income government 
officials. For example, one official from a lower middle-
income economy that does not have well-developed 
and consistent approach to investment policy, 
and which has not developed a model investment 
agreement, stated that the country’s negotiators 
“accept most of what the negotiation counterparty 
brings to the table.”79 One interviewee noted “copy 
and pasted sections” from one treaty to another.80 One 
interviewee with experience working at an arbitration 
center, noting that treaty negotiation support can 
greatly impact ISDS dispute outcomes, commented 
on certain very poorly drafted treaties that have and 
can lead to confusion among policy-makers and can 
exacerbate issues surrounding disputes.81
Relevant IIA-negotiation-related activities for an 
Assistance Mechanism may include support for 
analysis of potential social, environmental, and 
economic impacts of particular agreements under 
negotiation; and support for intra-governmental and 
multi-stakeholder consultation and engagement 
on negotiating objectives and priorities (which 
can also be crucial for subsequent ratification and 
implementation of agreed texts). For example, one 
upper middle-income government official said that 
its country’s negotiators struggle with finding the 
adequate balance of protection of foreign investors 
and ensuring that local companies retain comparable 
rights, because it is difficult to anticipate, and analyze, 
treaty impacts on domestic SMEs.82
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Similarly, in addition to understanding and 
communicating the country’s needs and priorities 
at the required level of detail during the course of 
negotiations, it may be important for negotiators 
to have support in development of negotiation 
strategies and tactics and forming alliances. 
Performing well in all of these areas may be difficult 
for many states. One reason may be that treaty 
negotiation is not necessarily the primary focus of 
certain officials’ jobs, or they transition between 
subject areas and are unable to gain sufficient 
expertise in the specifics of investment law.83 
Another is that ultimate decision-makers may agree 
to or sign an agreement containing provisions with 
which treaty negotiators disagree or do not support, 
particularly when a political decision has been taken 
to sign a particular IIA.84 
Broader structural concerns were also identified 
during interviews. For example, one official from 
a lower middle-income state felt that technical 
capacity at the negotiating table can be critical 
in negotiations and lead to successes in certain 
discrete areas.85 However, in instances in which the 
negotiating power of the parties is significantly 
disproportionate (e.g. negotiations between 
primarily capital exporting/importing states), this 
and several other government officials agreed that 
regardless of technical negotiating capacity on the 
part of specific officials, at the end of the day, politics 
and power-dynamics will prevail.86 Higher income 
economies may simply be unwilling to move from 
a certain position, even with respect to issues the 
lower-income economy has identified as a particular 
concern, and even when that country is negotiating 
from a technically skilled capacity.87 While all countries 
likely have certain non-negotiable positions, there 
was concern among some interviewees that some 
states become particularly rigid when broader 
power (im)balances are factored in.
Looking broader still, VanDuzer has identified 
systemic barriers that may prevent developing 
countries from adopting new and better approaches 
to IIAs that go well beyond the negotiating table.88 
Noting that unlike in trade negotiations, where there 
may be a more balanced give and take because 
developed countries also need to compromise, the 
objective of a developed country in an IIA negotiation 
may be much simpler – maintain a model as close to 
the developed country’s as possible.89 While certain 
low or middle income countries may be able to maintain 
stronger adherence to their own models, or certain 
elements within their models, many low and middle 
income economies are not similarly situated. Evidence 
of this effect may be gleaned from the continued 
dominance of developed-country treaty models, which 
tend to incorporate developing country interests only 
when the developed country revises its own model in 
a host-friendly way.90 To the extent resources exist to 
help developing countries identify and articulate their 
interests, these resources may be insufficient to address 
these systemic hurdles.91 Moreover the inability of 
developing countries to achieve successful negotiation 
of their models has systemic effects as it perpetuates the 
pervasive fragmentation and patchwork of obligations 
that characterize developing country treaties and may 
make compliance more difficult.92 
An example of these issues is potentially reflected in 
the variation in how different countries are identifying, 
articulating, and protecting existing and future non-
conforming measures in their treaties, with developed 
countries in a number of treaties carving out more from 
these types of treaty obligations than their developing 
country counterparties. Table 1 shows outcomes from 
the bilateral investment treaties that Canada has signed 
with countries over roughly the past five years (from 
1 January 2014 - 1 January 2019). Table 1 indicates 
the number of reservations that Canada and its treaty 
parties each included in their respective annexes to 
shield certain sectors and policy areas from restrictions 
on pre- and post-establishment national treatment 
obligations, restrictions on performance requirements, 
and/or restrictions on requirements relating to boards of 
directors, senior management, and entry of personnel. 
These disparate practices may be due to any of a number 
of factors, including disparities in negotiating parties’ 
respective mandates from other domestic actors; 
abilities to identify the issues and sectors for which it is 
useful to retain policy space; understanding of whether/
when a carve-out is necessary to retain that policy space; 
and/or other capacity to achieve a successful negotiated 
outcome. 
This example also demonstrates that the texts of treaties 
themselves may impose asymmetrical obligations, 
which has implications for: the costs and benefits that 
each treaty party will experience from the treaty, the 
nature and flow of costs and benefits that accrue to each 
treaty party from the concluded agreements, and treaty 
parties’ exposure to and ability to manage exposure 
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to ISDS cases.93 However, even in instances where 
the language of a treaty formally imposes identical 
obligations on each treaty party, the (nearly or 
completely) unidirectional flow of investment between 
the parties may mean that the commitments are not of 
equal practical significance for the states.94 
The challenges in closing power and capacity gaps 
in the negotiation context is likely exacerbated by 
the relatively decentralized nature of international 
investment law. In contrast to other negotiations, such 
as negotiations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, and under the World 
Trade Organization, there is no central hub of activity 
or Secretariat. Instead, separate bilateral, plurilateral, 
and multilateral (e.g., the Energy Charter Treaty and 
other negotiations between overlapping states) 
negotiations on IIAs, which may be stand-alone 
agreements or chapters in larger trade agreements, 
can proceed in parallel. Without attention to this 
aspect of investment law it may be difficult for an 
Assistance Mechanism to help states close capacity 
gaps related to negotiations. The decentralized 
nature of investment law also makes it challenging 
to document and map the existing support providers 
and efforts directed at supporting investment treaty 
negotiation in particular. 
Section 2.2.2.1 below offers some examples of relevant 
initiatives pertaining to investment treaty negotiation. 
The text boxes also provide some illustrations of 
support for negotiators in other processes that could 
be useful to consider in the context of IIA negotiations 
(Box 1, Box 2, Box 3). Then, Section 4.2.1 provides 
more detailed information on another institution, the 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), that provides 
negotiation support in the WTO context. 
Table 1 Reservations Protecting Non-Conforming Measures in Sectors & Policy Areas
Canada – reservations for 
existing and future non-
conforming measures 
in specified sectors and 
policy areas
Negotiating party – 
reservations for existing 
and future non-conforming 
measures in specified 
sectors and policy areas
Date of signature
Canada - 9 Moldova - 1 12 June 2018
Canada – 9 Mongolia – 6 8 September 2016
Canada – 9 Hong Kong, China SAR - 4 10 February 2016
Canada – 9 Guinea – 0 27 May 2015 
Canada – 9 Benin – 4 12 May 2014
Canada - 9 Burkina Faso - 8 20 April 2015 
Canada - 9 Côte ‘d’Ivoire – 5 30 November 2014
Canada - 9 Mali - 4 28 November 2014
Canada – 9 Senegal – 0 27 November 2014
Canada - 9 Serbia - 4 1 September 2014
Canada - 9 Nigeria – 7 6 May 2014
Canada – 9 Cameroon - 7 3 March 2014
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2.2.2.1 Existing and past investment law 
treaty negotiation initiatives
Several existing and past initiatives provide or 
have provided technical support surrounding 
negotiations, whereas others provide or have 
provided financial support to allow negotiators to 
travel to relevant conferences and negotiations.
One lower middle-income government official said 
that in accepting financial support, particularly in 
the context of negotiations, conflicts of interest can 
easily arise, and that as a government it is important 
to accept that you cannot attend without the 
assistance, but remain intellectually divorced from 
the support provider and ensure that negotiations 
proceed with only the best interests of the state in 
mind.95
2.2.2.1.1 UNCTAD facilitation rounds 
In the late 1990s through mid-2000s, UNCTAD organized 
“facilitation rounds” to support negotiation of IIAs.96 
These facilitation rounds brought country officials 
together to sign agreements. UNCTAD promoted 
the process by bearing the costs of travel, full board, 
and lodging for developing country officials as well 
as organizing the necessary facilities and substantive 
support. The process began in 1999, when UNCTAD 
organized a negotiation round after G-15 governments 
had encouraged UNCTAD to help them conclude BITs 
to ‘further promote economic cooperation and FDI’. 
The round was sponsored by the Swiss government and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Since around 2012, with the launch of UNCTAD’s 
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development, UNCTAD has focused its research, 
policy analysis, and technical assistance on activities 
that make the IIA regime more sustainable and 
development friendly. While providing policy options 
for treaty elements, UNCTAD draws attention to the 
strategic decisions policy-makers need to make when 
designing a “new generation” of investment policies, 
such as embedding investment policies into national 
development strategies, considering the pros and cons 
of signing IIAs, and options for terminating treaties that 
are no longer serving development objectives.
UNCTAD provides technical assistance in the form of 
model treaty and IIA reviews for states as well as for 
regional economic integration organizations.97
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Box 1 Government-funded, think-tank/civil 
society/academically delivered, support for 
climate negotiators
The European Capacity Building Initiative (ecbi), launched 
in 2005, aims to support the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations by building 
and sustaining capacity among developing country 
negotiators, and by fostering trust and understanding 
between industrialized and developing countries. 
The ecbi has three main areas of work. One is a Training 
and Support Programme (TSP), which is led by the 
International Institute for Environment and Development. 
The TSP has three main elements: “capacity building of 
junior negotiators to the UNFCCC through regional and 
pre-Conference of the Parties (COP) training workshops; 
capacity provision to the Group of Least Developed 
Countries (LDC Group); and bursaries for negotiators from 
LDCs, to ensure their continued participation and capacity 
development in UNFCCC processes.” 
The second area of work is an annual week-long trust-
building initiative, the Oxford Seminar & Fellows 
Colloquium. The first half of the week brings senior 
developing country negotiators together to discuss 
controversial and timely issues in preparation for annual 
COP negotiations. During the second half of the week, 
European negotiators join for the Oxford Seminar, where 
all officials have the opportunity to exchange views on key 
negotiation topics in an informal setting. 
The third area of work is a Publications and Policy Analysis 
Unit (PPAU), which produces papers aimed to be “relevant 
to ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC, timely, and 
trustworthy.” PPAU collaborates with developing country 
officials to identify relevant topics and to produce the 
publications. PPAU also produces background papers and 
guides geared to help more junior negotiators become 
familiar with the process and issues.754 
Box 2 Government-funded, WTO administered, 
support for broader LDC participation in 
fisheries negotiations
On 3 May 2019, WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo 
announced the establishment of a new trust fund 
designed to enable capital-based delegations from LDCs 
to attend and participate in WTO negotiations on fisheries 
subsides.755 
Box 3 CONNEX Support Unit – government 
funded, government/private-sector supported, 
support on investor-state contract negotiations
The CONNEX Support Unit756 assists developing 
countries and economies in transition in the preparation 
and implementation of (re)negotiations of large-scale 
investment contracts with foreign investors. It provides 
requesting governments with “rapid, independent, high-
quality and multidisciplinary support.” CONNEX support 
is meant to establish a level playing field, which results 
in mutually beneficial deals and a durable Government-
investor relationship. 
The CONNEX mandate to directly support negotiations 
reflects the articulated need and demand of beneficiary 
countries for assistance in negotiating contracts for large-
scale, complex projects (such as those in the extractive 
sector) to overcome existing asymmetries in access to 
information, resources, and experience. 
CONNEX exclusively advises governmental actors involved 
in (re)negotiations. The international and regional experts 
identified by the CONNEX Support Unit are bound by the 
CONNEX Code of Conduct to ensure their integrity and 
commit them to confidentiality. 
CONNEX has a strong focus on economic development 
objectives, in particular domestic revenue generation, 
and further promotes social and environmental 
development. It is continually monitoring and evaluating 
the developmental impact of its work, to ensure the 
satisfaction of the beneficiary governments. 
Germany is the founding and first member of the 
CONNEX Governing Board, the main governing body 
of the CONNEX Support Unit. Germany also hosts the 
Secretariat of the CONNEX Support Unit. The Governance 
Structure is complemented by an Advisory Committee, 
comprised of nine highly experienced individuals with 
different backgrounds, who provide strategic advice to 
the Secretariat and the Governing Board. The German 
government currently funds CONNEX but additional 
funding partners are expected to join soon.757 
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2.2.2.1.2 UNCITRAL Working Group III
In the context of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III on 
ISDS reform, which is not a specific treaty negotiation 
but may result in outcomes that substantively impact 
existing and future treaties and, in particular, the 
ISDS mechanism contained therein, the UNCITRAL 
Trust Fund is available for certain countries for travel 
and accommodation to and during Working Group 
III Sessions. 
Also related to the Working Group III process, CCSI, 
in collaboration with the UNCITRAL Secretariat 
and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) convened preparatory 
sessions in the days preceding the 36th, 37th and 
38th Sessions that were intended to (1) orient new 
delegates to the UNCITRAL process and update 
them on the previous WGIII and Commission 
sessions; and (2) enable delegates to effectively 
participate in the forthcoming Session.
2.2.2.1.3 Similar ad hoc support
One academic interviewed provides certain 
governments with specific, on-call support during 
certain ongoing negotiations. The International 
Institute for Sustainable Development also offers this 
kind of “hotline” support during certain negotiations. 
Other service providers that respond to government 
requests on a broad range of investment-related 
topics, such as IISD, IDLO, TradeLab, and several 
other international organizations, academic or 
private sector providers may similarly be available 
for ad hoc trainings, research or support with respect 
to specific negotiations.
2.2.3 Domestic implementation of IIA 
obligations
After an IIA is concluded, countries may encounter 
challenging and resource-intensive tasks in 
understanding the scope and nature of their 
obligations under those agreements, and in ensuring 
optimal and effective domestic implementation. 
These tasks also may be becoming increasingly 
demanding over time as states face a more complex 
web of treaty obligations.98 For developing states, 
this web can be particularly complicated due to the 
fact that the substantive elements of their treaties 
may be varied or inconsistent, whether due to the 
state not having a model provision, not effectively 
negotiating to remain consistent with its model, or for 
other reasons.99 In many cases, states may have a set 
of overlapping but inconsistent obligations vis-à-vis a 
single treaty-partner.
A number of state interviewees indicated interest 
in further understanding and exploring policies and 
practices for treaty implementation and dispute 
prevention (discussed below in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.3). 
The discussion below considers some of the issues 
that arise in the context of implementation and efforts 
undertaken to understand and address these issues. 
2.2.3.1 Compliance with core, post-establishment 
investment protection standards
Most IIAs in force contain a set of core provisions on 
direct and indirect expropriation, fair and equitable 
treatment (FET), post-establishment non-discrimination, 
and requirements regarding free transfers of capital. 
One broad strategy for minimizing or avoiding costs of 
ISDS disputes is for governments to take ex ante steps to 
prevent investor complaints that these treaty obligations 
have been breached. Such dispute prevention activities, 
however, are difficult to implement for a number of 
reasons.
For one, as is widely and often stated, these standards 
are usually vaguely worded, and have been subject to 
varied and even conflicting interpretations. The inchoate 
nature of the obligations and uncertainty regarding their 
meaning in practice can make it difficult for governments 
to know what conduct could trigger a claim, and what 
might result in liability. Moreover, cross-ministerial 
guidance or instructions to relevant officials/agencies/
branches to ensure that such persons and entities 
carefully follow relevant domestic law and procedure 
may be of little use, as compliance with domestic law 
is generally not a defense to an international law claim.
Additionally, assuming that one could identify factors: 
• beyond compliance with domestic law and 
• within the control of government actors 
that make claims and/or liability more or less likely, the 
breadth and depth of IIA coverage makes it difficult if 
not impossible to actually communicate those factors 
to the range of government actors whose conduct 
could trigger claims. The obligations contained in 
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IIAs generally govern all government actors, from 
local to national levels, from low- to senior-levels, 
and across all branches of government. IIAs also 
can cover the conduct of other actors such as state-
owned enterprises. Further, IIA obligations generally 
apply in all sectors of economic activity, and to all 
areas of government law and policy.100 High levels 
of bureaucratic and organizational capacity may be 
required to effectively implement cross-ministerial 
and cross-jurisdictional investment law sensitivity, 
a challenging task even in high-income economies 
with highly rated bureaucratic processes.101 Further, 
ad hoc training of specific officials may be ineffective 
or inefficient in contexts in which turnover of officials 
is high and institutions are not able to capture and 
internalize learning over time. 
In light of these factors the task of communicating 
IIA-compliance lessons across any given state may be 
daunting and extremely costly. This is likely especially 
difficult for decentralized states where local and state/
provincial jurisdictions have relatively significant 
governance authority. And given the challenges in 
stating with adequate precision what investment law 
requires, such nationwide training and awareness 
raising may not even provide domestic actors sufficient 
guidance to avoid triggering claims.102 
Moreover, even if dispute prevention policies and 
practices resulted in no formal ISDS claims, that does 
not necessarily mean that they should be judged a 
success. When claims arise out of the decisions of 
domestic courts, advance guidance may, in certain 
circumstances, raise greater concerns about judicial 
independence. Similarly, it is important to ensure that 
any IIA-compliance and awareness raising activities do 
not cause government actors to be unduly cautious 
toward or solicitous of private sector interests and 
demands due to fears that an otherwise lawful action 
may trigger a claim from a covered foreign investor 
somewhere in the corporate chain of an affected 
investment.103 Cautionary education regarding IIA-
mandates may exacerbate incidences of undue 
regulatory chill, and could distort government policy 
and practice in favor of certain economic interests to 
the detriment of other economic and non-economic 
interests.104 Thus, care must be taken not only to ensure 
that dispute prevention policies and practices warrant 
the resources they use, but also that they send the 
“appropriate” messages – a term that may be difficult 
to define – regarding the constraints imposed by IIAs.
There is a growing body of research looking at 
these issues, such as the depth and impact of IIA-
internalization in different jurisdictions.105 There are 
also opportunities to learn from prior and existing 
initiatives to support states in understanding and 
implementing their IIA obligations. 
2.2.3.2 Compliance with liberalization 
provisions and other elements of modern IIAs
Modern investment treaties often contain obligations 
not found in older-generation treaties. Liberalization 
commitments, including commitments on pre-
establishment national and most-favored nation 
treatment, and restrictions on performance 
requirements, are increasingly common. These types 
of provisions raise somewhat distinct challenges for 
implementation from those “core” obligations noted 
above. 
Various questions arise regarding the meaning and 
practical implications of these newer provisions.106 
Liberalization commitments adopted in a treaty 
may have immediate effects on and consequences 
for a range of policy areas including government 
procurement, government incentives schemes, socio-
economic development programs, land ownership 
rules, and public benefit schemes.107 Treaty parties 
and their domestic constituents must understand 
what compliance with these obligations means, 
and what policy space remains due to negotiated 
flexibilities, exceptions, and carve-outs. Government 
officials interviewed for this scoping study noted a 
lack of capacity in coordinating across ministries and 
beyond, and a lack of ex ante analysis, understanding 
and internalization of impacts of these kinds of IIA 
provisions.
States also identified intra-state organizational 
capacity challenges that prevent them from effectively 
advancing a coherent policy on specific elements 
of IIAs, noting, for example, that treaty negotiators 
and officials managing disputes do not effectively 
communicate and learn from one another, thus 
minimizing even the ability of the state to effectively 
internalize and implement its own experience and 
learning.108
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2.2.3.3 Existing initiatives 
Many of the initiatives discussed under Section 
2.2.1 (Investment policy-making and 4.7.5 (Efforts 
to democratize the law) are also relevant to these 
issues of internal implementation. Some additional 
relevant work is noted below. 
2.2.3.3.1 UNCTAD – Work on Treaty 
Implementation and Dispute Prevention
UNCTAD has worked with governments and other 
stakeholders relating to treaty implementation 
and associated dispute prevention policies and 
practices.109 It has researched and documented 
government initiatives, facilitated the sharing 
of experiences and exchange of knowledge, 
and deepened understanding of challenges 
and opportunities for governments seeking to 
understand and internalize treaty obligations. 
More broadly, its “pink series” on particular treaty 
provisions, and other publications on ISDS outcomes 
have contributed to helping states understand the 
practical implications of IIA obligations.110 
UNCTAD’s annual review of ISDS decisions 
summarizes tribunals’ (at times inconsistent findings 
on core issues in international investment agreement 
provisions (e.g. on legitimate expectations under the 
fair and equitable treatment standard, or reliance on 
the most-favored nations clause to expand tribunals’ 
jurisdiction).111
2.2.3.3.2 Ad Hoc initiatives
Certain Assistance Mechanisms, such as TradeLab, 
provide tailored research to respond to specific 
questions and circumstances of requesting 
governments and other parties.112 Analysis on 
specific topics is typically context specific and 
nuanced with respect to any state, and indeed, sub-
sections and demographics within states. Analysis 
conducted by TradeLab involves economic, legal, 
and other expertise. 
Other relevant work includes a 2019 Handbook 
on Obligations in International Investment 
Treaties, produced for the Australian Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, written by 
Jansen Calamita and published by the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC. 
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2.2.4 Ongoing engagement and treaty 
management
When states conclude IIAs, that is not the end of their 
law- or policy-making work, or their engagement with 
treaty parties and domestic constituents on the contents 
and implications of the agreements. Rather, there is 
much that can and should go on post-signature and 
ratification.
Crucially, states have a continuing role as “masters of 
their treaties” to guide interpretation of their IIAs. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) makes 
clear that states’ post-treaty-conclusion activities have an 
important role to play in continuing to clarify and shape 
the meaning of those international agreements. The VCLT 
expressly directs tribunals to take into account states’ 
subsequent practice and agreement in interpretation 
and application of treaty texts;113 and there is much that 
states can do, even unilaterally, to evidence their practice 
and seek to establish and demonstrate agreement. This 
includes ensuring consistency and coherence in their 
own pleadings; following disputes their investors file 
and submitting non-disputing party briefs;114 reacting 
to tribunal decisions;115 intervening in annulment or set-
aside proceedings; and issuing interpretations clarifying 
their understandings of treaty provisions.116 The treaty 
parties can also take joint action to more clearly formulate 
relevant agreements on interpretive questions.117 Some 
treaties contain provisions specifying that treaty parties’ 
joint interpretations of treaty provisions – which may be 
crafted in committees established by the relevant treaty 
-- are binding on tribunals.118  
To date, these tasks of ongoing treaty monitoring, 
engagement, and clarification do not appear to be widely 
performed. This may be because the potential value and 
impact of such actions under the VCLT or specific treaty 
provisions is not widely known; the bodies negotiating 
the treaties are not closely following the disputes and 
how the treaties are being interpreted and applied; 
the lack of awareness, due to gaps in transparency, of 
when treaties are being invoked by an investor; and/
or a lack of state resources available to follow disputes 
and decisions, and to give these issues the dedicated 
and consistent attention they require. Sharpe has stated 
that:
For many States, the various mechanisms for 
controlling the development of arbitral precedent 
may be more theoretical than real. Many States lack 
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a dedicated government official with the required 
knowledge, authority and resources to monitor 
investment disputes and intervene as a non-
disputing party or incorporate the latest arbitral 
case law into the State’s newest international 
investment agreements. Such States often turn 
individual disputes over to outside counsel, 
who themselves may not fully understand the 
mechanisms available to States to shape the 
development of international investment law or 
who may lack insight into the State’s other cases 
and treaty negotiations. Through unawareness 
or incapacity, States may unwittingly forfeit their 
ability to proactively shape arbitral precedent.119 
Assistance Mechanisms focused on treaty 
implementation could, therefore, play a role in 
supporting these types of activities and capacity within 
governments. 
A second aspect of these “living treaty” tasks arises 
from the fact that a number of IIAs, particularly newer 
agreements and those that are part of broader Free 
Trade Agreements, establish institutional mechanisms 
for treaty parties to engage in state-to-state dialogues 
assessing the implementation and implications of the 
agreements, tracking progress on agreed areas of 
cooperation, performing ongoing tasks, identifying 
future areas of cooperation and negotiation, and 
resolving issues that have arisen.120 Maximizing 
the opportunities presented by these institutional 
structures will require dedicated resources and 
attention. 
A third dimension relates to operational- and 
implementation-related tasks required or expected 
of individual treaty parties. For instance, some 
treaties call for states to conduct consultations 
with, or establish advisory groups of, stakeholders 
to advise on and support treaty implementation;121 
some treaties also anticipate ongoing evaluation of 
the agreements’ effects on sustainable development 
within the country.122 Creating and effectively using 
these stakeholder engagement systems, as well as 
designing and implementing meaningful assessments 
of treaty impacts, are complex initiatives that can 
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benefit from peer learning, technical assistance, and 
financial support.
These three types of post-signature IIA activities are 
not an exclusive list of the ways in which international 
law and specific IIA provisions provide space for, 
encourage, or even require ongoing engagement 
within domestic fora and between or among treaty 
parties regarding concluded treaties. The catalogue 
of relevant activities and initiatives likely stretches 
much longer. Nevertheless, it is an area that does 
not seem to have received much attention to date 
in international investment law but could have 
significant implications for the practical content and 
effects of treaty obligations, implementation of treaty 
commitments, effectiveness of treaty institutions, 
and exposure to and resolution of disputes. 
2.2.4.1 Existing initiatives
The OECD has analyzed and published papers on 
state control over treaty interpretation;123 and CCSI 
has also organized informal meetings on the topic 
among government officials. Research conducted 
for this Scoping Study did not, however, identify 
other initiatives focused on supporting ongoing 
engagement and treaty management as a general 
matter.124
2.3 Stocktaking: Challenges in 
managing ISDS proceedings, and 
existing mechanisms to overcome 
those challenges
To date, approximately 1000 investment disputes 
have been filed against nearly 120 respondent 
states.125 Some states have faced dozens of claims.
Other states have faced few or no claims in the 
decades since they first signed an investment treaty. 
However, publicly available statistics on claims do 
not necessarily reflect all claims that have been 
pursued and decided. Nor do they reflect those in 
which an investor submitted a notice of intent or 
notice of arbitration, but the matter was settled early 
and/or non-publicly. Thus, they underrepresent the 
extent to which individual states are facing ISDS-
related challenges. This section highlights key 
challenges in the defense of ISDS cases highlighted 
in literature and interviews, and some of the existing 
initiatives and resources to help address them. It groups 
these issues into the categories of: (1) case staffing; (2) 
anticipating, and potentially resolving, ISDS cases at an 
early phase; (3) appointing arbitrators; (4) dealing with 
uncertainty and ambiguity; (5) working with experts; and 
(6) engaging in discovery of and managing information. 
As discussed below, these issues have implications for 
costs and outcomes. Some are, or have been, targets 
of support initiatives, and some could potentially be 
addressed through reform discussions. All could also 
be considered in connection with development of any 
future Assistance Mechanism.  
2.3.1 Case staffing
The frequency of ISDS claims and cases are relevant to 
the question of whether and to what extent states want 
to internally staff for those disputes. If cases are few 
and far between, governments may opt not to spend 
resources on hiring, training, and providing continued 
professional development for staff in case of disputes. 
This may be particularly true for states with high turnover 
of staff and/or for states who are not organized to be 
able to easily allocate IIA/ISDS staff to other subject 
areas when they are not fully utilized on IIA/ISDS work. 
States may also be reluctant to risk handling disputes 
in-house, especially given the high stakes presented by 
large damages claims, and risk of creating damaging 
precedent if the state loses the claim.
There are three general models that states employ to 
handle their legal defense, each of which is described 
further below. According to Franck, the most common 
appears to be a hybrid system; the second most common 
is to use exclusively in-house counsel; and the third most 
common is to use exclusively external counsel.126 
Irrespective of the model chosen, in all cases and in 
advance, it is important to identify who, internally, has 
responsibility for and rights to do what, and to clearly 
set out those roles in laws or policies as appropriate. 
Then, when and if a dispute arises, governments will be 
in a better place to coordinate defense; choose whether 
or not to hire external counsel and, if so, on what 
terms; manage any outside counsel selected; control 
litigation strategy; engage with other relevant domestic 
actors; gather evidence; assess facts; and/or handle 
communications with the investor and others. Sharpe 
has set forth in detail the critical role that a designated 
agent within the government can play in advancing 
a government-led investment treaty policy.127 The 
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importance of developing and implementing these 
types of internal coordination plans before disputes 
arise was stressed by interviewees from government,128 
private practice,129 arbitration institutions,130 and 
existing support mechanisms. India, for its part, 
is an example of how the role of an agent can be 
implemented more fully into a country’s investment 
policy and practice.131 UNCTAD,132 ICSID,133 and private 
law firms134 have provided or are providing support on 
relevant structures and strategies. 
Yet it seems that there remains important work left to 
do. Joubin-Bret conducted a systemic review of the 
50 respondent states (as of 2015) that had faced more 
than three ISDS claims, finding that a minority had 
dedicated in-house teams, even when considering a 
task limited to managing the cases and interacting 
with outside counsel.135 Additionally, few countries 
had an identified, dedicated and structured lead 
agency or management team, and as a result, these 
cases were often dealt with on an ad hoc basis with 
various ministries or agencies leading the defense.136 
Consistent with those findings, one frequent comment 
by government representatives in interviews conducted 
for this scoping study was that they would like to 
know more about different countries’ approaches to 
these issues, and the advantages, disadvantages, and 
lessons learned from the different systems they put in 
place. 
Regardless of the approach to internal defense 
organization that a state is taking, once a dispute 
has been officially commenced, states may choose to 
settle the claim, or to proceed through the arbitration 
proceeding. 
With respect to the extremely high cost of top outside 
counsel, many states feel they have no choice but 
to pay. These expenditures, particularly for cash-
strapped governments, mean less to spend on other 
government functions, and this trade-off can have 
meaningful consequences, especially for developing 
countries. In some cases, however, governments may 
simply not have the liquid funds, or may not be willing 
or able to allocate the amount of funds necessary to 
hire outside counsel. 
These issues can affect case strategy and outcomes. 
For instance, some important research suggests that 
developing countries are more willing to settle ISDS 
cases than developed countries.137 In a 2017 paper, 
Strezhnev found that while high-income countries 
tend to win about 20% more investment disputes than 
low- or middle-income countries, this disparity can be 
explained by differences in early rates of settlement 
among countries. Specifically, developing country 
governments facing high arbitration costs are about 
22% more likely to settle a given dispute. Unpacking 
these findings, Strezhnev finds that even when the 
claim is poor, developing countries concerned by 
likely arbitration costs and potential damage awards 
choose to settle in order to avoid the risks of significant 
losses.138 In contrast, developed countries are more 
willing to bear the defense costs and risk of an 
adverse award. Developing countries may therefore 
particularly benefit from greater capacity in early case 
assessment that can signal whether they should in 
fact be settling or defending cases. This study also 
suggests that the high costs of defending claims and/
or the risk of a high adverse award have systemic effects 
that encourage risk-averse states to settle rather than 
defend claims. This raises serious questions about 
how and to what extent the high costs of defense and 
possible awards intersects with decisions to settle 
ISDS claims or actually pursue a defense. The reasons 
for this pattern, the systemic and individual impacts 
that these decisions to settle may have on developing 
countries, and how to address these issues, deserves 
further exploration in the context of an Assistance 
Mechanism focused on legal defense. 
On the flip side of the coin, when states do have the 
financial ability to pay (or can obtain financial assistance 
from elsewhere to do so),139 and have decided not to 
settle but to pursue a claim, these states are often 
“lawyering up, and lawyering up with quality counsel 
and with great experts.”140 While many government 
interviewees stated that there is a certain level of 
sticker shock when other branches of government 
see how much is being spent on ISDS defense, and 
all governments would like to see that cost decrease, 
once a claim has hit and the government decides to 
pursue a defense rather than settle, cost becomes a 
lesser priority than winning the case. For this countries 
that are financially able to do so are willing to hire the 
best lawyers.141 One individual with experience with 
an existing assistance mechanism stated “Developing 
countries don’t have a lot of money, but when it 
comes to defending cases, trust me, they will spend 
what they need to spend.”142 For many governments 
this involves difficult decisions on how and where to 
allocate scarce resources.
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However, while retaining experienced and high-
quality counsel was prioritized by many interviewees, 
some suggested that the perceived benefits of 
using major top-tier international law firms may be 
overestimated. One interviewee with experience 
working for an arbitral institution, for example, stated 
that while there are plenty of examples of small 
firms that cannot adequately manage a complex 
ISDS claim, large international law firms are not 
always necessary for states to achieve “adequate” 
legal defense: “We have seen very competent legal 
advice provided at much lower rates from regional 
firms, who have a strong arbitration practice and 
have branched out into investment arbitration. 
Moreover, we have seen firms established in, for 
example, Eastern Europe, provide highly competent 
advice at much lower rates than the international 
firms.”143 One upper-middle income government 
official expressed some frustration that large 
international firms are not always responsive and 
that it is necessary for this official to continuously 
be on top of case management to ensure that the 
firm is appropriately prioritizing this official’s work.144 
Some of the concern, therefore, seemed to be on 
the risk associated with hiring lesser-known and 
lower-priced firms, as opposed to conviction that 
such firms are of lower quality.
Moreover, the knee-jerk reaction to hire the best 
counsel, and spend whatever it takes to defend 
an award, may also be a result of not having a full 
understanding of where costs can be cut. As Sharpe 
has argued: 
[A] standing agent can help control costs 
through better allocation of government 
personnel and resources. Counsel fees generally 
constitute the bulk of arbitration costs.  State 
lawyers invariably cost less than experienced 
outside counsel.  Much arbitration work can 
be performed even within those governments 
that lack significant experience in international 
investment arbitration. Government lawyers, for 
instance, may retrieve and review documents; 
identify and interview potential witnesses; 
prepare timelines and memoranda on key issues; 
and research local law. Performing such time-
consuming work internally can substantially 
reduce the State’s litigation costs.145
When compared to the WTO context, the motivation to 
spend money on defense and hire top counsel is even 
higher in investment because in addition to costs, losing 
an ISDS case also results in a monetary award. One 
upper middle-income government official explained the 
pressure on governments: 
These cases are very public, and you have to answer 
questions to parliament, to the media, to the public, 
to everyone. Having a firm that has done 100 cases 
will be justifiable, whereas having a lesser-known firm 
that has only done 20 cases at a lower rate might be 
riskier. That’s the problem when governments face 
these claims – the responsibility is yours, but the 
money isn’t. Public funds are at risk. It’s very difficult, 
and these ISDS cases, where the state is being sued, 
raise questions in laymen’s eyes about why the “best” 
firm wasn’t chosen when the state is on the defense.146
In addition to the mainly financial hurdles governments 
experience in hiring legal counsel, distinct hurdles 
regarding a state’s engagement with outside counsel 
were described. One challenge noted in consultations 
was the timing of the engagement, and a procedural 
inability to bring outside counsel in at an earlier stage of 
the defense process. In the words of one private sector 
interviewee who also has experience with an existing 
Assistance Mechanism, “[i]t’s never really a budgetary 
constraint that prevents counsel from being brought in at 
an early stage, it is how governments operate.”147 There 
are various reasons that governments may engage at 
too late a phase. Some reasons may stem from internal 
coordination challenges in managing the notice. For 
example, as Sharpe explains: many governments have 
not implemented standard operating procedures 
in managing claims; many states do not have laws, 
regulations, decrees or directives to ensure that the 
responsible government official has authority to take all 
steps necessary to represent the State effectively; and 
procedural hurdles may inhibit a government authority 
from properly coordinating the defense of claims, 
both internally and externally.148 When clear authorities 
and procedures are not in place, any one agency or 
individual may be a hesitant to take ownership over the 
claim and internal management and coordination gaps 
may thus be exacerbated.149 The inability to conduct 
a rigorous early assessment of the strength of a claim 
(on jurisdiction, merits, and quantum) can have serious 
implications for early decisions that a state must make 
on settlement or proceeding to arbitrate.150 
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Rules on government procurement can also make 
timely case staffing particularly difficult when external 
counsel are used. However, those procurement rules 
and processes are often designed to serve important 
policy purposes (e.g., to ensure value-for-money and 
avoid corruption). It may be challenging to speed up 
processes while maintaining adequate oversight of 
government contracting and expenditures.151 
Another challenge may be much more closely related 
to the in-house capacity and experience of government 
lawyers, regardless of whether the claim is managed in-
house or if outside counsel is hired. Interviewees with 
experience working for arbitration centers highlighted 
in-house experiences as absolutely critical to claim 
management. In the words of one: 
In our experience [obtaining high quality 
representation] doesn’t have anything to do with 
how poor the country is or what mechanism they use 
(write a check, hybrid, in-house). In my view, good 
representation of states doesn’t seem to depend 
on how financially resourced the state is; experience 
is the important element. Countries who can afford 
good lawyers but have no experience in-house are 
the ones that make the most mistakes.”152
Another interviewee with experience working for 
an arbitration center stated that s/he had initially 
thought that the economic development status of 
a respondent state would be the clearest indicator 
of how responsive and effective a state will be in an 
ISDS claim, but that s/he has been proven wrong as it 
seems to be prior experience in managing claims that 
is most important.153
Thus, the challenges that were highlighted during 
CCSI’s consultations and research were that the high 
cost of outside counsel may lead the state to settle 
claims that may be of low quality. When states do 
decide to pursue claims, some states do not have the 
liquidity, or choose not, to pay for top counsel and may 
settle, or hire lower-cost counsel. However, in large 
part the concerns were not that states are not getting 
top outside counsel, but that in many cases when a 
state decides to hire top international legal counsel 
the state has serious concerns about foregoing other 
domestic spending priorities to pay for such counsel, 
is constrained in terms of its ability to timely retain 
external advisors, and faces hurdles engaging with 
and managing those service providers. As with other 
areas of IIA and ISDS engagement and management 
discussed during consultations, several interviewees 
noted that a certain level of capacity to engage with 
outside counsel, make decisions, and effectively 
manage those legal advisors is of critical importance 
to ensuring an effective defense. 
This study now turns to discussing how these issues 
interact with the three general models that states 
employ to handle their legal defense: in-house, hybrid, 
or fully out-sourced representation.
2.3.1.1 In-house counsel
This section considers specific issues that arise for 
states with respect to an in-house model of staffing 
the defense of claims.
In a recent study of states’ staffing of ISDS claims, 
Franck found that in roughly a quarter of disputes, 
states relied completely on in-house teams.154 States 
using this model include Argentina and the United 
States, as well as Canada for most, but not all, of its 
cases. 
In-house teams can have several advantages for 
states, including that they are lower cost, have a 
clearer and more consistent alignment of interests 
between attorney and client, are more accountable to 
the client government, have a deeper understanding 
of the state’s legal and policy positions, and have 
a better and more effective relationship with sub-
national jurisdictions and other agencies. An in-house 
counsel may also be in a position to elevate standards 
of conduct in international investment arbitration 
through training, experience, and professional 
socialization.155
Several interviewees from states that have faced three 
or more claims indicated that they are interested in 
conducting more (or all) of the state’s defense in-
house. Many in-house teams were seeking to take 
more control over strategy and decision-making, and 
to retain greater control over information gathered.156 
Interviews underscored that in-house teams were also 
better suited than external counsel to engage with, 
and gather evidence from, other relevant domestic 
government actors relating to the case, and to handle 
issues of domestic law.157
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Perceived barriers to adopting a fully in-house 
strategy included concerns about staffing, including 
balancing the frequency of claims with the expense 
and time it takes to build up in-house expertise, 
and doubts about the ability to successfully litigate 
against highly experienced investor-side counsel. 
Interviews and research, however, suggest that in 
some cases states have successfully managed these 
hurdles. 
First, in order to accommodate for staffing needs 
that ebb and flow, a few countries have hired people 
that move across to other activities depending on 
needs. For instance, in some countries with in-house 
teams, staff participating in ISDS defense can and 
do work in other types of international legal disputes 
(e.g., international human rights cases, WTO 
litigation, and specialized mechanisms such as the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal). They may also 
engage in other investment law-related activities, 
such as supporting treaty negotiations, engaging 
in investment-related dialogues in international 
forums, monitoring cases filed by their investors and 
submitting non-disputing state party briefs on issues 
of treaty interpretation, and engaging in state-
to-state or multi-stakeholder consultations under 
specialized bodies or mechanisms established under 
their treaties. Of course, specialization in investment 
law in addition to other substantive areas requires 
exceptional technical skill that must be built over 
time. To the extent staff are frequently rotated out 
of positions, or for offices with high turnover rates, 
it may be difficult for an in-house team to maintain 
relevant expertise.
For states seeking to build in-house capacity, the 
various options include hiring new staff with relevant 
expertise, hiring external counsel but working closely 
with them with a view to eventually transition work 
entirely in-house,158 arranging formal secondment 
programs (including with other governments),159 and 
attending training programs. Because treaty-based 
ISDS is still a relatively young field with few causes 
of action and a limited amount of “case law” it is an 
area where new practitioners likely face low barriers 
to entry and effectiveness.160 Major challenges to 
diffusion of knowledge about the law and practice 
are, confidentiality of awards, and as noted above, 
the concentration of sources behind paywalls and 
in English.    
Second, there remains some fear that respondent states 
seeking to rely exclusively or largely on in-house teams 
will be at a disadvantage as compared with investors 
hiring experienced private counsel. Some data, 
however, suggests that the average investor team will 
not have much of an advantage over even relatively new 
in-house state counsel teams. Using a dataset of 202 
cases generating 272 awards made public through 2012, 
Franck finds that “each legal entity represented a client 
[state or investor] in an average of two cases,” and that 
“the median number of cases was one.”161 She also found 
that “[r]oughly 75% of the known legal entities involved 
in [investment treaty arbitration] who arbitrated a single 
case had had no further demonstrated participation in 
[investment treaty arbitration].”162 These figures suggest 
that the experience gap between a relatively newly 
established respondent team and investor counsel is 
not necessarily great. Were an Assistance Mechanism 
to support filling gaps in experience or access to 
certain information, that may help to level playing fields 
between the parties.
Of course, these figures have likely shifted since Frank’s 
study. The rise of third-party funders as upstream repeat 
players capable of injecting additional substantive 
knowledge into the disputes and enabling (or requiring) 
use of certain quality legal teams might, for instance, 
have had an impact on market concentration and repeat 
play. Yet, when considering state needs, and taking into 
account the apparent interest among states to take more 
control over their ISDS defense activities, it is useful to 
both question the assumption that states committing 
to in-house structures will be outmatched by more 
knowledgeable private firms, and to understand the 
variables that make that assumption more or less likely 
to be true.
Overall, the frequency of ISDS threats and claims may be 
a key determinant in whether and what types of external 
versus in-house support states seek. If a state has not yet 
faced a case, faces them infrequently, or has not faced 
one for years, it may be more interested in extensive 
assistance by outside counsel, which can inform how an 
Assistance Mechanism may fill certain needs. As those 
states become more experienced in handling cases 
and staffing teams, however, or to the extent a larger 
number of claims or potential claims materializes, states 
may want and be able to do more on their own.
In consultations, states seeking to establish a greater role 
of in-house capacity raised certain ideas as to the ways 
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in which external assistance could continue to play a 
useful role. These included, for example, a “hotline”-
type mechanism for discrete questions in tight 
timeframes, assistance with adjudicator appointment, 
support with discovery and fact gathering, or support 
in early case assessment and management. The nature 
of those requests will likely affect the cost to provide 
the services, the willingness of beneficiaries to pay for 
the relevant services, and the interest and ability of 
those other than the users to fund those services. 
2.3.1.2 External counsel - hybrid and exclusive 
external models
This section considers hurdles states face in hiring and 
engaging with outside counsel. 
In her study, Franck found that approximately 70 percent 
of cases involved states using external counsel.163 In 
most, the states also relied to some extent on in-house 
lawyers. In a minority, the government appears to have 
been solely represented by outside counsel. These 
tended to be countries with only one ISDS dispute.164
When states do use external counsel, several 
government representatives from developed and 
developing countries noted the importance of ensuring 
that in-house teams still have sufficient capacity to 
effectively manage outside counsel and the claim. 
The in-house team must have the ability to exercise 
desired control over decisions regarding the claim 
and the confidence to “stand up” to outside counsel 
in the event of disagreement.165 Thus, even if external 
support is used, a certain, relatively sophisticated, 
level of internal competence is crucial. 
To the extent that a state’s model involves the use of 
outside counsel, it is viewed as important to appoint 
that counsel at an early phase in the dispute. However, 
as noted above, this objective may be hindered by the 
fact that the government may need to take a series 
of potentially time-consuming steps to appoint and 
hire counsel. These include following the relevant 
government procurement processes; identifying the 
desired criteria for service providers to be used in any 
tender process; doing due diligence on potential firms 
and lawyers; and contracting with the service providers 
regarding their fees and responsibilities. 
At the same time, certain decisions regarding the 
claim that must be made in this phase can potentially 
influence the outcome of the case (for example, 
decisions regarding selection of arbitrators, or 
decisions as to certain procedural matters), and must 
be made in as timely a fashion as possible. States 
noted various organizational capacity challenges that 
exist and prolong the amount of time necessary for 
the state to finalize these tasks.
Some states expressed interest in better understanding 
options for managing the steps required to: hire 
and manage outside counsel; craft contractual 
arrangements with outside counsel, optimally allocate 
responsibility between in-house and outside counsel; 
and identify ways to control fees charged by the 
firms employed.166 Several interviewees expressed 
concern about the high costs of external counsel, 
and perceptions that law firms lacked a sense of 
accountability to public taxpayers. Indeed, the 
issue of fees has been identified by delegations in 
UNCITRAL Working Group III as an issue of concern 
meriting multilateral reform. One 2017 study found 
that average costs for respondent states to defend 
ISDS cases are nearly $5 million,167 and average costs 
for states in annulment proceedings are nearly $1.5 
million.168 Table 2 below presents the findings from 
other studies on the costs of ISDS disputes.
While the fees being paid to external counsel may 
not vary much by respondent country, the difference 
in relative impact depending on countries’ respective 
revenue and budget, can be enormous. As noted 
by one lower middle-income government official 
that incurred roughly US$ 6 million in legal fees for 
services provided by London-based counsel, the fees 
constituted the “budget for a whole ministry, or two 
or three critical hospitals.”169 Another upper-middle 
income government official noted that the budget 
this official was requesting for outside counsel in ISDS 
cases for the coming fiscal year exceeded the amount 
that would be otherwise budgeted for the entire 
ministry.170
Notably, there are some initiatives on investment and 
trade issues that seek to support states in identifying 
and contracting/negotiating fees with external counsel. 
For example, IDLO’s ISP/LDCs program (discussed in 
Section 4.1.3) will assist states in obtaining no-cost 
legal services with respect to investment law matters. 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Trust Fund 
(discussed in Section 4.3.1.1) assists certain states with 
costs related to participation in disputes at the PCA. 
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Outside of IDLO’s ISP/LDCs program and the PCA Trust 
Fund, however, it does not appear, in the context of 
investment law, that a robust service yet exists to assist 
governments in procuring low-cost outside counsel for 
ISDS defense.
2.3.2 Staffing of defense claims: Issues of cost, 
quality and control 
From research and interviews conducted for this 
Scoping Study, some important takeaways regarding 
staffing and defense of ISDS cases are that:
• In some cases, states are unable to allocate funds 
necessary to hire international legal counsel and 
may choose to either settle rather than fully defend 
a claim, or to hire less expensive outside counsel.
• When states decide to hire international legal 
counsel, states did not widely report concerns 
about the quality of defense they were receiving 
or their ability to access law firms to provide them 
with quality defense. 
• Concerns that states expressed about hiring 
outside counsel include:
 °  the high costs of external representation;
 ° misalignment of interests and cost sensitivities 
between in-house and outside counsel;171
 ° challenges effectively supervising and 
controlling the management of the case when 
outside counsel were engaged;
 ° difficulties in the timely procurement of 
outside counsel; and 
 ° the ability to secure external input and advice 
on discrete issues and questions when a claim 
is handled in-house or before outside counsel 
has been procured.172
• Some states do not currently see a cost-benefit 
advantage to moving to an in-house model 
and will continue to rely on outside legal 
representation. 
• Some states were interested in taking greater 
control, and moving more defense activities in-
house, although:
 ° Some states were interested in ideas for 
ongoing discrete assistance from outside 
counsel (e.g., hotlines and second opinions) to 
complement an in-house model; and
 ° recognized that this would necessitate access 
to information currently held by firms.
These issues, in turn, raise questions of how to decrease 
costs of external counsel, and/or increase the ability of 
states to take a greater share of control (in a broad 
sense, including managing the claim in coordination 
with external counsel up through moving more of 
the actual defense in-house), while also retaining or 
Table 2 Legal Costs of ISDS Proceedings ($)
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COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 39
SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY
improving perceptions of quality. The answers to these 
questions should be considered in the development 
or expansion of an Assistance Mechanism. Even if it 
is ultimately decided that an Assistance Mechanism 
should not play an active role in advancing these 
objectives, it should also not undermine them, and 
would ideally complement steps that states take in 
reforming these areas, including beyond an Assistance 
Mechanism and into broader reform efforts.  
2.3.3. Anticipating, and potentially resolving, 
ISDS cases at an early phase 
It was commonly stated by interviewees that 
anticipating, avoiding, and resolving disputes at an 
early phase is a challenge for states. Section 2.2.3 
above discussed some initiatives to help states 
understand and implement treaty commitments. This 
Section focuses more specifically on actions relating 
to anticipating, and trying to resolve, potential or 
actual ISDS cases at an early phase.
2.3.3.1 Anticipating disputes 
The inability to anticipate a dispute has implications 
for states. States, of any economic development 
level, that have not implemented standard operating 
procedures upon notice of intent may struggle to 
organize and take control of the defense of the claim 
and other decisions that must be made early on. States 
may also feel at a disadvantage when compared to a 
claimant that has, in many cases, had a greater amount 
of time to organize and prepare a claim. 
While states do have some ability to anticipate certain 
disputes, the anticipation of a large number of disputes 
can be difficult for many reasons. One issue relates to 
a claimant’s use, or failure to use, the domestic court 
system. The requirement to exhaust local remedies 
is generally not expressly required by treaties (and 
in some treaties has been expressly waived). When 
claimants are required to exhaust domestic remedies 
(including for a specific period of time), states have an 
opportunity to identify a dispute bubbling up through 
the legal system, and their officials and institutions 
have a built-in opportunity to correct mistakes and 
prevent ISDS cases. 
Relatedly, when contract claims arise under a treaty, 
treaty provisions (namely the umbrella clause) 
and arbitral decisions appear relatively flexible in 
permitting investors to frame disputes as treaty claims 
and pursue them directly via ISDS alongside or instead 
of dispute resolution proceedings in contractually 
specified fora. 
Moreover, there is no doctrine of “ripeness” that has 
stepped in to uniformly control the flow of claims. 
States may be taken by surprise when they receive a 
notice of intent and learn that a lower level official has 
taken a relevant action, that an administrative agency 
has made a certain (appealable) decision, or that a 
lower- or mid-level court has issued a certain ruling. 
In short, the investor has significant flexibility to frame 
when a dispute has crystallized and a claim is ripe. 
While this benefits the investor, as it can determine 
whether and when to opt out of domestic or other 
proceedings, it can make it nearly impossible for a 
state to anticipate when a claim will arise, much less 
prevent it. 
These issues are among those that could potentially 
be resolved through other reform discussions, 
for instance to excise umbrella clauses, introduce 
requirements for exhaustion for all or some causes of 
action, and/or clarify the relevance of doctrines such 
as ripeness.
Another problem that makes the task of anticipating 
and avoiding claims difficult is that treaties may grant 
many investors, including indirect shareholders, in a 
particular investment the ability to pursue an ISDS 
claim. Governments may be unaware, before a notice 
of intent has been filed, that a foreign investor is 
involved in a particular investment, that such foreign 
investor’s interests are protected by a treaty, and if so, 
which treaty. The issue of shareholder and reflective 
loss claims is also an issue that could potentially be 
addressed through broader reform discussions. 
An additional issue is that makes the anticipation of 
claims challenging for states is that even if a state 
sees a dispute on the horizon, the relevant agency in 
charge of investment policy and dispute resolution 
may have no power to resolve the emerging dispute. 
If, for instance, the potentially brewing ISDS case 
relates to a court dispute between private parties 
over ownership of or rights to use land, the validity 
of intellectual property rights, or the existence and 
extent of tort liability, the executive branch of the 
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government may have no legal ability to override 
any subsequent judicial decision and likely has 
important policy reasons to avoid trying to interfere.
Dispute prevention was indeed identified as a 
“hot topic” and of great interest to states during 
consultations for this Scoping Study.
Early assessment and resolution of disputes 
 
In CCSI’s consultations many interviewees felt that 
the early stages of a dispute were an incredibly 
critical period during which little outside support 
for states is available. Two general issues were 
highlighted: (1) effectively managing the early 
periods of claims, organizing internally, and taking 
advantage of “cooling off periods, and (2) assessing 
the strength of the claim.
With respect to the first point, a potentially important 
opportunity that was identified arises with the so-
called “cooling off” period. Many treaties contain 
clauses requiring investors to give states notice of 
their intent to file arbitration claims before formally 
initiating the arbitration. A common challenge 
for states, however, is effectively managing these 
periods. One government official asked if a “best 
practices” handbook exists for the “cooling off” 
period, and to CCSI’s knowledge a generalized set 
of advice is not available. 
A number of interviewees from governments and 
private practice was that many states lack certain 
capacities in receiving and effectively managing 
claims. Sharpe has also articulated some of these 
issues, and solutions to them.173 For example, many 
states have not developed clear or comprehensive 
procedures dictating who should receive the 
notice and what they should do once they have it. 
Many do not have media guidelines or effective 
communication channels established with other 
ministries to provide cross-governmental updates 
on pending disputes. This can result in valuable time 
and evidence being wasted and may even escalate 
the dispute based on statements or conduct 
(including inaction) over that time period. There 
are some existing resources and initiatives to help 
address these issues. These include ICSID’s “Practice 
Notes for Respondents in ICSID Arbitration,174 
pro bono assistance provided by counsel,175 and 
opportunities for sharing experiences at workshops 
and trainings.176  
For states seeking to manage more of a claim in-house, 
the ability to turn to outside support regarding key 
questions (e.g. a “hotline” type approach) could be 
important during the defense-organizational phase. For 
states who plan to hire outside counsel, the time that 
procurement processes take can result in valuable lost 
time early in the process with respect to both procedural 
and substantive matters. On the procedural side, 
appointment of arbitrators and other early decisions 
impacting the procedural elements of the case can have 
lasting impacts on the ultimate outcome of disputes. 
On the substantive side, more attention to and better 
guidance during the “cooling off” period may assist 
states in early resolution of disputes. One interviewee 
with experience working for an arbitration center 
stated that these initial phases see “a limited number 
of problems arise, and it is definitely possible to have a 
high impact in this area.”
While there was general agreement that this phase 
is both critical and also one of the most difficult for 
states to take advantage of, some caution was urged. 
For example, to the extent one Assistance Mechanism 
were to become involved in advising many different 
client states about arbitrator appointments or other 
procedural elements of a defense at early phases there 
may be various concerns that one institution was the 
dominant player in an advisory role, and unintended 
systemic impacts could result.177
With respect to the second broad issue, governments 
may face challenges reviewing, understanding the 
strength of the case asserted in the Notice of Intent 
or subsequent Notice of Arbitration, and then taking 
appropriate action. Some of these challenges again 
arise from the structure and procedures of the current 
ISDS system. Rules regarding the contents of notices are 
relatively relaxed, and there are no general requirements 
to require filers to conduct due diligence and certify the 
veracity of their assertions, nor are their clear sanctions 
for non-compliance. The door to initiate a claim is 
relatively wide open, and arguably open to abuse, as 
the mere filing of an ISDS claim can trigger significant 
dispute-related expenditures and raises the threat of 
potential future losses. 
In other non-ISDS dispute settlement contexts, 
procedural tools are often used to avoid dragging 
defendants/respondents into high-stakes, high-cost 
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proceedings absent a sufficient showing of a plausible 
claim. The ISDS system could likewise employ some 
type of pleading standard to filter out frivolous and 
abusive claims, and provide respondents greater 
notice of the claims against them.178 One could, 
for instance, envision rules of procedure whereby 
investors had to assert facts at the time of submitting 
their notice of intent and/or arbitration on:
• the relevant treaty or treaties;
• the identity of the investor, including its corporate 
structure if a legal person;
• the investment and relevant treaty provision 
protecting that investment;
• whether or not any additional proceedings had 
been or were being pursued relevant to a fork-in-
the road or similar provision;
• the measure(s) alleged to have given rise to the 
breach and the date(s) of the measure(s); 




Detailed factual and legal allegations in Notices 
of Intent and Notices of Arbitration, particularly of 
information that is within the custody and/or control 
of the investor claimant, can be crucial for enabling 
governments to conduct useful case assessments 
and decide whether and how to proceed (e.g., by 
suggesting mediation, settlement of all or some 
claims, or deciding to defend against the case). 180 
Increased pleading requirements would likely result 
in some added costs for the investor. Those costs, 
however, would presumably be relatively minimal if 
the required disclosures called for information within 
the investor claimant’s custody or control, and would 
arguably be outweighed by the systemic contributions 
that these disclosures could make toward improving 
early case assessment. 
While several interviewees suggested that an 
Assistance Mechanism may assist in early assessments 
of the strength of a claim, absent a sufficiently robust 
factual matrix on which to base their analysis, legal 
opinions on the strength of the investor’s claims and/
or state’s defense may be too vague and general to be 
of much use.
Effective early case assessment depends on at least 
two things: one is having enough information to 
evaluate the case, at least on a preliminary basis; the 
other is having access to a legal team that can do that 
analysis. If a team is not in-house, then timely external 
support will need to be found. 
Some existing efforts described below are attempting 
to assist states with early identification and/or 
prevention of disputes and assessment of claims. 
2.3.3.1.1 World Bank Systemic Response 
Mechanism
The WBG’s Systemic Investor Response Mechanism 
(SIRM) seeks to be an early warning and tracking 
system that identifies problems arising from 
government conduct, allowing governments to 
respond to investor grievances at a phase earlier than 
a dispute.181 The SIRM works by collecting certain data 
points and identifying patterns of political risks that 
impact investments and quantifies investment lost 
or gained as a result, thereby providing evidence of 
impacts and a basis for reform or steps to minimize 
the recurrence of investment-related problems.182
SIRM is not a one-sized fits all solution, but is adapted 
to the political economy circumstances of every 
country.183 Common elements, however, include: (1) 
empowerment of a lead agency that implements and 
coordinates SIRM, (2) an early alert mechanism and 
tracking tool to identify problems to the lead agency, 
(3) problem solving methods available to the lead 
agency and other agencies to find a solution, including 
through exchanges of information, consultations, 
peer pressure, or legal opinions, (4) political decision 
making at higher levels when the lead agency is 
unable to recommend a solution or discipline a peer 
agency.184
The SIRM has been piloted in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Dominican Republic, Georgia, Albania, Colombia, 
Kyrgyz Republic, and Mongolia.185
2.3.3.1.2 Similar state led ISDS prevention 
initiatives
Korea’s Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman 
(OFIO) was established in 1999 to provide aftercare 
support and grievance resolution services for foreign 
investors and foreign-invested companies in Korea.186 
The OFIO is intended to improve the investment 
environment in Korea and help to resolve investor 
grievances at an early phase. The OFIO provides an 
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online application for investors to seek to resolve 
grievances in a wide variety of industries.187 The 
OFIO also can help investors navigate legal and 
legislative processes related to their grievances.
Similarly, Brazil’s Cooperation and Facilitation 
Investment Agreement (CFIA) model is based 
on dispute prevention.188 The CFIA sets forth 
institutional mechanisms to assist in dispute 
avoidance and to achieve early settlement of 
potential investor grievances.189 The objective is to 
assist host countries in anticipating possible origins 
of disputes and taking earlier preventative action.190 
The inspiration for a focus on investor support was 
found in the Korean OFIO.191
Both the OFIO and the CFIA models present a 
rethink of the areas in which states might allocate 
scarce resources to address investor grievances, 
looking to a greater extent to address concerns 
before they rise to the level of a full-blown dispute. 
In many cases earlier attention to concerns and 
disputes may benefit both the investor and the host 
state.
2.3.4 Appointing arbitrators
A potentially outcome-determinate, time-sensitive, 
and early-phase task (briefly discussed in the 
preceding section) is the appointment of arbitrators. 
An ongoing OECD project is addressing the various 
policy issues and challenges that arise with respect 
to arbitrator appointment, appointing authorities 
and adjudicator compensation in ISDS cases.192 
The preliminary findings of this project indicate 
that the system for the selection of arbitrators in 
ISDS cases is very complex, involves limited levels 
of public disclosure on arbitrator appointments and 
may be affected by significant competition between 
arbitration institutions competing for ISDS cases.
Notwithstanding the increased transparency of 
arbitral awards in recent years, a significant share 
are not yet publicly available, nor are the bulk 
of other materials produced in connection with 
ISDS proceedings such as pleadings submitted to 
tribunals and transcripts of hearings. These materials 
can provide insights into arguments that arbitrators 
may have raised when acting as counsel, and also 
into what resonates, or does not, with them when 
sitting on a tribunal. 
Due to confidentiality of these documents, however, 
there are asymmetries in who can access and benefit 
from these insights. Repeat-player law firms, expert 
witnesses, third-party funders, and arbitration 
institutions contain a relative wealth of relevant material 
in their internal files and networks. Others, including 
states that are infrequent respondents, may be forced to 
choose between going without a similar depth of crucial 
information or paying to access it. 
There are some ongoing efforts to gather and 
disseminate information about arbitrators, including by 
IAReporter,193 Arbitrator Intelligence194 (both behind a 
paywall), and Pluricourt’s Investment Treaty Arbitration 
Database (PITAD).195 Free or reduced-price access to 
subscription databases, free or low-cost access to expert 
advice on arbitrator section, and virtual or in-person 
platforms for sharing experiences about arbitrators 
are all ways of closing existing “gap[s] on access to 
information” that contribute to states’ current “reliance 
on outside counsel.”196 
These issues are further linked to ongoing reform 
discussions. Initiatives for a court-like mechanism 
that would move ISDS away from its use of party-
appointed arbitrators could, for adherents to such a 
new mechanism, reduce the need for case-by-case due 
diligence on, appointment, and possible challenge of 
arbitrators.  
2.3.5 Handling cases - dealing with inconsistency, 
uncertainty and incorrectness
As recognized in the context of UNCITRAL’s Working 
Group III, states have concerns about inconsistency, 
uncertainty, and incorrectness of arbitral decisions. 
These are all features of investment law that complicate 
domestic officials’ abilities to predict whether a claim will 
succeed or fail. However, irrespective of the outcome of 
a claim, states incur significant costs to defend against 
claims and are not likely to recover those costs.197 
Some efforts to address these issues of inconsistency, 
uncertainty, and incorrectness include drafting new 
language for future agreements; renegotiating existing 
treaties; using tools available under the VCLT to clarify 
for or bind tribunals to specified interpretations; 
engaging in treaty committees to consult on and address 
problematic issues of interpretation; and participating in 
negotiations such as the ongoing efforts at UNCITRAL 
to craft reform solutions, including the potential 
establishment of a more permanent adjudicatory body 
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and appellate system to bring more clarity to the 
content of the law. Assistance Mechanisms could be 
used to better support states in each of these areas 
of work.
A related solution (one which is particularly relevant 
in the event that developed country donor funds may 
be financing an Assistance Mechanism) is for countries 
to explore steps to work with treaty counterparties to 
minimize the uncertainty surrounding treaty language 
or treaty interpretation, such as through joint 
interpretative statements or other clarifications. This 
step could help to avoid or reduce disputes over the 
content of relevant treaty standards. 
Data indicates that, should (particularly developed) 
home country governments wish to rein in some of 
the more expansive interpretations of substantive 
and jurisdictional treaty provisions and ensure that 
interpretation is (re)aligned with the intent of the 
treaty parties, their actions could potentially impact 
the conduct of a large number of proceedings. In 
practice, capital importing states are less frequently 
non-disputing state parties and more frequently 
the respondent, and opportunities to act as a non-
disputing state party are thus more infrequent. Steps 
to clarify treaty party intent, particularly on the part 
of the non-disputing parties, could potentially reduce 
claims that attempt to stretch the bounds of treaty 
language and make it clearer to tribunals when a 
claim is without merit and worthy of early dismissal: 
“The United States, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Spain are ‘strongly 
represented’ as home states of investor claimants”198 
and consequently have important opportunities to 
play a more active gatekeeping or management role 
regarding the way their treaties are used.199 Greater 
certainty on the bounds of treaty language could, in 
turn, potentially narrow the jurisdictional window for 
claims and issues that respondent states are currently 
spending valuable resources disputing before arbitral 
tribunals. 
Table 3 Non-disputing State Party Submissions Made Under Different Types of IIAs
Source: Data on claims under different treaties is from UNCTAD (search done October 9, 2019); 
data on non-disputing state party submissions is collected from PITAD databases, supplemented 
and corrected by CCSI (internal spreadsheet updated as of October 9, 2019).
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Table 3 sets forth the frequency of non-disputing 
state party briefs under various treaties.
Consideration should be given to the reasons for 
which states currently do not choose to engage in 
joint interpretations or other clarifying efforts, and 
any attempts to increase the prevalence of these 
efforts may seek to take account or correct for the 
reasons underlying the current lack of engagement, 
if possible and desirable.
2.3.6 Handling cases - working with experts
Included within data for legal fees are often fees for 
expert witnesses on valuation and other topics. While 
studies on party costs do not tend to systematically 
distinguish between legal counsel and other fees, 
having a better sense of the expenditures on each 
– and their relative importance in ISDS proceedings 
– is necessary as an Assistance Mechanism could 
focus on enabling access to one of the two, or 
both.  Information available from costs submissions 
that are publicly available indicates that expert fees 
can approximate legal counsel fees in amount.200 
And if states move more tasks in-house, they may 
nevertheless continue to feel the need for support 
in identifying, contracting with, and working with 
experts on technical topics. 
2.3.7 Handling cases - engaging in discovery, 
managing information
A final set of issues identified in this Scoping Paper relates 
to the challenges that governments face conducting 
discovery and gathering and managing the volumes 
of evidence that may be required to effectively defend 
ISDS disputes. These activities may cause governments 
to engage in court proceedings in foreign jurisdictions 
in search of evidence, and to identify and contract with 
technical service firms to assist in document retention, 
review, and disclosure. While such tasks are relatively 
discrete, there could be important savings in time and 
cost for states – especially those with in-house teams – 
to have assistance in performing them.
 
Section 2 of this Scoping Study has set forth the various 
phases of a state’s engagement with international 
investment law. With respect to each, capacity 
challenges in the ability of a state to effectively achieve 
its objectives has been set forth, along with a discussion 
of what resources are available to states in these areas. 
We now turn to considering previous attempts to 
establish an investment law advisory center, followed 
by a discussion of potential models for an Assistance 
Mechanism in investment law. 
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As states began, in the early 2000s, to grapple 
with the significant increases in ISDS cases, 
several attempts were made to establish 
regional advisory centers.761 These efforts are 
described here in order to assess these efforts 
and any lessons learned. 
3.1 UNCTAD-IADB-OAS-VCC
In the 2000s, several Latin American states, with the 
support of UNCTAD, the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB), the Organization of American States 
(OAS), and the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
International Investment (VCC)201 proceeded 
extremely far along the process of establishing 
a regional investment advisory center. In 2006, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and other Central 
American countries requested a feasibility study of 
an advisory center to assist countries in the handling 
and defending of investor-state disputes.202 A detailed 
set of consultation guidelines and a consultation 
report were prepared to review what services an 
advisory center could provide as well as the possible 
institutional options for such an initiative.203 In 2009, 
a steering committee meeting of interested countries 
took place to come up  with a consolidated vision 
and develop terms of reference for an advisory 
center.204 It was agreed that: the center would be an 
intergovernmental organization, established by states 
and run by states; the model would be the ACWL; it 
would ultimately be financially self-sufficient; and the 
center would carry out two core functions of advisory205 
and defense206 services. 
The initiative resulted in a draft treaty and a 
consolidated budget that was submitted to interested 
countries and discussed at a steering group meeting 
in Colombia in May 2009. February 2010 had been set 
for the ministerial signature of the treaty that would 
establish this center, however efforts failed at the last 
minute.
Based on interviews with individuals involved in this 
effort (both conducted by CCSI and reviewed in the 
context of desk research), certain lessons can be 
learned. As a general matter, technical issues (even 
those that were eventually overcome), questions 
surrounding funding of the center, and last-minute 
changes to several countries’ negotiators are viewed 
as having significantly contributed to, if not caused, its 
failure.207
Certain technical issues proved to be high hurdles in 
negotiations. One interviewee understood differing 
country positions as stemming from divergences in 
country needs in disputes (e.g. how much each country 
wished to perform in-house versus outsource), which 
resulted in each country ultimately taking a different 
approach and having a different perspective on what 
each viewed as the appropriate and desirable role 
for an advisory center, particularly with respect to the 
desired level of involvement in the defense of claims, 
and how much responsibility should be given to a 
center.
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A second, not unrelated, technical issue surrounded 
the ideal structure of a center, including what its 
staffing would look like, what the nationality of its 
officials would be, and where it would be located. 
With respect to its location, it was agreed that it 
would initially be located in Washington D.C., a 
location favored by certain negotiators, and then 
moved to Panama, although even with respect 
to South American locations, there were several 
competing proposals.208 Each of these discussions 
was highly political, and one interviewee involved in 
this process noted that the ability to resolve these 
seemingly small and last-minute questions about an 
advisory center should not be underestimated.209 
Ultimately, one of the most difficult issues was the 
funding of the center, and “when it came to funding, 
the whole thing blew up at that point.”210 The 
agreement that the center would be self-sufficient, 
combined with difficulty in estimating ISDS dispute 
costs, persisted and made difficult finalization of 
the scope of services and member contributions 
(and whether these would be differentiated 
based on economic development levels) and 
how contributions from other organizations or 
development banks with interests in the IIA/ISDS 
system would be handled.211 
Finalization of financial details coincided with last-
minute changes to several key negotiators and the 
loss of certain influential diplomats in the effort was 
ultimately the final blow.212 
The final steps of the UNCTAD-IADB-OAS-VCC 
project also coincided with the introduction of 
a competing UNASUR advisory center initiative, 
described below. These proposals were similar 
but were supported by different members of the 
region, which resulted in neither center gaining 
comprehensive regional backing.213
3.2 UNASUR
In May 2008, the Heads of States of the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR) set forth a plan of 
action that included an investment court, investment 
arbitration rules, and an advisory center on investment 
law and ISDS for UNASUR member states.214 UNCTAD 
had been invited to assist the working group on ISDS 
with technical assistance and input as far as technical 
options, budgetary issues, and institutional options.215 
The idea for a Southern Observatory on Investment 
and Transnational Corporations arose in the early 
2010s around the time that the UNCTAD-IADB-OAS-
VCC project was abandoned.216 While it was not 
based directly on the ACWL model, it was intended to 
provide a collective repository for the region’s ISDS-
related knowledge and experience to assist in strategic 
defense of UNASUR member states in order to more 
systematically influence regional and international 
investment rules.217
While the status of the UNASUR project is unclear, and 
no public announcement has been issued to indicate 
significant progress, it appears that an Executive 
Committee has continued to advance specific proposals, 
and that a proposed legal framework and agreements 
establishing a center are proceeding.218
3.3 ANZ-ASEAN Forum 
Outside of the Latin American region, in 2012 Vietnam 
proposed to the Australia-New Zealand and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ANZ-ASEAN) 
Forum that a regional advisory center be established 
similar to that envisioned by the UNCTAD-IADB-OAS-
VCC initiative.219 
This proposal focused on the cost burden of and 
technical expertise needed for ISDS disputes and the 
need to share expertise and experience among the 
ASEAN region, and called upon states to move this 
onto the ANZ-ASEAN agenda. 220 This proposal did not 
ultimately gain sufficient political support.221
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An Assistance Mechanism (or Mechanisms) to 
provide investment law-related support could take 
a wide variety of forms. Several are described below. 
This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Moreover, 
while this study has, in the interest of conceptual 
coherence and clarity, attempted to place existing 
Assistance Mechanisms into the general categories 
set forth below, given the myriad services and 
models, neat divisions proved challenging and 
overlap between categories occurs. Some of the 
mechanisms described below already support 
investment law-related activities and some focus 
other substantive areas or forums, but all are helpful 
to consider as a model for how an investment-law 
focused mechanism could work, as well as to benefit 
from lessons learned in other contexts. Of course, 
any Assistance Mechanism should be designed 
to most efficiently and effectively respond to the 
identified concerns and capacity challenges that it is 
intended to address. 
4.1 Institutionalized, multi-
service support including legal 
representation of client governments
One model for an Assistance Mechanism 
would be an institutionalized mechanism that is 
able to pursue a range of functions, depending on 
the context and need of a particular beneficiary, 
and which could include any of a menu of services 
(e.g. capacity building, negotiation support, policy 
advice, legal opinions, and/or defense). 
This section addresses a range of models of multi-
service Assistance Mechanisms, each of which varies 
in its focus and services offered. 
First, an Assistance Mechanism may be conceptually 
similar to the Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL). 
Indeed, the ACWL model is often raised in the 
context of an Assistance Mechanism in international 
investment law and is thus described in some 
depth below as a potential model for an Assistance 
Mechanism in investment law.222 The ACWL can be 
distinguished from other mechanisms as it is the only 
mechanism that provides a significant level of direct 
legal services in-house, by its own ACWL lawyers. The 
ACWL also has a “clearinghouse” element, whereby 
some services are provided through the ACWL but 
by private practitioners in specific circumstances.
The African Legal Support Facility (ALSF), also described 
below, provides an extensive range of services, 
but, compared to the ACWL, operates to a greater 
extent on the “clearinghouse model”, facilitating 
legal relationships between private practitioners and 
government clients. However, the ALSF compares itself, 
to some extent, to an office of “general counsel” in that 
its in-house lawyers are able to, and do, provide many 
legal services and advice in-house, and help countries 
manage relationships with, and advice received from, 
outside counsel. 
The International Development Law Organization’s 
(IDLO) Investment Support Programme for Least 
Developed Countries (ISP/LDCs), described below, 
facilitates a wide range of investment-related services, 
but currently has a more limited “in-house” advisory 
role. The ISP/LDCs program is active in cultivating 
relationships with outside service providers (which 
include economists and development policy specialists 
in addition to private practitioners) and remaining 
engaged with the beneficiary throughout the matter. 
Unlike the ACWL (limited to WTO law) and ALSF (focused 
to a greater extent on investment contracts), the ISP/
LDCs program is an existing Assistance Mechanism that 
is specific to investment law-related support.223
Finally, suggestions for an investment law “hotline” are 
briefly described in this section, as this notion arose in 
CCSI’s consultations and could form an element of any 
broader institutionalized mechanism.
Each of these existing Assistance Mechanisms - ACWL, 
ALSF, and ISP/LDCs – are now described in depth. 
4.1.1 Advisory Center on WTO Law
4.1.1.1 Overview
The ACWL was established in 2001 pursuant to 
an agreement between a coalition of developed 
and developing members of the WTO.224 As an 
intergovernmental organization it “enjoys a legal status 
on par with the UN and the WTO.”225 While the ACWL 
was founded as, and functions as, an intergovernmental 
organization independent of the WTO, its explicit 
mission is to “provide developing countries and LDCs 
with the legal capacity necessary to enable them to 
take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
WTO.”226  To that end, it provides developing country 
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Members and LDCs with direct institutional support 
for defense and prosecution of claims at pre-set 
prices, technical support and capacity building, and 
free legal opinions concerning WTO law. The ACWL 
has been broadly credited, both by recipients of 
its aid and observers in academic and civil society 
organizations, with substantially supporting access 
to the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanisms by 
developing countries and LDCs and increasing access 
to justice within the existing institutional frameworks 
of WTO law. 
4.1.1.2 Organizational governance
The ACWL’s governance structure was designed with 
the goal of isolating the day-to-day work of the center’s 
professionals from direct “control or influence by any 
Member [(of the ACWL)] or group of Members.”227 The 
ACWL is independent of the WTO and is governed 
at the highest level by a General Assembly, which 
consists of representatives from each member country 
(developed and developing), as well as representatives 
from any LDC entitled to the ACWL’s services.228 The 
General Assembly meets biannually and performs 
three functions: (1) monitoring the performance of 
the ACWL, (2) electing the Management Board of 
the ACWL, and (3) adopting budgets and regulations 
proposed by the Management Board.229 
The Management Board has a more direct role in 
the management and financial control of the ACWL. 
The Management Board performs four key functions: 
(1) appointing the Executive Director in consultation 
with Member countries, (2) preparing annual budgets 
for approval and adoption by the ACWL General 
Assembly, (3) supervising the administration of the 
Endowment Fund, and (4) proposing rules and 
regulations (for consideration and adoption by the 
ACWL General Assembly).230 The Management Board 
will also decide on any appeals by Members to whom 
legal support in a dispute settlement proceeding has 
been denied.231
The Management Board consists of six individuals who 
serve “in their personal capacities and independent 
of their national affiliations.”232 These individuals serve 
two-year terms, and national affiliations are considered 
in their appointment: three of the Management Board 
members are nominated by developing country 
Members of the ACWL, two by developed country 
Members of the ACWL, and one by LDC beneficiaries 
of the ACWL. In addition, the Executive Director 
of the ACWL serves as an ex officio member of the 
Management Board. Lawyers familiar with the Centre’s 
decision-making bodies noted that representatives 
nominated by developed country members tend 
to be retired ambassadors or civil servants, while 
other Management Board members often had active 
professional relationships with developing countries 
or LDCs. These lawyers speculated that by turning 
to retired experts, the ACWL has the advantage of 
incorporating a developed country perspective while 
avoiding some of the perceived conflicts that would 
arise if Managing Board members had ongoing formal 
relationships with developed countries who could not 
use the Centre themselves.
Finally, the day-to-day operations of the ACWL 
are managed by an Executive Director, who 
represents the ACWL externally and reports directly 
to the Management Board.233 Throughout CCSI’s 
consultations, representatives from academia, civil 
society organizations, private sector law firms, and 
developing and developed country governments 
all independently credited Frieder Roessler, the first 
Executive Director of the ACWL, for contributing 
significantly to its early reputation and its current 
track record of success. Additionally, a number of 
interviewees suggested that Roessler’s personal 
reputation was a crucial element in convincing 
developed countries to “buy-in” to the idea of the 
ACWL and provide financial and political support to 
its establishment.
Table 4 illustrates the governance structure of the 
ACWL.
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According to a note by the Management Board, this governance structure aimed to put in place a system of 
“checks and balances … to ensure that when a developing country Member or least-developed country seeks 
legal advice from the ACWL …the ACWL’s advice will be based solely on the professional expertise of the 
Executive Director and staff of the ACWL, operating entirely independently of any influence, control or fear of 
consequences from any of the ACWL’s Members, especially its donor Members.”234 This note placed significant 
Table 4 Governance structure of the ACWL
The General Assembly 
shall …
The Management Board shall …  The Executive Director 
shall …
• Evaluate the 
performance of the 
ACWL;
• Elect the Management 
Board;
• Adopt regulations 
proposed by the 
Management Board;
• Adopt the annual 
budget proposed 
by the Management 
Board;
• Perform the functions 
assigned to it under 
other provisions 
of the Agreement 
Establishing the 
ACWL.
• Report to the GA;
• Take decisions necessary to ensure the 
efficient and effective operation of the 
ACWL in accordance with the agreement 
establishing the ACWL;
• Prepare the annual budget for the GA’s 
approval;
• Decide on appeals by Members to whom 
legal support in a dispute settlement 
proceeding has been denied;
• Supervise the administration of the 
Endowment Fund;
• Appoint an external auditor;
• Appoint the Executive Director in consultation 
with Members; 
• Propose for adoption by the GA regulations 
on
o Management Board procedures,
o duties and conditions of the Executive 
Director, staff, and consultants, and
o the administration and investment 
policy of the Endowment Fund; and
• Perform the functions assigned to it 
under other provisions of the Agreement 
Establishing the ACWL.
• Report to the 
Management Board;
• Manage the ACWL’s day-
to-day operations;
• Hire, direct, and dismiss 
the staff of the ACWL in 
accordance with the staff 
regulations adopted by 
the General Assembly;
• Contract and supervise 
consultants;
• Submit to the 
Management Board and 
the General Assembly an 
independently audited 
statement of receipts and 
expenditures relating to 
the budget during the 
preceding fiscal year; and
• Represent the ACWL 
externally.
Source: adapted from ACWL, The Governance of the ACWL: A Note by the Management Board (22 October 2015), ACWL/
MB/W/2015/20, 7 (internal citations omitted).
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weight on the limited nature of the General Assembly’s 
powers to manage the operations of the ACWL, and on 
the important role of the Management Board in acting 
as a “‘buffer’ between the management of the ACWL’s 
day-to-day operations, and ‘the policies of donor 
countries … and user developing countries… .’ In other 
words,” the Management Board’s note continues, “the 
Management Board exists to ensure that the operations 
of the ACWL are managed, not by the ACWL’s Members 
themselves through the General Assembly, but by an 
independent body of highly-qualified individuals that 
are not answerable to the political goals of the ACWL’s 
Members either individually or acting in blocs.”235 The 
note also highlights the importance of the fact that 
the Executive Director is not appointed by the ACWL 
Members through the General Assembly, but by the 
Management Board in consultation with the ACWL 
Members. It emphasizes that this was done in order to 
avoid politicizing the appointment process, “ensur[ing] 
that the Executive Director and staff of the ACWL 
would provide professional advice based on their 
technical expertise and independently of any political 
considerations.”236
Overall, this text emphasizes the Management Board’s 
powers vis-à-vis the ACWL General Assembly. It 
highlights the Management Board’s powers to take 
decisions and the ACWL General Assembly’s limited 
power to approve but not “review, amend, or appeal” 
those decisions.237 Nevertheless, it is not certain that the 
members of the ACWL General Assembly would agree 
with that characterization; and it is unclear what would 
happen in the event that the ACWL General Assembly 
declined to approve decisions or recommendations by 
the Management Board.  
4.1.1.3 Scope of services
The legal services offered by the ACWL can be 
generally divided into three categories: (1) assistance 
in WTO dispute proceedings,238 (2) legal advice on 
issues of WTO law,239 and (3) “training on WTO law,” 
or what is more commonly described as “capacity 
building,”240 although this Scoping Study, in defining 
and conceptualizing “capacity” more broadly, would 
characterize all services provided by the ACWL as 
meeting some element of “capacity” challenges 
experienced by states.
An overview of ACWL activities from 2008-2018 is 
shown in Table 5.
In terms of the distribution of person-hours across 
these activities, one estimate is that between 40 and 
60 percent of the ACWL’s work is in its non-dispute-
related activities (i.e., legal opinions and training/
capacity building).241
As this subsection will discuss, these services are 
inextricably interlinked and imbricated; legal opinions 
support the pursuit or defense of dispute proceedings, 
which provide substantive capacity building within 
litigant governments that help identify new trade law 




The ACWL, uniquely among the Assistance 
Mechanisms discussed in this Scoping Study, provides 
direct legal support for developing countries and 
LDCs in WTO litigation. The ACWL’s mandate allows 
it to provide support to litigants and third-party 
participants engaging in or considering WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings at any and all stages of the 
dispute, from preliminary dispute evaluation through 
Appellate Body procedures, and compliance and 
implementation.242 ACWL Members and LDCs are 
charged specified hourly rates (Table 6), while non-
Member developing countries must pay a higher hourly 
rate for ACWL services. One of the most frequently 
cited benefits of the ACWL’s direct representation 
structure is that it serves as a repository of expertise 
that allows infrequent WTO litigants to compete on 
more or less equal terms with some of the WTO’s 
largest users like the United States or the European 
Union.243 Although developing countries and LDCs 
individually are infrequent users of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement forums, the ACWL itself is one of the 
most frequent participants in WTO litigation. Since 
its establishment in 2001, the ACWL has provided 
direct legal support (either through its own lawyers 
or through external counsel) in approximately 20% of 
all WTO disputes – more than 60 proceedings.244 This 
broad portfolio of cases allows the ACWL to perform 
the function of “pool[ing] the legal experience of 
developing countries and LDCs in WTO legal matters 
and enabl[ing] each of them to draw on this collective 
experience to defend their individual interests in 
dispute settlement proceedings.”245 
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While in theory the ACWL has the ability (with the 
permission of the Management Board) to refuse to 
litigate truly frivolous cases, CCSI’s consultations 
suggest that this option has never been exercised 
and that non-meritorious cases brought to the 
ACWL have historically been diverted prior to 
litigation, during the diligence phase or otherwise. 
It is important to note also that governments are 
not required to use the ACWL, and “it is therefore 
not uncommon to see a government use the 
ACWL in one dispute and a commercial law firm in 
another.”246 
Additionally, the ACWL will at times work alongside 
private counsel also engaged by the government, 
on terms set by the client government. CCSI’s 
consultations suggest that the Centre has historically 
been quite accommodating of alternate case 
management structures when client governments 
request them. Consultations also suggest that the 
ACWL is able to effectively do this because it has 
a good reputation and private sector firms are 
therefore willing to work as co-counsel with the 
ACWL on matters. 
A number of government officials from low and middle-
income countries noted in Scoping Study consultations 
that while strict public sector procurement processes 
present hurdles to benefiting from private sector advice 
in early-stage ISDS disputes, the ACWL’s status as a 
trusted and well-established treaty-based organization 
means that it is easier to both seek and to justify seeking 
the ACWL’s help at the earliest stages of disputes, or 
even when disputes are being considered. There is 
some empirical evidence to support the idea that the 
ACWL has helped secure more thorough representation 
for developing countries and LDCs – a 2010 study of 
the ACWL’s impact noted that the Centre seems to 
have allowed developing countries “to pursue disputes 
undertaken more fully.”247 However, it does not appear 
that the ACWL’s existence has brought many “new users” 
into the WTO system – the overwhelming majority of 
clients of the ACWL had participated in WTO disputes 
prior to working with the Centre.248
Table 5 ACWL Activities: 2008-2018
ACWL 






17 14 14 10 8 8 8 3 7 6 7
New requests for 
support in WTO 
disputes
5 3 4 4 1 3 5 0 4 3 2
Legal opinions 237 186 196 181 204 215 231 218 206 194 175
Certificates of 
training
39 37 38 34 37 37 30 31 29 34 32
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Rosters of external counsel and pre-set fees
In the event of conflicts of interest (usually, when two 
adverse countries entitled to the ACWL’s services both 
request the Centre’s assistance in the same dispute), 
the ACWL will represent the first country that requested 
its assistance. With respect to the other country, the 
ACWL maintains a curated list of lawyers and law firms 
who have agreed to represent ACWL Members and 
LDCs on the same terms as those provided by the 
Centre, including with respect to fixed rates.249 As of 
2017, 36 firms and individuals, including a number 
of prominent international law firms, had joined the 
ACWL’s roster of external counsel.250 
The ACWL has an External Counsel Fund, fixed at 
CHF300,000, that is used to pay these attorneys 
(depending on the eligibility of the client country for 
free or reduced fee services). For 2018, it was expected 
that the expenditures would not exceed CHF75,000.
Technical Assistance Trust Fund
In 2002, the ACWL decided to establish a Technical 
Expertise Trust Fund to be able to finance the 
preparation of the underlying technical dossiers 
required in complex dispute settlement proceedings. 
Through experience, it became clear that in certain 
kinds of technical disputes, particularly those pertaining 
to the WTO Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade 
and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures, the highly-
specialized expertise that is necessary during the 
course of litigation was a barrier for many developing 
countries who do not have this expertise in-house, 
and cannot afford to hire experts on an ad hoc basis. 
The ACWL budget was also not large enough to 
pay the costs necessary to prepare these kinds of 
technical cases. Developing countries and countries in 
transition that are ACWL Members as well as LDCs, 
can request disbursements from this trust fund up to 
CHF100,000. The amount of the subsidy varies, from 
20% to 90% of costs, by the category of membership 
of the ACWL (Categories A, B, C and LDCs, discussed 
below). The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has contributed CHF250,000 (EUR171,500) to the Trust 
Fund for a period of three years. The balance as of 31 
December 2018 was roughly CHF550,000.
4.1.1.3.2 Legal advice
In addition to direct representation and dispute 
support, the ACWL provides on average 200 legal 
opinions per year on issues of WTO law. The legal 
opinions are entirely free of charge for Members and 
can also be obtained at set fees by non-Member 
developing countries.251 These opinions, granted on 
a strictly confidential basis, take forms ranging from 
extensive meetings to lengthy written opinions.252 The 
opinions fall into three general categories:
• Systemic: General or systemic issues arising in 
connection with negotiations and WTO decision-
making. They include legal issues raised by 
negotiating proposals, arising in trade policy 
reviews, and connected to the work of various 
WTO Committees;
• Internal compliance: States seeking advice 
regarding the consistency of their own measures 
and other international treaties (e.g., subsidies, 
trade remedies, intellectual property protections) 
with WTO law. The ACWL notes that these are 
sometimes used by ACWL Members and LDCs 
to help resolve internal disagreements within 
the government about the WTO-consistency of 
proposed measures; and  
• External compliance: States seeking advice 
regarding the WTO-consistency of measures 
taken by other WTO Members and legal options 
for addressing those inconsistencies.253  
In the period from 2014-2018, 35% of legal opinions 
related to systemic issues, 36% to issues of internal 
compliance, and 29% to external compliance.254
In 2015, the ACWL General Assembly approved a 
proposal enabling the ACWL to use its Roster of 
External Counsel to provide these legal opinions when 
conflicts of interests prevented the ACWL from doing 
so. (Previously, the Roster of External Counsel had 
only been used in the context of dispute settlement 
proceedings). Under this approach, when the ACWL 
has a conflict of interest, LDCs and developing country 
Members can obtain a free legal opinion from a 
lawyer/law firm of their choosing that is on the Roster. 
The ACWL will pay the fees of the lawyer/law firm.255
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Several developing country representatives in 
consultations for this Scoping Study noted that in 
the context of ISDS disputes, budget constraints, 
strict procurement laws, and anti-corruption 
regimes make it difficult to quickly secure the advice 
of private-sector counsel in the earliest stages of a 
dispute or before taking actions that could trigger 
disputes. These representatives frequently pointed 
to the ACWL’s free provision of legal advice and 
opinions as a crucial resource that circumvented 
these restrictions and allowed them to quickly take 
informed action. Bohanes and Vidal-Leon note 
that the terms of these opinions, especially when 
unrelated to imminent disputes, would be “difficult 
to match for a private sector provider,” and that the 
expertise, informality, and accommodation offered 
by the ACWL’s legal opinions uniquely positioned 
the ACWL among institutions.256 However, CCSI’s 
consultations revealed that at least one upper-
middle-income government has structured a 
standing retainer agreement with a private sector 
firm that allows for similar access to on-demand 
legal opinions in the investment law context, albeit 
at a (relatively inexpensive) fixed cost.257
However, it is important to realize that ACWL 
opinions are not without restrictions. First, “the 
limitations of the ACWL’s mandate necessarily 
limit” the benefits of the ACWL’s opinions, as the 
ACWL cannot advise on non-legal issues “such 
as economic policy or negotiating strategy or 
negotiating objectives.”258 These kinds of non-legal 
issues may prove to be more pervasive to questions 
of investment law than with respect to WTO law. 
Second, the inability of the ACWL to volunteer its 
services means that governments are unable to seek 
help with “unknown unknowns” – issues that might 
present serious future challenges but have not 
been identified in a particularized way by the client 
government.259
4.1.1.3.3 Capacity building
Finally, the ACWL engages in significant capacity 
building for developing countries and LDCs who 
access its services. This capacity building was integral 
to its design, and takes three forms: first, traditional 
capacity building through trainings and seminars; 
second, hands-on training for government officials 
through organized secondments to the Centre; 
and third, inherent capacity building through close 
collaboration with government officials making use of the 
Centre’s direct representation services. Claudia Orozco 
Jaramillo, then-Minister Counsellor with the Permanent 
Mission of Colombia to the WTO who is broadly credited 
with originating the idea of the ACWL,260 described the 
philosophy of the ACWL’s representation quite clearly.
“[T]he essence of the ACWL is not to be a law firm but 
to contribute to development by helping developing 
countries learn by doing. For this to happen, both the 
ACWL and the user countries need to permanently 
bear in mind this goal. Whenever a user country 
decides to participate in a case it should appoint a 
team of Government officials to represent the country 
and request that such team be coached to perform as 
much and as far as possible. The essence of the ACWL 
is to help developing countries to move forward on 
the path to development through enhancement of 
their human resources and institutional organization 
and by acting with the conviction that all, even 
marginal contributions, are significant to this overall 
purpose.”261
With respect to more traditional capacity building, 
the ACWL’s main training and seminar program is 
a 9-month training course that meets weekly and is 
offered to WTO delegates from developing countries 
and LDCs. Additionally, the ACWL offers a number of 
ad hoc trainings, which can be set up at the request 
of governments.262 These trainings are open to invitees 
of any developing country Members and LDCs, and 
so occasionally include private sector representatives 
invited by governments. Users of these training services 
who were consulted by CCSI (mostly, but not entirely 
developing country governments) describe these 
trainings as substantially similar to those provided by 
other nonprofit organizations, governments, and private 
sector firms. However, the ACWL’s annual training course 
has the advantage of being located in Geneva, and so 
is easily accessible for countries’ representatives to the 
WTO.
The ACWL also operates an intensive 9-month 
secondment for trade lawyers from developing country 
Members and LDCs, which functions as a paid training 
program that places these lawyers directly alongside 
ACWL staff. Although this project was not initiated 
until 2005, its presence was part of the early plans for 
the ACWL.263 This program has other parallels; in the 
process of compiling this paper CCSI spoke to private 
sector lawyers who had negotiated contracts that 
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had involved placing government lawyers in similar 
secondments inside their firms. Nevertheless, the 
ACWL’s secondment program allows trade lawyers 
from developing countries and LDCs to gain substantial 
experience with hands-on WTO litigation that would 
be difficult for these governments (who, individually, 
are not frequent WTO litigants) to duplicate in other 
contexts, including within their own government or 
perhaps, even, in a private firm.264
Perhaps most significantly, the ACWL contributes to 
developing legal capacity in its users by permitting, 
indeed requiring, client governments to work closely 
with the Centre’s staff during the course of direct 
representation through the ACWL.265 Although this 
feature is often overlooked, lawyers who had worked 
for the ACWL directly, interfaced with ACWL services 
from within developing country governments, or 
coordinated with the ACWL from the private sector 
all credited the ACWL’s lean staffing model with 
substantially increasing the capacity of developing 
country governments. Although a number of 
government representatives noted that the ACWL’s 
resources and work model made it slightly less 
responsive to short-term demands than a private 
sector firm would be, they also pointed out that 
the ACWL’s staffing model meant that the Centre, 
by design and necessity, worked closely with in-
house government lawyers and provided intense 
hands-on training opportunities that were rarely 
available from other sources. As Claudia Orozco 
Jaramillo’s comments above indicate, this training-by-
collaboration was always intended to be a benefit of 
the ACWL’s service provision structure. Although this 
is not unique to the ACWL, and many governments 
operate “mixed” models of representation that 
involve collaboration between private sector counsel 
and government lawyers, a number of government 
attorneys were of the opinion that the ACWL’s 
collaborative representation process provided a vastly 
more valuable capacity building opportunity than any 
private-sector partnership they had experienced.
The ACWL has been highly praised for its contribution 
to enhancing the legal capacity of the states who 
access its services. It is important to note, however, 
that the ACWL’s capacity building programs focus 
on developing technical competence and expertise 
within the specific framework of WTO litigation rather 
than on building more broadly governments’ capacity 
to advocate for their national economic interests.266 
As such, the ACWL’s model is well suited to a more 
narrow-conception of capacity building but is not 
well-suited to address organizational, institutional 
or systemic problems that might substantially hinder 
states’ ability to effectively participate in the WTO 
system and advance their economic interests. These 
systemic barriers could take a variety of forms, from 
breakdowns in inter-governmental decision-making 
processes to failures to communicate effectively with 
the private sector to fear of economic retaliation from 
trading partners.267 Without the ability to provide aid 
in these areas, the ACWL’s interventions are limited 
to building technical competence and “equality of 
arms” within existing international legal frameworks 
rather than supporting the development of more 
effective and equal institutional forms. Still, the narrow 
focus of the ACWL’s capacity building effort may have 
significantly eased the ACWL’s acceptance by the 
global community. 
In CCSI’s consultations the ACWL’s success was also, 
in part, attributed to its ability to focus on legal rather 
than policy issues, and thus retain an aura of neutrality. 
The ACWL’s 2017 Annual Report, in response to the 
frequently asked question, “How does the ACWL 
ensure the neutrality and impartiality of its advice?” 
frames this narrow approach as a key feature of its 
neutrality. As a matter of policy, “[t]he ACWL provides 
only legal, not political, advice.”268 Similarly, lawyers 
involved in the formation of the ACWL noted in 
consultations with CCSI that perceptions of the 
Centre as “apolitical” were crucial to its acceptance 
by both developed and developing WTO members. 
It is also important to note that the use of the term 
“narrow” in this context reflects the scope of ACWL 
interventions rather than their quality or intensity. In 
fact, multiple civil society and developing country 
observers consulted by CCSI believe that the ACWL’s 
capacity building programs are quite effective in 
helping government officials acquire and maintain 
technical legal expertise in the narrow sense. 
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4.1.1.4 Funding
From its initial formation, the ACWL’s funding 
structure was central to its mission. Claudia Orozco 
Jaramillo was very explicit in her belief that the 
Centre’s funding structures were essential to its 
effective governance, long-term viability, and 
immediate legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community:
[The ACWL] needed to be economically 
independent to ensure stability and credibility. 
Additionally, the need for economic stability had 
to be balanced with the need to ensure that the 
long-term viability of the facility would result from 
the quality of its services. For that reason, an 
economic model was developed based on a trust 
fund that provided certain stability combined with 
payable services. Even though some developing 
countries lack resources required to pay legal fees 
at market rates, services should not be offered 
free of charge. Free of charge services affect the 
quality of the services and the dynamics between 
the provider and the user. The model had to 
empower developing country users as owners and 
clients of the facility.269
When the ACWL was established, it was envisioned 
that, after an initial five-year transition period (2001-
2005), it would be self-sustainable, funded by a 
combination of (1) earnings on an Endowment Fund 
funded by contributions of developed and developing 
country ACWL Members and other governments, and 
(2) fees charged to developing countries and LDCs for 
support in WTO disputes.270 The ACWL also has some 
ability to accept contributions from other sources for 
“specific purposes that are not related to dispute 
settlement cases,”271 but segregates those funds 
from its core functions. This mixed funding model has 
been described by those close to the Centre as “co-
ownership” between developing and developed states, 
and a number of lawyers familiar with the work of the 
ACWL have credited this built-in reliance on developing 
country funds for the Centre’s perceived institutional 
independence from developed country donors. 
With respect to the Endowment Fund, it is primarily 
funded by its developed country Members, which now 
number eleven (there are also thirty-six developing 
country members, one associate developed country 
member, and forty-four LDCs entitled to services 
without membership). A “majority of the ACWL’s funding 
originates from development agencies or development 
directorates within a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. …These 
contributions are normally considered as part of each 
Member’s Aid for Trade effort and can be categorized 
as [official development assistance].”272 Each developed 
country member has contributed at least $1,000,000 to 
Table 6 Hourly and maximum total charge to complainants and respondents in WTO panel 
proceedings762
Category CHF per hour Maximum fee for a WTO panel proceeding
Category A Member 324 CHF46,628
Category B Member 243 CHF35,721
Category C Member 162 CHF23,814
Least developed country 40 CHF5,880
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the operation of the ACWL through either endowment 
fund contributions or direct contributions to the annual 
budget.273 
In terms of voluntary contributions from non-
governmental sources, while those are permitted 
under the ACWL’s financial regulations, they have been 
discouraged on the ground that they create tensions 
with the “ACWL’s impartial and non-issue driven 
nature.”274 On at least one occasion, for instance, “a 
private foundation decided not to provide funding 
when the ACWL could not guarantee that it would 
take certain legal positions.”275
With respect to service fees charged to users, 
contemporary observers of the ACWL’s formation noted 
that this charging model was rooted in “four elements: 
the ability to pay, the user pays principle, the need to 
create incentives to become [a founding funder of the 
Centre], and the need to avoid frivolous cases.”276 “The 
ACWL charges developing countries and LDCs for 
access to the ACWL’s direct representation services on 
a tiered payment scale, with country categorizations 
based on their underlying economic activity or GNP 
per capita (country categories A, B, C, LDC). Category 
A countries, which are charged the highest amount, 
are those whose economic activity makes up >1.5% of 
World Trade Share (WTS) or those who are identified 
as High-Income Countries based on GNP per capita. 
Category B countries are defined as countries whose 
economic activity makes up between 0.15% and 1.5% 
of WTS or those who are identified as Upper Middle-
Income Countries based on GNP per capita. Category 
C countries are those whose economies represent 
<0.15% of WTS, and the lowest fees are charged to 
countries identified as LDCs.277 Services other than 
direct representation (i.e., legal advice and training/
capacity building) are provided free of charge to 
developing country members and LDCs.  Table 6 
illustrates the hourly rates and the maximum fees that 
the ACWL will charge different Members and LDCs for 
support as a complainant or respondent in WTO panel 
proceedings. It sets additional maximum charges for 
other phases of dispute settlement (e.g., consultations, 
Appellate Body proceedings, participation in different 
phases as a third-party).278  
As indicated in Table 6, countries at each payment tier 
are charged a different per-hour rate for the work of 
the ACWL’s staff, ranging from CHF324 Swiss francs 
per hour for Category A countries to CHF40 per hour 
for LDCs. In the event of a dispute between two 
Members or LDCs who both seek the services of the 
ACWL, these fees are raised by 20% to match fees 
provided to private sector counsel.279 Outside counsel 
is then engaged for the party who is not represented 
by the ACWL,280 and will have agreed to charge fees 
commensurate with those charged by the ACWL. 
Any payment required by outside counsel beyond 
the ACWL’s established fee structure is paid by the 
Centre.281
In addition to offering services at discounted hourly 
rates, ACWL provides detailed “time budgets” 
for different types of representation that include a 
projected number of hours for each activity and a 
total maximum cost.282 The costs estimated by these 
time budgets represent a firm cap on the amount the 
ACWL will charge for the described services, although 
all parties consulted on the topic acknowledged that 
the actual work done by ACWL lawyers frequently 
exceeded (in some cases, significantly) the time 
budgets provided on an uncompensated basis, 
although no one felt that the quality of service, or the 
ACWL’s dedication to the client, diminished after the 
time budget had expired. Government officials who 
worked directly with the ACWL cited this as a key 
feature of the ACWL’s appeal, as it allows states to 
predictably budget for the Centre’s services without 
noticeably restricting the availability of resources 
to deal with unexpected complications. A number 
of developing country officials told CCSI that the 
ACWL’s fee structure and transparency provided 
a public good beyond their role in the ACWL’s 
representation; these time budgets (and maximum 
fees charged) have occasionally been used as a 
negotiating tool for developing country governments 
securing representation from private sector law firms, 
and the ACWL’s existence as a “best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement” has allowed some countries 
to secure substantially lower rates for private 
sector representation. One noted that although his 
government had not engaged in active negotiation 
with private law firms to substantially lower fees, 
this interviewee had seen bids decrease by 20 to 30 
percent as the legal market adjusted to the presence 
of a low-cost competitor (the ACWL). However, 
Bohanes and Vidal-Leon point out that the ACWL’s 
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rise to prominence coincided with broader shifts in 
international legal markets and the expanding role 
of firms in developing country markets like China, 
India, and Latin America, and so might not be the 
sole or direct cause of price changes.283
 
Despite the original vision for the Centre, the ACWL 
has never achieved financial self-sustainability. 
After its first transitional phase, at the end of 2005, 
the Endowment Fund stood at CHF18.0 million, 
with projected yields of roughly CHF0.8 million per 
year. Fees for services rendered were estimated at 
CHF0.3 million per year. Together, those amounts 
were less than one half of the annual cost of ACWL 
operations (CHF2.3 at the time). A 2006 Task Force 
report concluded that, given the growth and success 
of the ACWL, and the size of and returns to the 
Endowment Fund to that point, it was doubtful 
that the Endowment Fund would ever reach a size 
necessary to ensure the ACWL’s self-sufficiency.284 
Additionally, while demand for all of the ACWL’s 
services has increased, a significant portion of 
that demand continues to be for legal opinions 
and training/capacity building activities, services 
for which the ACWL does not charge. Due to the 
increased demand for ACWL services and associated 
staffing needs, the annual budget of the ACWL 
has grown (albeit modestly) each year. For 2016, it 
was roughly CHF4.3 million;285 and for 2019, it was 
estimated at roughly CHF4.7 million.286 In contrast 
income from legal fees averaged only CHF161,000 
per year from 2002-2014; stated differently, legal 
fees have constituted on average roughly 4 percent 
of the ACWL’s annual revenues.287 Notwithstanding 
that gap, at least one external audit of the ACWL 
commissioned by a developed country ACWL 
Member recommended against any increase in fees 
on the ground that it would have limited impact for 
financial sustainability but “would likely discourage 
Category B and Category C Developing Countries 
from reaching out for ACWL assistance.”288
To date, ACWL governance has used five year-
periods to conduct major evaluations of the need for 
and role of ACWL services, examine funding needs, 
and plan for whether and how to meet those funding 
needs. The budget for the 2017-2021 period is 
estimated at CHF23.548 million. Taking into account 
revenue from the Endowment Fund (which, by the 
end of 2015, had reached roughly CHF26 million) 
that could be withdrawn to fund the Centre over the 
five-year window, CHF20 million in additional voluntary 
contributions was determined necessary to cover the 
ACWL’s financial needs through 2021.289 It is expected 
that these funds will need to come from voluntary 
contributions of developed country Members. Funding 
appears to be an ongoing challenge for the ACWL. 
While users, donors, past and current employees, 
external auditors, academics, and others, widely give it 
high praise, experience shows that it continues to need 
to raise significant sums to support its five-year budgets. 
4.1.1.5 Scalability 
As of 31 December 2018, there were eleven developed 
country Members, one developed country associate 
Member, thirty-six developing country Members of 
the ACWL, and forty-four LDCs entitled to its services 
without a membership requirement.290 This represents 
just over forty percent of WTO Members. Also, as of 
31 December 2018 there were fifteen members of staff 
(twelve lawyers, including the Executive Director, and 
three administrative staff), and four attorneys with the 
ACWL under its secondment program. 
Given the resources required to hire and retain quality 
staff, and to devote the time necessary to provide quality 
legal support, the ACWL would not be able to increase 
its activities absent additional funding and could face 
challenges meeting needs if there were any dramatic 
increases in demand for ACWL services.291
4.1.2 African Legal Support Facility 
4.1.2.1 Overview
The ALSF, based in Abidjan, Côte D’Ivoire, is a public 
international, treaty-based organization hosted by the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) Group.292 The ALSF 
provides legal advice and technical assistance to African 
countries with respect to the negotiation of complex 
commercial transactions, creditor litigation, and other 
related sovereign transactions or disputes, including 
with respect to international investment law. Its mission 
is “[a]chieving sustainable legal capacity for Africa,”293 
to be met through its goal of removing asymmetric 
technical capacities and to level the playing field of legal 
expertise among parties to litigation and negotiations. 
All of its activities aim to build additional legal capacity.294
The ALSF was established by African finance ministers 
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following a call, in June 2003, for the creation of a legal 
technical assistance facility to help Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPCs) address the growing problem 
of vulture funds (legal claims based on distressed debt). 
The Commission for Africa again reiterated the need 
for such a facility in March 2005. The G8 recognized 
that lawsuits instituted by vulture funds against African 
countries were an obstacle to debt relief arrangements 
that had been agreed in 2005. The ALSF was created 
by a treaty that came into force in December 2008 and 
per its founding treaty, will terminate in 2022.295
4.1.2.2 Organizational governance
The governance structure of ALSF consists of a 
Governing Council representing twelve members 
of participating states and institutions, consisting 
of: a Management Board composed of five regional 
member countries of the AfDB (each serving in his or 
her personal capacity),296 four OECD member-states,297 
one non-OECD member-state,298 a permanent seat 
for a representative of the AfDB, and a seat for an 
international non-governmental organization. The 
technical staff is headed by a Director.
According to one interviewee who is familiar with the 
founding and operation of the ALSF, key traits that 
contributed to its success were that it was a regional 
initiative, and not something that came from the G20, 
G7, or other organizations outside of the region, and 
that it started with African institutional support (the 
AfDB), and thus benefitted from trust relationships 
that were already established.299 
4.1.2.3 Scope of Services 
ALSF is a “broker-plus” model. ALSF helps countries 
to engage outside counsel, but ALSF in-house counsel 
also give advice and guide governments on what 
that outside counsel is saying and in managing this 
relationship.300 ALSF’s eight technical staff maintain 
an internal knowledge base and expertise and are 
thus able to help governments interpret and enact 
the advice that they receive from outside counsel, as 
well as to assist governments with relevant capacity 
building and other tools that will strengthen the ability 
of governments to act on their own.301 
While ALSF was primarily founded with the idea of 
helping to combat issues related to vulture funds, in 
the early days of the ALSF it became clear that the 
problem that HIPCs were experiencing went beyond, 
and was more profound than, issues surrounding the 
lawsuits initiated by vulture funds, and that there was 
a need for broader advisory services with respect to 
foreign investment, particularly with respect to natural 
resources and infrastructure contracts, and related 
capacity building.302 ALSF now engages in a much 
wider range of services ranging from negotiations, 
litigation support, capacity building, and knowledge 
management, and will coordinate with outside services 
providers to engage, as appropriate, to facilitate these 
services.303
ALSF conducts diligence around every requested 
service, and while it has no formal policy surrounding 
requests that should be rejected, some may be 
rejected during the course of ALSF’s internal diligence 
policy. 
4.1.2.3.1 Engaging ALSF and Outside Counsel
ALSF operates upon request of governments. A 
government must submit a formal written request for 
assistance to the ALSF. This requirement is based on 
a desire, by the ALSF, to ensure that there is sufficient 
political buy-in to ALSF assistance before ALSF will 
engage.304 As such, it has been the experience of ALSF 
that when governments agree to formally submit a 
request, there is broader agreement that they need or 
desire specific assistance and are willing to request it 
from the ALSF.305
In all cases, while ALSF will facilitate access to outside 
counsel, governments make the final call on which 
counsel they hire. The objective is to ensure that 
governments trust outside counsel to the greatest 
extent possible.306 
In the past ALSF used a procurement process and 
provided a roster of firms that were available for 
engagement by governments. This system was in 
many ways difficult to manage, not least because it 
meant ALSF was constantly negotiating counsel fees 
(in its “broker” capacity).307 It is understood that ALSF 
has now moved to a panel system, which is easier to 
manage, but which also means that rates are locked 
in for a longer period of time, which is a trade-off.308 
Under a panel approach, ALSF enters into framework 
contracts with firms. When a request for assistance has 
been received, ALSF then brokers with 4-6 firms to 
enter into a procurement (including bids and financial 
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proposals), which can be done relatively quickly 
under existing framework agreements.309 ALSF does 
maintain terms of reference for flat-fee arrangements 
but has found that this kind of financial arrangement 
is very difficult for litigation, so has generally focused 
on other options of reduced fee arrangements, 
which all vary by the kind of assistance required 
and by firm.310 Some firms do work on a pro bono 
basis, some do one hour of pro bono for each hour 
of paid time, others commit to pro bono capacity 
building with paid advice. Success fees in litigation 
are also possible, however, ALSF did not prefer this 
remuneration method.311 A key to ALSF’s success 
is “demanding heavily discounted rates and brutal 
negotiation” with service providers.312
In some cases, ALSF encountered political sensitivity 
among client governments during the process of 
hiring outside international counsel.313 In order to 
ease political tensions in the client country, ALSF 
began a practice of first coordinating the hiring 
of a domestic firm in the client country to act as 
local counsel, and then asked that this firm hire 
international counsel in coordination with ALSF.314 
This small change in practice made political issues 
much easier to navigate because local counsel 
typically knew the decision-makers in the client 
country, and the government decision-makers knew 
and trusted local counsel to help lead them through 
the process of hiring and engaging with international 
counsel.315
However, allowing client-countries to select their 
own firms and go through their own procurement 
processes did result in some tensions with some 
ALSF donors.316 As a general matter, donors were 
interested in clear and transparent procurement 
processes, which was not always the case in every 
client country.317 While this was a difficult tension for 
ALSF to navigate, they generally leave this kind of 
process and decision-making up to the client country, 
as long as certain general minimum requirements of 
both the process and the selected firm are met.318
ALSF also facilitates grants and loans to client 
countries. With respect to litigation services, ALSF 
uses grants and loans to offset the cost of outside 
counsel.319 In order to streamline this approach and 
make it more consistent, ALSF created a country 
list that helped to qualify what the default position 
would be on each project.320 This list was based on 
various country-based sustainability analyses (such as 
the IMF’s) and then also on the specifics of the sector 
and project.321 
ALSF has also started doing “reimbursable advances” for 
services, with respect to which repayment is contingent 
on success.322 The World Bank Group uses similar 
structures, called “reimbursable advisory services.” 
While this project was difficult to start, it is envisioned 
that these kinds of financial advances will form the bulk 
of ALSF’s financial arrangements for legal support  in 
the coming years.323 While these advances, can be 
a source of financial risk to the institution, the ALSF 
decided that the value of governments being able to 
get advice through this kind of financing, and, critically, 
governments feeling like they could take independent 
advice, outweighed the institutional risk.324 
Under a “reimbursable advance, ALSF directly funds 
the lawyers selected by the government to complete a 
specific project, and then requires the government to 
reimburse the ALSF if the project is successful.325 What 
defines “success” in each context is pre-determined 
and agreed between ALSF and the client government, 
and is entirely context-dependent (e.g. the negotiation 
achieves financial close).326 A “reimbursable advance” 
effectively amounts to an interest-free loan to the 
government where ALSF (and by extension, a donor 
institution) has agreed to take the first loss in case of 
failure.327  The rationale for this type of financial structure 
is based on the ultimate objective of development and 
ALSF being a development institution.328 While this kind 
of financial arrangement was technically available from 
ALSF for years, it did not gain any interest until recently. 
One interviewee attributed this delayed take-up to 
ALSF needing to first gain the necessary trust among its 
users.329 
4.1.2.3.2 Capacity building
ALSF engages in capacity building on a project/client-
specific basis as well as through the ALSF Academy.
Project-specific capacity building and trainings 
Each of ALSF’s projects blends capacity building with 
advisory services, the precise nature of which depends 
on the project at hand. This combination is considered 
highly effective, particularly when compared with 
capacity building that only takes place in classroom 
settings outside of specific negotiations or litigation.330 
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While ALSF used to do more of this kind of general 
training, it found that one-off classroom sessions 
divorced from specific projects had little impact and 
were not useful from a cost-benefit perspective.331 Now, 
for example, if a country has requested negotiation 
assistance, capacity building related to that project 
may involve analyzing and critiquing actual contracts 
that have previously been negotiated by the client 
country and examining the contracts against market 
practice and what other countries are doing in similar 
circumstances.332 This kind of capacity building has 
been viewed as being far more impactful, although it 
is much more difficult, specific, and time-consuming 
to build into projects than generic training.333
In one interviewee’s experience, it is critically important 
to lead a project with this kind of relevant training (the 
above example would be relevant, for example, prior 
to a contract negotiation).334 It not only helps to give 
government officials an overview of the process that 
will occur and to build specific knowledge, but it also 
provides an opportunity for the government officials 
to get to know, and ideally have more trust in, outside 
counsel, which is viewed by the ALSF as critical to the 
success of any project.335 One low-income government 
official felt that this kind of capacity building may be 
useful to a certain extent, but that because much of 
any actual negotiation is still managed by a private 
firm (through coordination with ALSF) the kind of 
capacity building that is necessary to actually transfer 
knowledge is lacking in the ALSF model.336
ALSF Academy Project
Through the ALSF Academy Project, the ALSF is 
now launching a three-level capacity building and 
certification program in negotiating commercial 
agreements for African lawyers and experts.337 Firms 
can pay a minimal sum and their lawyers can access the 
Academy. The first cohort is still proceeding through 
this one-year course, which began at the end of 2018. 
ALSF started the ALSF Academy Project based on the 
recognition that equitable and durable agreements 
surrounding investment projects and ensuring that 
they are negotiated to stand the test of time, are 
key components of attracting and retaining FDI. 
However, some countries may face challenges 
in negotiating these deals because some topics, 
requiring specific expertise, are often not taught at 
African institutions.338 The ALSF Academy Project aims 
to remove the asymmetrical technical capacities and 
level the field of expertise among parties to litigation 
and negotiation.339
4.1.2.3.3 Knowledge sharing
ALSF has attempted to do formal and informal 
“information sharing” among governments, but one 
interviewee notes that this is fraught with challenges.340 
One of the challenges is antitrust – especially if there 
is any collusion about pricing. ALSF found that the 
best way to promote information sharing was by 
organizing peer-to-peer regional events on certain 
topics, with a requirement that whomever attends has 
to present on what his or her government is doing with 
respect to a given topic.341 In so doing, ALSF found 
that government officials also speak to each other 
during breaks, or at dinner or lunch, and that other, 
more informal information-sharing often happens in 
this context.342  
4.1.2.4 Funding
ALSF has a variety of donors including AfDB, the 
African Development Fund, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, other regional and national 
development agencies and institutions, and states.343 
Since becoming operational in 2010 through 2018, it 
has received $81.51 million in contributions.344 
As a general matter, in order to minimize conflicts 
between these donors and ALSF and its grantees, 
ALSF has made efforts to build a wall around its 
governance structures and to require donors give 
into a multi-donor fund while prohibiting donations 
to any specific project or case.345 This was viewed 
as particularly critical in cases in which ALSF was 
supporting litigation services. 
When it comes to potential conflicts of interest between 
the ALSF and its donors, ALSF also emphasizes the 
role of client-country representatives (acting in their 
individual capacity) in ALSF’s management and 
decision-making structure.
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4.1.3 International Development Law 
Organization, Investment Support Programme 
for Least Developed Countries 
4.1.3.1 Overview
The ISP/LDCs program was designed in collaboration 
with the UN Office of the High Representative 
for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked 
Developing Countries and Small Island Developing 
States and was launched in September 2017.346 
The ISP/LDCs program provides on-demand legal 
and professional assistance to LDC governments347 
and eligible state-owned (SOEs) or private sector 
small and medium-sized entities for investment-
related negotiations, dispute settlement, and 
other investment-related matters by matching 
beneficiaries with support providers.348 The ISP/
LDCs program also supports training and capacity 
building activities.349 The ISP/LDCs program is at 
an early phase. It has begun providing advice to 
countries on negotiations of investment treaties 
and is in discussions with beneficiaries and support 
providers to begin facilitating the representation of 
states in ISDS proceedings. 
The objectives of the ISP/LDCs program are to ensure 
that LDCs derive maximum benefit from existing 
investment opportunities, to increase sustainable 
investment flows, and to promote greater economic 
diversification. In order to accomplish these 
objectives, ISP/LDCs seeks to address the capacity 
constraints that LDC governments, SOEs, and small 
and medium-sized private sector entities may face in 
investment relationships and with foreign investors 
by providing pro-bono assistance from lawyers and 
other expert partners.350 All operational expenses 
are provided through donor funds.
The ISP/LDCs program envisions that all costs, 
such as logistical costs, expert fees (where pro 
bono services are unavailable), and travel expenses 
for experts, will be covered, but the budget is not 
unlimited.351 Expenses for a typical ISDS dispute, 
for example, are currently beyond the means of the 
program.352
4.1.3.2 Scope of services 
The ISP/LDC program is demand-driven, and can be 
used to facilitate anything in the broad category of 
“investment-related” services, including negotiations, 
dispute settlement, and improving skill and capacity.353 
With respect to investment-related negotiations (which 
can include investment agreements or contracts) and 
disputes, including investor-state dispute settlement 
procedures, support may, for example, include: reviewing 
the feasibility of an investment, drafting contract 
provisions, assisting with treaty drafting, review or 
negotiations, implementing treaty provisions, mediation 
or alternative dispute settlement, or preparing for and 
engaging in dispute settlement/ISDS.354
ISP/LDCs offers matching services for experts and 
beneficiaries. It does not provide direct advisory services 
in-house. However, as the program scales up and as 
funding becomes available, it may hire individuals 
to conduct relevant training and capacity building 
activities, oversee service provision, and provide short-
term technical assistance to beneficiaries.355 
Assistance that can be provided by the ISP/LDCs 
program is wide-ranging and limited only by the 
requests on investment-related services that may come 
from beneficiaries, and the experts that the ISP/LDCs 
program is able to facilitate (within the context of its 
budget and available pro bono services). The ISP/LDCs 
program has established a roster of law firms and other 
experts who are willing to provide advice and assistance 
to eligible beneficiaries at no cost (any residual costs 
would be made up by the ISP/LDCs program, not the 
beneficiary).356 The role of the ISP/LDCs program is to 
match the needs of the beneficiary to the skills and 
availability of partners, and ensure that decision-making 
on expert engagement remains with the beneficiary.357 
Once this relationship has been established, ISP/LDCs 
remains available and receives regular reports, assists 
as needed in paperwork, pays expenses and disburses 
funds against deliverables (where applicable). The 
primary relationship remains between the beneficiary 
and the expert. 
Currently, the ISP/LDC roster consists of about thirty 
trusted law firms and other organizations. While more 
were interested in joining, ISP/LDCs found that including 
more, at this preliminary stage, was unnecessary.358 
However, the program has fielded some requests that 
may require a broader range of expertise in the future 
(for example, with respect to damage experts or other 
technical issues).359 One interviewee noted that even 
though the roster is limited, it includes large firms that 
have a wealth of expertise in a wide range of topics, so 
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the program already includes expertise to cover much 
more than just arbitration services.360
The range of ISP/LDCs roster could be a benefit as it 
can draw on a broader range of expertise for certain 
kinds of assistance. For example, with respect to treaty 
negotiation services, several interviewees familiar 
with treaty negotiations and Assistance Mechanisms 
stated that law firms are not well placed to advise on 
treaty negotiations, but ISP/LDCs broader roster may 
permit beneficiaries to draw on expertise outside of 
law firms.361 
Eligible participants in the ISP/LDCs program can 
submit a request directly from the ISP/LDCs website, 
which is available in English and French, and will soon 
be available in Portuguese.362 The request is evaluated, 
and program staff will then reach out to facilitate 
engagement with the beneficiary.
ISP/LSCs has experienced some expected growing 
pains in convincing both governments and lawyers that 
this kind of organization and the services it provides are 
a plausible avenue to pursue.363 The ISP/LDCs program 
sees trustworthiness as the main issue that it will need 
to overcome, just as the ACWL, the ALSF, and other 
established programs have, and this is something 
that must be developed over time.364 One interviewee 
noted that the reputation of the IDLO Director-General, 
Irene Khan, has helped in establishing a certain level 
of trust from the beginning.365 Other factors that this 
interviewee believes will establish a certain level of 
comfort that will at least lead to initial conversations 
with clients include: “(1) a good reputation in rule of 
law and independence, (2) some funding to support 
the intervention, (3) a respectable list of partners.”366 
These factors are absolutely critical given the sensitive 
and confidential relationships that will need to be 
established between ISP/LDCs’ beneficiaries and 
service providers.
4.1.3.3 Funding
With respect to operational funds for the program, 
in its initial phase, the ISP/LDCs program is aiming 
to raise €2 million, a large portion of which has been 
pledged,367 although it remains unclear to CCSI how 
much has actually been donated. At the IDLO ISP/LDCs 
kickoff event at UN Headquarters in September 2017, 
for example, the Director General for International 
Cooperation and Development of the European 
Commission announced a decision to set aside €1 
million for the ISP/LDCs program.368 The program 
finally received those funds in December 2019.369 
With a fully-funded €2 million in donations, ISP/LDCs 
envisions that it would be able to make about twelve 
interventions of medium size, which could take the 
form of arbitrations or large-scale trainings, but, of 
course, the program is in a nascent stage and plans to 
internalize lessons learned as it evolves.370
One interviewee familiar with IDLO’s operations noted 
that one inevitable challenge with any Assistance 
Mechanism, including the ISP/LDCs program, is 
ensuring that there is a secure source of funding. For 
ISP/LDCs, it can, with respect to some projects, benefit 
from the “corporate social responsibility” attitude of 
some firms who are willing to provide pro bono or 
low-cost services. However, this interviewee noted 
that “when it comes to a contentious and hot issue 
like ISDS, you have the added challenge of eating 
someone else’s lunch.”371 In other words, the program 
will be directly competing with profit-making firms in 
this area and recognizes that this is a potential conflict 
for those firms.372 The extent to which this is a hurdle, 
and if so, whether this hurdle can be surmounted, 
remains to be seen.
4.1.3.4 Scalability 
One interviewee familiar with ISP/LDCs’ operations 
views the program as very well-designed to be 
scalable.373 ISP/LDCs has secured commitments for 
pro-bono services from all members of its current 
roster and envisions adding more experts as it grows. 
Thus far, commitments from listed roster-members 
are anywhere from 10-20 hours, to “unlimited,” and 
everything in between.374 Of course, for any given 
project this could mean hundreds or even thousands 
of hours over the course of a year or two. Scalability 
will thus depend, to a large extent, on the dedication 
and extent of the program’s strategic partners.
It remains to be seen whether certain services may 
be more scalable than others. For example, several 
interviewees raised concerns that even the largest 
private firms would not do an entire ISDS claim pro-
bono, and also stated that in any event, such services 
would not qualify as “pro bono” eligible in some 
jurisdictions.375 One private practitioner stated that 
“[t]he ability of a firm to represent a state with any 
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amount of competency from a pro bono perspective 
with that amount of money on the [claimant] 
side is unimaginable.”376 Noting that some firms 
do represent states at a loss, often for tactical/
marketing reasons, “there is no capacity for taking 
on a pro bono client at a $4-$6 million loss for your 
firm,” particularly when the state has paid in other 
cases, or could conceivably pay, this fee.377 One 
interviewee noted that this kind of pro bono is not 
ethically within the scope of what such interviewee’s 
jurisdiction would define as a pro bono client.378
As established, the ISP/LDCs program has very slim 
overhead and a lean institutional set-up required 
to oversee the program. It is not envisioned that 
more than three individuals would be necessary to 
oversee the program, given the ability to call upon 
and coordinate with IDLO’s larger staff of eighty-plus 
individuals as specific needs and expertise arise.379 
Specific fund-raising or other efforts may require an 
additional staff member.380
4.1.3.5 Beneficiaries
Beneficiaries of the ISP/LDC program include 
governments, as well as state-owned enterprises and 
small and medium private sector entities, listed as 
(or originating from) one of the 47 Least Developed 
Countries, as defined by the UN Committee for 
Development Policy. 
One interviewee familiar with this boundary 
recognized that even in countries that are wealthier 
than the 47 Least Developed Countries, there 
are pockets of need that could benefit from the 
ISP/LDCs program, and acknowledged that how 
program boundaries are drawn has impacts on 
a mechanism’s ability to be of service when some 
entities fall outside of the line but otherwise fit the 
model.
Thus far, no SOEs or private sector entities have 
applied for assistance.381 The ISP/LDCs program 
focuses, in particular, on supporting businesses 
owned by women and individuals from marginalized 
and excluded groups and promoting their access to 
economic opportunities.382 
4.1.4 An investment law “hotline” 
Drawing on their experience with the ACWL, several 
government officials, representing each of the four 
economic development levels, noted the potential value 
of an Assistance Mechanism that could act as a “hotline” 
(which may complement other services offered). There 
is, certain officials stated, a need in the investment law 
sphere for ad hoc, trusted, state-oriented, expert advice 
that is similar to that which the ACWL provides in the 
trade arena, and which is not always available in-house. 
It was stated that this is one of the most valuable aspects 
of ACWL membership. 
A wide range of issues were noted by governments as 
areas in which they would envision relying upon such 
assistance, including questions related to policy-making 
in other sectors (e.g. how certain actions may impact 
investment law obligations), investment law policy-
making, dispute prevention, early dispute management, 
and questions that may arise during the course of an 
active dispute. It was noted that unless there is an actual 
dispute warranting a full procurement, it is difficult to 
find the opportunity to ask these kinds of questions to 
outside experts.383
Regarding dispute settlement, one government official 
noted that part of the value-add of outside counsel 
is the wealth of knowledge accumulation gained 
by handling disputes for government-clients, and a 
state-oriented center that could provide this kind of 
knowledge service would be valuable.384 A government 
that is focused on moving a larger component of active 
dispute management in-house stated that it would be 
valuable to call upon a “hotline” to ask specific questions 
related to its own management of the claim.385  One 
government stated that it is not always confident that 
advice received from paid outside-counsel is necessarily 
in its best interest and would value the opportunity to 
“get a second opinion.”386
With respect to the value of this service in the policy-
making (in contrast to the dispute) arena (e.g. does a 
certain regulatory action violate an investment treaty), 
its value may be more limited or nuanced, in the context 
of investment law. For example, as one government 
official interviewee pointed out, unlike WTO-law, 
which is the focus of the ACWL’s advice, investment 
law is not based on a common set of treaties and is 
also a heavily standard, as opposed to rule-based, 
legal system.387 However, several governments noted 
that certain idiosyncratic issues that arise during the 
course of policy-making or dispute prevention can 
easily strain government capacity, and the answers to 
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these discrete questions can be critical.388 Another 
stated that it is “usually not a question of whether or 
not the government can do something but how the 
government can do something.” In certain cases, 
a “hotline” may be able to assist governments in 
advancing their policy objectives in this way. It may be 
able to focus on procedural matters and thus navigate 
to a greater extent the policy-heavy matters that may 
be the focus on investment-law related questions.
A related issue that may increase the difficulty of more 
abstract legal questions or opinions in the investment 
as opposed to WTO context is that ex ante, it may 
be difficult to anticipate and understand the world of 
possible “covered” investors, as well as the treaties 
pursuant to which they may select to advance claims. 
As every treaty would include its own provisions 
definitive legal guidance may prove somewhat elusive.
Finally, to the extent that a center was to give states 
policy-oriented (as opposed to dispute management) 
advice, concerns regarding regulatory chill or 
overdeterrence may arise (see Section 2.2.3) and such 
issues should thus be considered in determining the 
role of and scope for this kind of assistance, including 
how to mitigate undesirable impacts.
4.1.5 Clearinghouse models of negotiation and 
litigation support
In addition to ALSF and ISP/LDCs discussed in 
more depth in the subsections above, various 
other clearinghouse models of legal support exist. 
For example, CONNEX389 and the International 
Senior Lawyers Project,390 among others, connect 
beneficiaries with external support providers at no 
cost to the beneficiary, although funding models 
between clearinghouse support providers can 
differ. For example, while many existing Assistance 
Mechanisms offer support to the beneficiary at a 
no-cost basis, some Assistance Mechanisms pay the 
support provider for the service, while some rely on 
pro-bono provision of services. 
One interviewee advised that if an Assistance 
Mechanism for investment law engaged in matching 
outside counsel to client countries there would need 
to be a database of lawyers who are considered 
both state-friendly and credible.391 This interviewee 
recommended the same for arbitrators but noted that 
in that case “politics” is more of an issue. 
4.2 Institutionalized, multi-service 
support (not including direct legal 
representation of client governments)
There are a wide variety of Assistance Mechanisms that 
offer multiple services to governments. Unlike those 
described above, the existing Assistance Mechanisms 
described in this section do not provide or facilitate 
legal representation. Many are not described in depth 
here as they receive more robust treatment and 
description in other sections of this Scoping Study.
4.2.1 International organizations
The extensive work of UNCTAD, the OECD, and the 
World Bank Group, and the various areas of support 
that they offer to governments, particularly in the 
policy-making arena, are described in various places 
throughout this Scoping Study (particular in Section 
2.2). 
4.2.2 Arbitration centers
While many arbitration centers provide quality training 
and other support services to governments and other 
beneficiaries, International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA) and the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (SCC) are specifically highlighted here. 
4.2.2.1 ICSID 
ICSID staff members host events and provide training 
on arbitration-related issues around the world.392 ICSID 
also offers a half and full-day course on ICSID practice 
and procedure in English, French and Spanish.
ICSID’s Practice Notes for Respondents in ICSID 
Arbitration393 addresses questions frequently asked by 
ICSID member states or investors. It highlights issues 
of interest to respondent states related to prevention 
of disputes, contract and treaty drafting, the pre-
arbitration phase, managing claims, critical issues for 
consideration (including case strategy and budgeting), 
an outline of the steps of an ICSID arbitration, 
specifics regarding ICSID hearings, and post-award 
processes, among other topics. This document 
provides general organizational suggestions and 
questions that states should be considering before 
and during an arbitration. However, this publication 
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does not provide legal advice or policy guidance 
and is not an exhaustive guide to the arbitration 
process. While it is thus extremely useful for all ICSID 
respondents as a reference that flags certain issues 
and promotes a greater understanding of the ICSID 
process, respondents that have little experience in 
investment disputes will likely require further, more 
specific, guidance as to implementation and strategy 
surrounding a claim. Moreover, while certain aspects 
of this guidance are more general, some are specific 
to ICSID, so to the extent a claim is proceeding at 
another arbitral center, some of the guidance would 
not apply.
4.2.2.2 The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
The PCA maintains a Trust Fund (described in greater 
detail in the following Section 4.3.1.1) to provide 
financial assistance to certain qualifying states to 
enable them in whole or part to meet certain defined 
expenses.394 Qualifying states include states party to 
a PCA Convention (or an institution or enterprise 
owned or controlled by such state) that are listed on 
the OECD’s DAC List of Aid Recipients.395
In addition to the PCA Trust Fund, the PCA also 
conducts training for its member states upon 
request.396 The PCA’s training’s are tailored to the 
specific request.397 Each training is conducted by a 
PCA lawyer who has experience with PCA cases.398 
The PCA’s trainings typically focus on states of the 
arbitration process and seek to value in terms of 
the experience that the PCA lawyers can share.399 
The PCA benefits in this regard from its permanent 
regional offices in Singapore, Mauritius, and Buenos 
Aires that have a mandate to raise awareness of 
and teach on international dispute settlement in 
these regions.400 Regional offices permit greater 
exchange and engagement with member states and 
discussions with a broader range of audiences (e.g. 
political and technical actors).401
4.2.2.3 The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, like ICSID 
and the PCA, hosts events and provides regular 
trainings in investment arbitration for counsel, state 
officials, and students.
The SCC (along with ICSID, the Energy Charter 
Secretariat, and the PCA) co-hosts the Energy Charter 
Treaty Forums. In co-operation with the ECT Secretariat, 
SCC staff organizes and contributes at annual workshops 
in Brussels, including a mock investment arbitration 
under the SCC Rules. The workshop’s program is 
designed primarily for state officials and deals with 
substantive and procedural law issues commonly raised 
in ISDS cases but has also raised for example issues of 
mediation.
The SCC supports the annual Frankfurt investment moot 
and usually organizes a side event during the moot for 
the purpose of knowledge-building and development 
of advocacy skills among the students attending the 
moot. A pre-moot event has been hosted for a number 
of years as well, addressing specifically investment 
arbitration procedure under the SCC Rules.
4.2.3 Academic institutions
Academic centers offer a range of services to 
governments including trainings, forums for information 
sharing, technical legal assistance, and tools to facilitate 
policy development. CCSI, for example, offers a wide-
range of these services, and other academic centers offer 
support ranging from ad hoc to broader programmatic 
support. 
4.2.4 Non-profit centers
Various non-profit centers, such as IISD, offer multiple 
services to governments, including trainings, forums 
for information sharing, technical legal assistance, and 
tools to facilitate policy development. 
4.3 Financial or in-kind inputs directly to 
client governments
In addition to models that focus, more directly, on 
facilitating legal advice to client governments by 
providing or connecting the beneficiary directly with 
a support provider, as described in Section 4.1, an 
Assistance Mechanism may also focus, to a greater 
extent, on financial transfers being made to client 
governments to offset the financial obligations of 
services that the client itself procures. 
It must be noted, however, that some of the models 
described below, in addition to a focus on a financial 
or in-kind transfer, also help facilitate procurement of 
services, more in line with the models in Section 4.1 and 
those in this section represent a spectrum of services 
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offered to beneficiaries rather than being categorically 
separate as only financing mechanisms, although we 
have attempted to focus on certain primary elements 
of the models and distinguish them for the purposes 
of this Scoping Study. Each of the models below, 
litigation/arbitration trust funds, third-party funding 
for respondent states, contingent fee representation, 
and insurance products and loans, emphasize financial 
assistance to facilitate representation. 
4.3.1 Litigation/arbitration trust funds
Various international dispute resolutions institutions 
have established trust funds to financially assist 
certain litigants with arbitration/litigation costs and/or 
costs related to execution of awards.402 As a general 
matter, these funds provide some financial assistance 
for parties to hire outside counsel. In some cases, 
the funds are more institutionalized and also provide 
matching services with counsel (and could thus 
be categorized as a more multi-service Assistance 
Mechanism discussed Section 4.1).
The examples below provide insight into how funds 
are currently used and are being, or could more 
robustly be, applied in the investment law context. 
In CCSI’s consultations, reactions to a trust fund in the 
context of investment law were mixed, and depended 
a great deal on what the particular interviewee deemed 
to be the objective of an investment law Assistance 
Mechanism as well as whether or not capacity building 
should play a prominent role in such mechanism’s 
mandate. While facilitating more financial resources 
that can be used to pay for certain investment-law 
related services, namely ISDS defense, to states was 
generally welcomed by interviewees, qualifications 
often followed, or concerns were raised. For example, 
one concern was that if capacity building, in any of its 
broad or narrow conceptions, is to be an objective of 
an Assistance Mechanism, a trust fund would not (or to 
a very limited extent) address capacity challenges.403  
Other issues were identified in connection with a 
trust fund. For example, one lower middle-income 
government official stated that grants and loans may 
provide value in efforts to obtain outside support, but 
more money does not change the level of trust that this 
official could have in the quality of advice received, or 
the internal capacity necessary to assess whether that 
advice is in the state’s interest.404 It addresses only the 
issue of high costs of disputes without addressing any 
of the other challenges that countries experience with 
the IIA/ISDS system.
One high-income government official stated that from 
that country’s perspective, a litigation fund would 
not be something it would support for a couple of 
reasons.405 First was that this approach has too narrow 
of a focus on litigation, whereas in this country’s 
experience with its treaty counterparties, there needs 
to be broader attention given to resources available 
to governments to manage and prevent disputes, 
including capacity building.406  This official also 
noted that it would be politically challenging for it 
to support a fund that would ultimately be used by 
governments to defend against claims brought by this 
country’s outward investors.407  This official stated that 
unlike direct financial support directed at litigation/
arbitration, support of capacity building efforts have 
a less-direct link to, and conflict with, the country’s 
outward investors’ interests.
One member of a non-governmental organization that 
works with governments stated that a fund may make 
accountability easier - there is a direct link between the 
services provided and the government to whom they 
are to be provided, but that audits would need to be 
carefully conducted as money can easily be misused or 
abused.408 Indeed, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda’s diligence in this area (discussed below in 
this section) brought to light certain economic abuses 
of funds.409 Moreover, this NGO interviewee noted 
that each government and each government’s needs 
are unique, and some governments may benefit from 
more money to strengthen in-house capacity rather 
than more money to spend on hiring outside counsel, 
which may be a better long-term outcome. 
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4.3.1.1 Permanent Court of Arbitration 
Financial Assistance Fund
The Hague-based PCA, an intergovernmental 
organization established by the Hague Conventions 
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
of 1899 and 1907 (PCA Conventions), is the oldest 
existing system for the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes.410 Recognizing that there 
may be instances when states are deterred from 
recourse to international arbitration (or other means) 
offered by the PCA Conventions because they find 
it difficult to allocate the necessary funds (including 
fees and expenses of tribunal members; expenses 
of implementing an award; payments to agents, 
counsel, experts, and witnesses; and operational 
and administrative expenses connected with oral 
and written proceedings), the PCA established in 
1994 a Financial Assistance Fund for the Settlement 
of International Disputes (PCA Fund) to provide 
financial assistance to certain qualifying states to 
enable them in whole or part to meet certain defined 
expenses.411 Qualifying states include states party to 
a PCA Convention (or an institution or enterprise 
owned or controlled by such state) that are listed on 
the OECD’s DAC List of Aid Recipients in disputes 
before the PCA.412
The PCA Fund is financed through voluntary 
financial contributions of states, intergovernmental 
organizations, national institutions, and natural and 
legal persons, although in practice states are the 
primary donors.413 Qualifying states may submit 
written requests for financial assistance to the 
PCA Secretary-General, along with, among other 
items, an itemized list of estimated costs for which 
assistance is requested, and an undertaking to 
provide an audited list of actual expenditures.414 
While the PCA’s International Bureau implements 
the fund,415 disbursement decisions are made by a 
Board of Trustees composed of seven members with 
experience in international dispute resolution.416 
Members are appointed by the PCA’s Secretary-
General and serve a renewable term of four years.417 
In practice Members that are appointed are of the 
highest moral character with deep knowledge of 
public international law (e.g. individuals who have 
served as ICJ judges) but are not those whose 
primary income or financial interests derive from 
investment law-related work (which may also simply 
be reflective of the PCA also handling disputes 
outside of investment-law).418 While the PCA Secretary-
General chairs the Board of Trustees and participates in 
meetings, he or she does not vote on funding decisions.419 
In deciding to allocate funds, the board is to be guided 
by the financial needs of the requesting State and the 
availability of funds,420 and will determine the amount of 
financial assistance to be given, for what costs it is to be 
allocated, as well as any terms and conditions deemed 
appropriate.421 
Donations to the PCA Trust Fund ebb and flow. Every 
year the PCA Secretary General calls upon member 
states to donate to the PCA Trust Fund, with varying 
levels of success. On the one hand, donations have been 
more forthcoming when high profile cases (thus far, of 
the public international law, state-to-state nature) are 
being administered by the PCA and governments have 
a more concrete understanding of where their pledged 
funds will go.422 As a general matter, however, the PCA 
Trust Fund has found difficulty in soliciting funds when 
there is not a specific case where the need, and public 
international law benefit, is clear. Of note, one individual 
familiar with the PCA Trust Fund has characterized 
this reality not as an unwillingness of governments to 
financially support other states with respect to their 
needs, but one of governments being less (or in some 
cases not at all) willing to make general budgetary 
contributions for the broader “rule of law” objectives of 
the PCA Trust Fund, such as general equality of arms, 
that are not (implicitly) tied to a specific case.423 
Since 1995 when the Fund was established, ten grants 
have been made in eight separate cases (with at least 
one case having more than one grant) and two of 
these grants have been with respect to investment law 
cases.424 In the experience of one person familiar with 
the PCA Trust Fund, no requests for assistance have 
been rejected and at least a portion of the requested 
funds have been granted in all cases in which requests 
have been submitted.425 Notably, the amount granted 
has never been at the level that would be required to 
pay the fees of, for example, a commercial law firm 
representing a party to a dispute.426 Rather, grants tend 
to be sufficient to cover institutional and arbitrator costs. 
Notably, in at least a few ISDS cases being administered 
by the PCA, the PCA Secretariat has notified the 
respondent state of the existence of the fund and the 
eligibility of the state to apply for financial assistance 
and the state has not applied.427 Reasons for the failure 
of eligible states to apply for financial assistance in the 
context of ISDS disputes remain unclear.
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4.3.1.2 The International Court of Justice Trust 
Fund
In 1989 the United Nations Secretary-General 
Javier Perez de Cuellar established a trust fund to 
financially assist developing states litigating before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or with the 
execution of a judgment of the ICJ (ICJ Trust Fund).428 
The International Court of Justice is the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations established in 1945 
and seated at the Peace Palace in The Hague.429 The 
ICJ’s role is to settle, in accordance with international 
law, legal disputes submitted to it by states and to 
give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to 
it by authorized UN organs and specialized agencies. 
Between 22 May 1947 and 1 July 2019, 177 cases were 
entered in the General List.430
Recognizing that the costs of appearing before the 
ICJ are considerable, and that such costs can be a 
factor in deciding whether a case is referred to the ICJ 
by a state, the ICJ Trust Fund was viewed as financial 
assistance helpful to states that lack the necessary 
funds to appear before it or to execute judgments.431 
States, inter-governmental organizations, national 
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and 
natural and juridical persons may all voluntarily 
contribute to the ICJ Trust Fund,432 which is 
implemented through the UN Office of Legal Affairs433 
and an annual report is intended to be made available 
to the General Assembly,434 although an annual report 
has apparently not been made since 2012. Available 
funds in years preceding 2012 were in the high $2 
millions.435
States may request financial assistance by submitting 
an application to the ICJ, which should include an 
itemized statement of estimated costs for which 
assistance is requested and an undertaking to provide 
a final, audited accounting of actual expenses.436 A 
panel of experts, “composed of three persons of the 
highest judicial and moral standing” is then convened 
by the Secretary-General to evaluate each request for 
assistance to examine the request and recommend 
to the Secretary-General the amount of assistance 
to be given and the types of expenses for which the 
assistance may be used.437 The experts work is to be 
confidential,438 and recommendation guided solely 
on the financial need of the requesting state and 
the availability of money in the ICJ Trust Fund.439 The 
Secretary-General will then provide assistance based 
on the evaluation and recommendation of the expert 
panel.440
4.3.1.3 International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea Trust Fund 
In 2000 the United Nations Secretary-General 
established a trust fund (ITLOS Trust Fund) to 
financially assist developing states litigating before 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), located in Hamburg, Germany.441 
The ITLOS is an independent judicial body, composed 
of 21 independent members, that was established by 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
which entered into force in 1994.442 UNCLOS 
establishes a comprehensive legal framework to 
regulate all ocean space, its uses and resources. ITLOS 
adjudicates disputes arising out of the interpretation 
and application of UNCLOS.
As the costs of legal fees and travel to Hamburg 
can be considerable, the ITLOS Trust Fund was 
established with the intention that the burden of costs 
would not need to be a factor in a state’s decision to 
bring a dispute before the ITLOS or to respond to an 
application to ITLOS made by others.443 There is no 
cost to states party to the UNCLOS for submitting 
a case to ITLOS, but non-state parties pay a fee 
fixed by ITLOS.444 Developing states that are parties 
to a dispute before ITLOS may request financial 
assistance from the ITLOS Trust Fund to help them to 
cover the costs related to lawyers’ fees or travel and 
accommodation of their delegation during the oral 
proceedings in Hamburg.445 The ITLOS Trust Fund is 
maintained by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, Division 
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.
States may apply to ITLOS for funds, and a panel of 
independent experts is convened to review applications 
and make recommendations to the Secretary-General 
on the amount of financial assistance to be given.446 
States, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, as well as natural and juridical persons 
are invited to make financial contributions to the ITLOS 
Trust Fund.447 Donor contributions to the ITLOS Trust 
Fund are slow, despite repeated General Assembly 
entreaties, and are considered insufficient in light of 
the mandate and need.448 The balance of the fund at 
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the end of 2006 was $70,621.17.449 
The ITLOS Secretariat also maintains a list, available 
upon request of a member state, of offers of 
professional assistance, which will be provided on 
a reduced fee basis by suitably qualified persons or 
bodies.450 
4.3.1.4 Trust Funds Maintained by 
International Criminal Courts
International criminal courts maintain funds that, 
among other activities, serve to provide for the 
costs of defense counsel appointed in the case of 
indigent defendants. Some of these institutions 
maintain lists of counsel that can be appointed in 
such circumstances or even will appoint appropriate 
counsel under certain circumstances. 
4.3.1.4.1 The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC), based in 
The Hague and established by the Rome Statute,451 
began operations in 2002. It investigates and, where 
warranted, tries individuals charged with the gravest 
crimes of concern to the international community: 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
the crime of aggression.452 The ICC seeks to hold 
criminals accountable and prevent crimes from 
happening again.453 In order to achieve this goal it 
acts as a court of last resort and thus complements 
and does not replace national judicial systems.454
The ICC maintains both a Legal Aid System for accused 
as well as a Trust Fund for Victims.
With respect to the Legal Aid System, the Rome Statute 
provides that accused individuals have certain rights, 
including legal assistance of the defendant’s choosing, 
or to have legal assistance assigned by the court if justice 
so requires and without payment if the accused lacks the 
means to pay for it.455 Legal aid is thus mandatory for 
indigent defendants. (In contrast, provision of legal aid 
for indigent victims in discretionary).456
A List of Counsel is maintained by the ICC’s Counsel 
Support Section.457 Legal support providers that meet 
certain criteria are able to apply to be included in this 
list; and defendants seeking legal aid are to choose their 
counsel from the list.458 
The Legal Aid System caps its payments to the defense 
team. (Table 7). 
The ICC’s Legal Aid System covers the costs of legal 
representation of indigent defendants by seeking 
to ensure that they receive adequate resources to 
cover all costs reasonably necessary, as determined 
by the ICC Registry, for an effective and efficient legal 
representation. The Registry assesses both the likely 
costs of the defense case, and the financial status of the 
defendant, and applies a formula to determine what 
contribution the person should make, if any. The ICC also 
provides some funding for investigation and experts. 
Specific operative and objective principles are used to 
determine the need for aid, including obligations to 
dependents, flexibility, and simplicity.459 
Table 7  Maximum Total Monthly Payments (as of 2016)





Source: Richard J. Rogers, ‘Assessment of the ICC’s Legal Aid System’ (2007), 5 January 2017, 17.
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On average, the Legal Aid System’s annual cost per 
case through 2016 was estimated to be €286,548 for 
pre-trial phases, €395,064 for trial phases, and €386,548 
for appeals.460 This is reported to be lower than the 
per-case legal aid expenditures of other international 
criminal courts.461  
The Legal Aid System struggles with budgetary 
constraints, which, among other concerns, have 
resulted in pressure from civil society to reevaluate the 
legal aid budget along with a more holistic reform of 
indigent representation at the ICC.462 The budget for 
legal aid in 2016 was €4,521,000.30 (up from €2,355,600 
and €2,866,400 in 2015 and 2014 respectively), 
representing 3.25% of the total ICC budget.463 This is 
less than 10% of the budget allocated to the Office of 
the Prosecutor.464 The legal aid budget is a part of the 
ICC’s overall budget, which is funded by ICC member 
states. The contribution of each state is determined in 
the same way that its UN dues are determined, which 
is roughly based on income, population, and debt 
burden. Additional funding is provided by voluntary 
contributions from organizations, corporations, or 
other entities. 
The ICC also maintains a Trust Fund for Victims 
(TFV), which was created in 2004 by the Assembly of 
State Parties.465 The TFV’s mission is to support and 
implement programs that address harms resulting 
from genocide, crimes of humanity, war crimes, and 
aggression. To achieve this mission, the TFV has a 
two-fold mandate: (i) to implement Court-Ordered 
reparations and (ii) to provide physical, psychological, 
and material support to victims and their families. 
Victims can apply to the ICC to be granted the right 
to participate in all phases of an ICC proceeding.466 
Victims are those who have suffered harm as a result 
of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court.467 They are permitted to put their views 
before the judges and if the accused is convicted, 
may ask the court to order reparations, which may 
be individual or collective, depending on what is 
most appropriate from the perspective of the victims 
in the case.468 Reparations may include monetary 
compensation, return of property, rehabilitation, 
medical support, victims’ services centers, or symbolic 
measures such as apologies or memorials.469 The ICC 
may order reparations be made through the TFV.
4.3.1.4.2 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was a UN court that dealt with war 
crimes that took place during the conflicts in the 
Balkans in the 1990s.470 Its mandate lasted from 1993 
- 2017. 
All persons indicted by and appearing before the 
ICTY had the right to be represented by defense 
counsel. This and other rights of the accused are 
based in international human rights instruments and 
were enshrined in the ICTY’s Statute and further 
regulated by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.471 
If the accused wished to have defense counsel, he or 
she could either choose his or her own or be assigned 
one by the Registrar.472
Accused persons who could not afford to pay for 
counsel were entitled to the assignment of counsel, 
paid for by the Tribunal.473 If the accused had means 
to remunerate counsel partially, the Tribunal only 
covered the balance of the costs.474 The Office for 
Legal Aid and Defense Matters within the Registry 
dealt with all matters related to the issues of defense 
and detention at the ICTY.475 Legal aid at the ICTY 
was allocated from the general ICTY budget, which in 
turn was approved by the UN and was $286,012,600 in 
2010-11, $250,814,000 in 2012-13, and $179,998,600 in 
2014-15.476 
Accused requesting legal aid from the ICTY had to 
make full financial disclosures of assets (including 
those of all members of his or her household).477 
Accused who request ICTY-paid counsel were then 
appointed counsel from the list maintained by the 
Registrar, known as the “Rule 45 List.”478 An accused 
could also propose another counsel that met the 
criteria set forth in Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of the ICTY. 
The Registry maintained a publicly available and 
transparent system of remuneration for defense 
counsel.479 Rates were viewed as sufficient to attract 
counsel on part with the prosecution’s senior trial 
attorneys.480 Payment for defense was intended to 
cover all aspects of the trial as well as preparation 
of the case (evidence gathering, interpretation, 
investigation, research, witness interviews and 
preparation, and arguing in court).481 
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Payment to defense counsel varied depending on 
the complexity of the case as well as the phase of 
proceedings and whether the accused selected 
counsel from the Rule 45 List or choose non-Rule 
45 List counsel.482 Complexity of the case was 
determined by the Registry and was based on 
various factors, including: “the accused’s position 
within the political or military hierarchy; the number 
and nature of counts in the indictment; the number 
and type of witnesses and documents involved; 
whether the case involves crimes committed in 
a number of municipalities; and the novelty and 
complexity of legal and factual arguments the case 
will deal with.”483
With respect to Rule 45 List counsel, the legal aid 
policy generally consisted of monthly, lump-sum 
payments to permit the hiring of counsel, and 
facilitate other payments, all of which remain publicly 
available.484
Table 8 provides an example of ICTY legal aid 
payments. 
Self-appointed counsel outside of the Rule 45 List were 
subject to a different compensation scheme.485 In this 
case, invoices were required to be submitted to the 
Registry and payments were made directly to counsel 
in accordance with the maximum available rates.486 
According to the ICTY’s Remuneration Scheme, for the 
pre-trial phase there was a maximum of 150 hours per 
month per team member, of two, three or five persons, 
depending on the complexity of the case, and a total 
of 3,000, 4,500 or 6,000 (respectively) hours total could 
be remunerated.487 For the trial phase, a maximum of 
two, three or five team members may be remunerated 
for up to 150 hours per person, for a total of 300, 450 or 
700 (respectively) hours total, and at the appeals phase 
a maximum of 600 to 900 hours total could be billed for 
the entire phase, with up to 100 hours per defense team 
member per month.488 
Support staff (legal associates, case managers, 
investigators, and language assistants) each were 
subject to a fixed gross hourly rate ranging from €16.80 
to €28.40 depending on years of experience.489 Some 
legal associates to self-represented accused, depending 
on their function, applied to the ICTY and were granted 
an hourly rate of up to €78.80.490
Table 8 ICTY pre-trial lump sum payments (as of January 2013)






Level 1 €1,873 €45,163 €104,750 €151,786
€1,109 maximum
Level 2 €1,873 €45,163 €213,858 €260,895
Level 3 €1,873 €45,163 €377,695 €424,731
These amounts do not include the costs of Daily Subsistence Allowance ("DSA") and travel which 
are covered separately in accordance with the applicable registry policies. 
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4.3.1.4.3 The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) was established by the UN Security Council 
to “prosecute persons responsible for genocide and 
other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of Rwanda and 
neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994.” The Tribunal was located in Arusha, 
Tanzania, and had offices in Kigali, Rwanda. Its Appeals 
Chamber was located in The Hague.491 Its opened in 
1995 and its mandate lasted until 2015.
All ICTR accused had the right to be represented 
by competent counsel. This and other rights were 
enshrined in Article 20 of the ICTR’s Statute and 
are further regulated by its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.492 Defense counsel were deemed critical to 
uphold the principle of equality of arms between the 
prosecution and defense and to ensure the fairness of 
the proceedings.
The ICTR’s Defence Counsel & Detention Management 
Section (DCDMS) assured the provision of competent 
defense counsel to indigent accused persons.493 
Defense counsel at the ICTR were not part of the 
institutional structure but were paid as independent 
contractors. The DCDMS was created as part of the 
Registry that coordinated and facilitated the work of 
defense counsel.
DCDMS compiled and maintained a list of defense 
counsel, which, upon the request for assistance and 
determination of eligibility, was submitted to an 
indigent detainee or accused to permit the selection 
of counsel. Over 200 lawyers from a wide variety of 
countries were included on the DCDMS list.
The budget for the ICTR, through which the Legal 
Aid Program was funded, was kept by the United 
Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions.494 The defense of most of the 
accused appearing before the ICTR was funded in this 
manner.495 Funds available for legal aid in the ICTR were 
very limited, although the ICTR Registry was vigilant in 
monitoring funds and ensuring that professional and 
ethical standards were maintained and the funds not 
abused.496
4.3.1.5 Legal aid provided by international and 
regional human rights courts
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, 
pursuant to Rules 105 through 110 of the Rules of the 
Court, the ability to grant legal aid to applicants in 
connection with the presentation of his or her case to 
the ECtHR.497 Legal aid shall be granted to applicants 
when the President of the Chamber is satisfied (a) 
that it is necessary for the proper conduct of the 
case before the Chamber, and (b) that the applicant 
has insufficient means to meet all or part of the costs 
entailed.498 Applicants must complete a declaration of 
income, assets, dependents, and financial obligations 
in order to determine their eligibility.499 Legal aid may 
be granted to cover lawyer fees as well as travel and 
other expenses of the applicant and counsel to appear 
before the Chamber. The Registrar fixes the rate of 
fees, payable in accordance with legal-aid scales in 
force, as well as the amount of expenses that will be 
covered.500
In practice it has been suggested that the ECtHR is 
rather frugal in its granting of legal aid, particularly 
as some years have seen funds unspent, and as the 
ECtHR’s caseload has increased, the amount of legal 
aid has not increased in proportion.501
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(OACHR) also maintains a Legal Assistance Fund. The 
OACHR fund can be used to cover expenses related 
to: gathering and sending documentary evidence; 
expenses derived of the appearance of the alleged 
victim, witnesses and experts in hearings held by 
the Commission; and other expenses considered 
pertinent by the Commission for the processing of the 
case.
Applicants for OACHR Trust Fund benefits must 
demonstrate that the applicant lacks sufficient means 
to cover some or all expenses, and must specify which 
expenses, as well as the relation to the case, intended 
to be covered by funds of the OACHR Trust Fund.502
4.3.2 Third-Party funding for respondent states 
Third-party funders are investment funds that invest 
in assets with the expectation of a return on their 
investment. In the context of ISDS, the assets are the 
potential value of treaty-based legal dispute outcomes. 
In exchange for investing in the claim and providing 
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funds that will be used to pay the expenses that a 
party incurs in pursuing the claim and enforcing an 
award, the funder takes an interest in an eventual 
financial award on a non-recourse basis.503 
Increasingly, investors suing governments in ISDS are 
turning to third parties to finance their litigation.504 
Recent years have seen significant increases in 
the number of funders as well as the number of 
funded ISDS cases.505 The increased use of third-
party funding in ISDS raises various policy issues, 
many of which stem from the inherent asymmetry 
of ISDS in which investors sue states, but states, as 
a general matter, cannot sue investors, but some of 
which are inherent to the introduction of (currently 
largely unregulated) for-profit investments into ISDS 
claims.506  
4.3.2.1 Scope of potential aid
The most critical impact of the asymmetric nature 
of ISDS is that, as a practical matter, third-party 
funding is available to claimants and in most cases, 
not to respondent states. This is because (1) under 
nearly all existing treaties states cannot initiate but 
can only defend claims, and (2) the possibility of 
counterclaims is extremely limited. Therefore, states 
do not have a financial “upside”; the best financial 
position that a respondent state can usually hope 
for as an outcome is an award for 100% of its costs, 
with interest, and recovery for reputational harm 
(e.g. as a safe destination for FDI).507 The profit 
potential that attracts funders to claimant positions 
does not currently exist for ISDS respondents 
except in circumstances when contractual or other 
counterclaims exist. 
With that said, some forms of respondent 
funding have reportedly been successful in some 
circumstances. For example, a version of portfolio 
funding, in which the losses of an ISDS defense could 
be offset by another portfolio of cases in which the 
state was pursuing contract-based claims (likely in 
other fora, such as domestic courts or commercial 
arbitration) where there was an opportunity for 
financial recovery.508
Respondent funding may also take the form of an 
insurance product. With an after-the-event insurance 
arrangement, if a litigable event has occurred 
and a claim has arisen against a respondent, the 
respondent and funder could seek to agree on a valuation 
of the claim - how will a tribunal apply the law to the 
facts and what will the claimant’s award be, if anything? 
And if the claimant prevails, will the tribunal shift costs? 
If the price of downside risk can be agreed between the 
respondent and the funder, the respondent could then 
purchase a “policy” that would protect it against a higher 
than anticipated award. The respondent would pay a 
deductible for the expected judgment or settlement, 
and for amounts that exceed that agreed threshold, the 
funder would have a contractual obligation to pay. That 
obligation to pay an award or other amount, such as 
award for costs, is negotiated and context-specific, so 
could be an obligation shared between the state and 
funder based on various thresholds and permutations. 
4.3.2.2 Potential beneficiaries
Third-party funding, based on the economic 
opportunities largely absent from respondent-side 
ISDS investments, primarily benefits claimants and not 
respondents. Claimant use of third-party funding is 
discussed further below in Section 6. 
4.3.2.3 Scalability 
While the use of third-party funding to support investor 
claims in ISDS has apparently been on the rise in recent 
years, there are several hurdles to greater third-party 
funding for respondent states. 
For one, it is plausible third-party funding could be 
available for/linked to respondents’ counterclaims, 
but most existing treaties, in their current form, do not 
clearly permit the possibility of such claims against 
investors. While in a few, limited cases, counterclaims 
have been successful, absent a more extensive and 
robust possibility for treaty-based counterclaims in ISDS, 
the possibility of respondent-side third-party funding is 
likely to remain limited. 
Additionally, absent greater predictability in awards for 
fees, third-party funders may be unable to predict with 
sufficient accuracy in which cases the amount invested 
can be recovered. To the extent states lack the liquidity 
to finance a defense, third-party funding could act 
similar to a loan. It may be that for any such market 
to become robust greater predictability in fee awards 
would be required. Uncertainty regarding damages 
awards may similarly limit the market for after-the-event-
type insurance models. 
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Overall, third party funders are private sector 
participants in the ISDS field whose relevance for 
respondent support seems limited under the current 
system, though it could potentially be used in 
some cases and even complement other Assistance 
Mechanisms in some ways. For example, funders, 
under certain circumstances, may be able to provide 
necessary liquidity to the respondent state (or its 
counsel) during the course of a proceeding, which 
could then be used to pay an Assistance Mechanism or 
another legal support provider. However, considerable 
thought would need to be given as to the contractual 
rights that would be granted to funders interacting 
with the state as well as any kind of Assistance 
Mechanism. Some funders require contractual rights 
to remain involved in, and potentially even control, 
certain aspects of how the case is managed by the 
party, including, for example, decisions to settle, or 
not. Moreover, third-party funders are not subject to 
fiduciary obligations to the litigating party, nor any 
ethical or conflict of interest obligations. Additionally, 
the financial terms third-party funders need in order 
to provide support may be unpalatable to respondent 
states (and even investors) and their stakeholders.
A final consideration relevant to scalability is that 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group III has identified third-party 
funding in ISDS as a concern warranting multilateral 
reform. Consequently, Assistance Mechanisms 
involving the use or expansion of third-party funding 
would likely need to take into account outcomes and 
outputs from the Working Group in addition to any 
other treaty-based or institutional reforms.509
4.3.3 Contingent fee representation for 
respondent states
4.3.3.1 Scope of potential aid
Law firms may engage to act on a full or partial 
contingency fee basis in representing respondents in 
ISDS disputes. In this case, the law firm bears some 
or all of the cost of the arbitration proceeding and 
assumes some or all of the risk of loss. For example, a 
client (or the law firm) may pay out of pocket expenses 
and the law firm may forego payment of some or all 
of its fees in exchange for an interest in any eventual 
award or settlement. The more risk that the law firm 
assumes, the greater share in the outcome the firm 
would likely contract to receive. In this way law firm 
contingency arrangements may be viewed as similar 
to (and by some definitions a form of) third-party 
financing of claims. One difference between third-
party funding (as the term is used in this Scoping Study) 
and contingency fee arrangements, however, is that 
law firms have fiduciary and other ethical obligations 
to their clients (respondents or investor claimants). 
Third-party funders’ duties do not run to their client 
litigants. Instead, their obligations are owed to their 
shareholders. 
Law firm contingency financing will often be provided 
in combination with other outside financing, such as 
third-party funding or other loan services, either to the 
law firm, the client, or both. 
4.3.3.2 Potential beneficiaries
The largest hurdle to contingency arrangements in 
ISDS respondent representation is, as with third-party 
funding, the lack of a financial upside for respondent 
states. There is not a contingent outcome (other than 
fee awards) in which to take a financial interest. 
Contingency funding is likely more readily available 
for investors. Not only are investors potentially able 
to enjoy an upside recovery, but studies indicate that 
they are also, at present, more likely to be awarded 
recovery of the legal fees and expenses incurred in 
pursuing their claims.510 Investors as beneficiaries are 
discussed further in Section 6.
4.3.3.3 Scalability
An increase in their ability to offset the funds necessary 
for the defense (or pursuit) of a claim could address 
liquidity problems experienced by some governments 
(or claimants) in the context of ISDS cases. 
To the extent counterclaims or other predictable fee-
shifting practices were introduced more systematically 
in ISDS, respondent-side contingency arrangements 
may become more attractive and available.  However, 
the cost of supporting, and risking, contingent fee 
arrangements is not insignificant, and many law firms 
are not able to assume significant financial risks, 
particularly on the kind of large claims and expenses 
that have thus far characterized ISDS disputes.511 
Certain developments in insurance options, which are 
enabling firms to hedge fee risks, and in third-party 
funding arrangements, where portfolio arrangements 
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can enable firms to take on more contingent fee work 
while mitigating fee risk and cash flow concerns, 
may make contingency arrangements possible on a 
larger scale.512
4.4 Pro bono, ad hoc legal and expert 
assistance to respondent states
The provision of pro bono legal and expert 
assistance may be a useful way to provide services 
to client governments, or to complement paid 
services. CCSI’s consultations made clear that pro 
bono legal support can be valuable and important 
to respondent states in many contexts and 
circumstances. Many pro bono-based Assistance 
Mechanisms exist with varying degrees of focus on 
investment law matters, and consideration could 
be given to expanding existing services. However, 
several concerns about reliance on more robust 
provision of pro bono services were raised.
First, CCSI’s consultations revealed concerns on the 
part of government officials that firms may not treat 
pro bono clients in the same way as paying clients 
when there are competing interests and demands 
on time. For example, on a pro bono basis it would 
be difficult for a law firm to take on a client for a 
dispute that could last several years if that mean that 
the firm would then be conflicted from accepting 
certain paid investor-side work during or after the 
dispute.513 These kinds of concerns were ultimately 
about quality and responsiveness of counsel working 
on a pro-bono basis.
Second, while many lawyers and law firms contribute 
vast numbers of pro bono hours to respondent states 
(and many firms have internal guidelines encouraging 
lawyers to engage in at least a specified minimum 
number of hours of annual pro bono service), the 
scale at which pro bono services could be offered 
was noted as being limited as compared to the 
commitments required for handling ISDS cases. It 
was questioned whether firms would ever be willing 
to handle a case on a pro bono basis given the time 
required and potential revenue forsaken.
In consultations conducted by CCSI, one high-
income government official stated that it would be 
useful to have an Assistance Mechanism that could 
build up and draw upon pro bono relationships to 
lessen the amount of support that may need to be 
provided directly by center staff and, not unrelated, to 
alleviate funding requirements that may be required by 
an Assistance Mechanism with more robust in-house 
expertise and projects.514 However, another high-income 
government official noted that pro bono assistance can 
be provided in ad hoc situations, but is not a scalable 
model to address asymmetric outcomes and lack of 
capacity experienced by many countries.
This section describes certain pro-bono models of legal 
support.
4.4.1 The International Development Law 
Organization’s (IDLO) Investment Support 
Programme for Least Developed Countries (ISP/
LDCs)
Of all pro bono mechanisms analyzed for this Scoping 
Study, the ISP/LDCs program, although in its early 
phases, is the most specific with respect to investment 
law matters. This existing Assistance Mechanism 
is described in great detail in Section 4.1.3 and a 
description is thus not repeated here. 
4.4.2 TradeLab 
4.4.2.1 Overview and scope of services
TradeLab is a global network of universities and training 
centers that conduct pro bono projects for developing 
countries, SMEs, civil society organizations, or other 
stakeholders.515 TradeLab aims to “empower countries 
and smaller stakeholders to reap the full development 
benefits of institutions and rules that govern our 
global economy,”516 including international investment 
agreements and international investment law. 
TradeLab is based on a system of legal clinics. Students 
are paired with experts, who are then connected with 
client beneficiaries on a given, typically semester-long, 
project. Tradelab posts research memoranda and 
other non-confidential output on its website,517 thereby 
seeking to achieve three objectives: (i) help beneficiaries 
build capacity; (ii) train students; and (iii) inform and 
create awareness for the wider public.518 TradeLab sees 
potential to democratize legal education and the legal 
profession in the field of international economic law by 
spreading learning and expertise beyond a handful of 
highly specialized universities and large law firms.519
TradeLab seeks to move beyond litigation, recognizing 
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that stakeholders need help in negotiation, 
implementation and compliance with international 
legal issues and agreements, which often must be 
complemented by economic research, policy analysis 
and translation support. There is a large emphasis 
placed on capacity building, with TradeLab noting 
that any law firm could answer a question, but often 
what is lacking is a more in-depth analysis of what, 
exactly the problem or question is, which requires a 
deeper understanding of the rules and institutions 
and how they affect the entity or organization, and 
thus the ultimate interest and questions that should be 
considered.520 Thus, TradeLab clinics hold exploratory 
discussions to identify and define interests and needs 
of beneficiaries, and then help to frame projects 
around public interest objectives.521
TradeLab advertises its ability to assist client 
beneficiaries with discrete questions relating to: 
• research and analysis for treaty negotiations;
• compliance assessment of domestic or foreign 
laws;
• compliance assessment of proposed or existing 
legislation;
• drafting model legislation;
• drafting advocacy positions in the context of 
existing agreements on trade and investment;
• assessment of legal claims or defense strategies;
• writing of party, third party submissions and legal 
memoranda;
• preparation of amicus curiae briefs; and
• legal and economic research on cutting-edge 
trade or investment law questions.522 
Beneficiaries anywhere in the world can submit projects 
directly via TradeLab’s online platform, or directly to a 
TradeLab clinic or the TradeLab Coordinator.
 
One of the benefits of this kind of Assistance 
Mechanism is that it can fill gaps where stakeholders 
lack the resources to conduct research and answer 
policy or other questions in-house or retain outside 
counsel to do it for them.523 To the extent a state or 
other stakeholder has general questions, issues, or 
concerns, and has a several month window in which 
to receive a memorandum, this kind of assistance 
could help to overcome resource constraints. It is most 
suited for in-depth questions that can be answered in 
a several months’ time-frame.
 
TradeLab has an extremely lean staff and expenses 
limited to one paid coordinator, who facilitates the 
network and provides institutional, administrative 
and legal/substantive support, including outreach to 
beneficiaries and alumni, and the expenses necessary 
for running the TradeLab website.524 It has received 
several grants, and benefits from the in-kind, voluntary 
service of students and their expert mentors, and, 
by extension, the universities that pay professor 
salaries and facilitate the clinical teaching experience 




TradeLab assists on a no-cost basis developing 
countries, SMEs, civil society organizations, or other 
smaller stakeholders.526
4.4.3 Other pro bono networks
Various other pro bono networks exist that are able 
to field requests from states and other stakeholders 
for discrete pro bono assistance, typically pairing the 
requestor with an appropriate lawyer/law firm who 
will engage directly with the client in representation 
for the matter. Examples include the International 
Senior Lawyers Project527 and the Thompson Reuters 
Foundation’s TrustLaw.528 Resources available for 
assistance, and eligible beneficiaries and projects vary 
based on the specific partner engaged.
4.5 Intergovernmental knowledge-
sharing hubs
Many of CCSI’s government interviewees, from each of 
the four economic development categories, stressed 
the importance and value of information sharing and 
opportunities for governments to “compare notes” 
and learn from one another. They noted existing, ad 
hoc opportunities to engage, and certain existing 
efforts to create more organized platforms for 
governments to convene, discuss relevant investment 
law topics, and learn from other governments that 
had or were currently considering similar issues. Many 
interviewees felt that while some opportunities to 
engage with other governmental officials exist, there 
is more that could be done from an organizational 
perspective to facilitate engagement, and that certain 
existing efforts could be better funded or more 
institutionalized. Certain existing knowledge-sharing 
opportunities that were highlighted during CCSI’s 
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consultations are described below.
4.5.1 Informal “sideline” knowledge-sharing
On the sidelines of organized events at which 
government officials are otherwise gathering 
- UNCTAD’s World Investment Forum or other 
UNCTAD events; the OECD’s Freedom of Investment 
Roundtable, Investment Treaty Dialogues, and 
annual conferences on investment treaties; or other 
trainings or meetings (such as those hosted by 
ICSID,529 CCSI, or IISD, for example) - officials get to 
know one another and find the time to ask questions 
and share knowledge. One lower middle-income 
government official noted that “while organized 
trainings are useful, a lot of the value comes from 
the unplanned interactions, not from the slides.”530  
4.5.2 Formal knowledge-sharing 
opportunities
Some existing Assistance Mechanisms as well as other 
organizations, recognizing the value of knowledge-
sharing among government officials, have planned 
and established more formal opportunities to allow 
this to occur. 
For example, IISD has organizes an Annual Forum 
of Developing Country Investment Negotiators in 
partnership with various international and regional 
organizations that are regularly represented.531 
The Annual Forum is hosted on a rotation-basis by 
developing country governments in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. The 13th Annual Forum will 
take place in early 2020 in Thailand. The meeting 
aims to ensure that developing countries are able 
to attract responsible investment that advances 
sustainable development while safeguarding their 
legitimate policy space. More than just a meeting, 
the Annual Forum has evolved into a community 
of government officials from developing countries 
who are determined to work towards a systemic 
reform of the international investment agreements 
(IIA) regime so that it better serves their countries’ 
interests. Around 100 officials from more than 
50 countries and regional organizations attend 
annually, giving participants an opportunity to listen 
to international investment law experts; discuss 
emerging issues, trends, and legal developments in 
the field; and engage in peer learning with fellow 
negotiators. Forum participants remain engaged in 
the community through an online mailing list, regional 
meetings, and peer-to-peer exchanges.
As an example of a regional knowledge-sharing effort, 
the Center for the Advancement of the Rule of Law in 
the Americas (CAROLA) at Georgetown Law hosted a 
workshop on ISDS Reform in Latin America, which brought 
together delegates from Latin American countries to 
share their experiences surrounding the negotiation, 
administration, and arbitration of investment treaties 
and identify areas of concern and potential reform.532 
This workshop is part of a broader effort by CAROLA to 
provide a permanent platform for regional cooperation 
focused on investment law reform. This kind of regional 
platform, largely conducted in Spanish, permits informal 
knowledge sharing and relationship-building that can 
be beneficial to long-term government objectives.
As noted in Section 4.1.2, the ALSF has attempted to 
do formal and informal “information sharing” among 
governments. One interviewee familiar with the ALSF’s 
efforts in this area stressed that formal networks with the 
purpose of information sharing can bring challenges (e.g. 
anti-trust concerns if there is collusion around pricing).533 
Through experience, ALSF found that the best way to 
promote information sharing was by organizing peer-to-
peer regional events on certain topics, with a requirement 
that whomever attended had to present on what his or 
her government was doing to address certain issues.534 
In so doing, ALSF found that governments naturally will 
also speak to each other during breaks, or at dinner or 
lunch, and that other, more informal information-sharing 
often happens in this context.535  
4.5.3 Informal or treaty-based knowledge-sharing 
networks
Government officials often reach out to other 
government officials with general or specific questions 
through informal or treaty-based networks. For 
example, in CCSI’s consultations one high-income 
government official stated that many countries (pointing 
to both developing and developed states) have an 
enormous amount of expertise in specific areas and 
other states could greatly benefit from learning how 
other governments have achieved certain objectives, or 
managed certain obstacles.536 
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This official’s government has engaged both formally 
(through workshops) and informally with many 
different governments over the past several years.537 
The official noted that it often happens that a treaty 
partner will approach with specific questions about, 
for example, dispute avoidance or management, and 
would like to understand in greater detail how the 
government has internally organized around these 
issues, and what steps it takes when it is gearing up for 
an actual dispute.538 This official’s government has also 
fielded very specific questions from other countries, 
such as how it finances its defense, how it selects 
and contracts with outside experts, how it manages 
the discovery process, what considerations it gives to 
arbitrator selection, among others.539 
Relatedly, this developed country official stated that 
it has a more general interest, and sees great value, 
in engaging with treaty partners on a technical level 
to ensure the coherence of the investment law system 
generally, and specific treaties, in particular.540 Such 
engagement could involve discussions around treaty 
use or interpretation, the role for joint interpretations, or 
the use and value of non-disputing party submissions.
Based on these experiences, this developed country 
official suggested that a promising path forward for 
an Assistance Mechanism would be to build upon 
and perhaps make more robust the existing networks 
and information sharing that is already occurring, 
and clearly valued, among government officials.541 
This kind of knowledge-sharing would then permit 
states to approach with, and take away, information 
relevant to the state’s own approach to defense and 
to build expertise at various stages of its own internal 
process.542 Another high-income government official 
reiterated similar ideas, and also suggested that 
regional and language-based networks could also be 
useful for certain topics.543 
One high-income government official, and several low 
and middle-income government officials, suggested 
that sharing information in this way would greatly 
facilitate their countries’ efforts to gain greater control 
over defense of ISDS cases, as they would like to 
have more information on the specific ways in which 
other governments approach or have moved in-house 
certain aspects of the defense, including, for example, 
which aspects may easiest to move in-house, which 
are more difficult, and specific hurdles that may be 
encountered along the way.544
4.6 Discrete capacity building 
mechanisms 
Identification of capacity challenges, and capacity 
building, as a general matter, were identified as a 
thematic issue that may impact consideration and 
formulation of any Assistance Mechanism. The ways 
in which this study has conceptualized the meaning 
of capacity is more broadly addressed in Section 2.1. 
Certain discrete capacity building mechanisms are 
discussed below. Assistance Mechanisms could be 
developed or expanded to address certain discrete 
capacity challenges.
4.6.1 Capacity building provided by 
international organizations
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, many international 
organizations provide investment-law related capacity 
building services to states. These include UNCTAD, 
the OECD, UNCITRAL, the WBG, among others.
4.6.2 Investment law trainings 
Several organizations conduct investment law training 
programs aimed specifically at government officials.
Arbitral institutions, including ICSID, the PCA, and the 
SCC (among other arbitral institutions) offer various 
kinds of training, often of a procedural nature. These 
trainings are further described in Section 4.2.
CCSI’s annual Executive Training on Investment 
Treaties and Arbitration for Government Officials 
takes place at Columbia University, in New York City, 
over the course of two weeks every summer.545 CCSI’s 
training is limited to officials currently employed 
by their government in order to most appropriately 
and effectively tailor course content and better 
equip officials to gain a deeper understanding of 
investment law and policy and the implications that 
this complex and ever-evolving field has on host state 
policy-making and treaty-based liability. The first week 
of the training focuses on substantive elements of 
investment law, and the second week on procedural 
aspects of ISDS disputes. Sessions are taught by CCSI 
staff as well as a broad network of highly experienced 
lawyers from the private sector, governments, and 
international organizations. This training also provides 
an opportunity for informal discussion, learning, and 
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network-building among officials that many training 
alumni have found extremely valuable. This training 
is offered on an at-cost basis to participants, and 
scholarships are available for participants from 
low- and in some cases middle-income countries, 
depending on the availability of funds. CCSI also 
conducts in-country trainings upon request, which 
can be useful if a larger number of officials from one 
country plan to participate.
The International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) designs and carries out in-
country training courses for officials from developing 
country governments and regional organizations.546 
IISD’s training courses are aimed at assisting 
negotiators and policy-makers in developing 
investment policies, laws, treaties, and contracts 
in ways that support the achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), align with 
their countries’ national development priorities, and 
limit the negative impacts of investment treaties on 
their governments’ right to regulate. Typically, IISD’s 
trainings on international investment law cover 
substantive and procedural aspects of traditional 
investment treaties; novel approaches in modern 
treaties and models; strategies for international 
negotiations on investment; and national, regional, 
and multilateral initiatives to reform international 
investment law and investor–state arbitration. IISD 
develops the agenda of each training in collaboration 
with the host government or regional organization 
in order to tailor the event to the host’s needs. 
These trainings are delivered by teams of highly 
qualified international lawyers. Typically counting 
on funding from development aid and philanthropic 
organizations, IISD’s training courses are offered 
free of charge for developing country governments. 
In some cases, countries may be requested to 
contribute toward reasonable expenses. In case of 
insufficient funds, priority is given to least developed 
countries.
The ability for non-profit organizations to provide 
these kinds of trainings, particularly for low-income 
or middle-income economies, is, for the most part, 
dependent on availability of grants.
4.6.3 Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)
In recent years, Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), 
free online courses that are available to anyone to enroll, 
have increased in popularity. While organization of a 
MOOC requires one-time financing for content creation 
and production,547 many MOOCs are offered several 
times a year, starting on a designated date and lasting 
several weeks, with lecturers perhaps one time a week 
and assignments and quizzes in the interim (estimated 
time per week is typically 5-10 hours). The cohort 
completing the MOOC can engage in online forums 
and information exchange. Often, lecturers featured in 
the MOOC are on-call during these times. Université 
Catholique de Louvain, with Professor Yannick Radi, 
offers a 10-week investment law MOOC.548
4.6.4 Contractual arrangements or secondments
As described in various sections of this Scoping Study, 
the ACWL, many law firms, and even some states 
provide secondments to government officials from 
developing countries. These secondments are valuable 
opportunities for government officials to join an 
experienced legal team and to transfer knowledge back 
to the official’s own ministry or department.
4.6.5 Efforts to “democratize the law” through 
transparency and knowledge sharing
In recent years there has been broader recognition of the 
public nature and public interest implications of many 
ISDS disputes and efforts to bring greater transparency 
to this field, such as by making public filings and awards. 
In many cases, however, related knowledge or easily 
searchable information is held behind paywalls that may 
prove too great a luxury for some governments to easily 
afford. For example, Columbia University’s subscriptions 
to roughly 20 different investment law-related databases 
and online or print publications cost in the aggregate 
approximately $45,000 per year. This cost is after each 
is negotiated to achieve the lowest possible price, 
and after benefitting from academic as opposed to 
commercial rates. 
Various existing mechanisms and other organizations 
have taken steps to make more information about 
investment law and arbitration publicly available on a 
no-cost basis, and some of those services are described 
below. 
82 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
SCOPING STUDY
It is important to stress, however, that several Scoping 
Study interviewees and many other stakeholders have 
raised concerns that it is not merely transparency of 
information, but actual democratization of knowledge 
that will be required to truly move toward a more 
level and equal playing field as between developed 
and developing states, as well as vis-a-vis the rights 
and interests of other stakeholders in the system. 
For example, when states outsource legal services to 
private sector actors, states reduce their own learning 
and knowledge capture and thus perpetuate a cycle 
by which more and more knowledge is held in law 
firms rather than in-house. In many cases, language 
barriers greatly exacerbate these issues.
4.6.5.1 UNCITRAL
4.6.5.1.1 UNCITRAL’s Transparency Registry
UNCITRAL’s Transparency Registry is a repository for 
the publication of information and documents in treaty-
based ISDS.549 It was established by the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based investor-State 
Arbitration (Rules on Transparency) in 2014.550 Subject 
to certain qualifications, the documents listed in Article 
3 of the Rules on Transparency are to be made available 
to the public, which include, among others, written 
statements and filings of the parties, non-disputing 
party submissions, transcripts, and awards. The Rules 
on Transparency apply in relation to disputes arising 
out of treaties concluded after April 1, 2014 when the 
arbitration is initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, unless the parties otherwise agree. The United 
Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention) is 
an instrument by which parties to treaties concluded 
prior to April 1, 2014 consent to apply the Rules on 
Transparency.551 Five states are party to the Mauritius 
Convention as of the writing of this report.
4.6.5.1.2 UNCITRAL’s WGIII website
UNCITRAL’s WGIII website has grown to include 
a wealth of information about its ISDS reform 
project.552 This website includes all submissions from 
governments made throughout the reform project as 
well as substantive background notes prepared by the 
Secretariat to better assist the WGIII in its work. All 
audio recordings and reports of all sessions are readily 
available. The page provides links to substantive 
submissions made by observer organizations and 
other non-states (e.g. the G77, United Nations Special 
Procedures Mandate Holders) to assist the WGIII in 
its work, as well as to selected research material (e.g. 
by the OECD) and work produced by the academic 
forum.553 A bibliography of recent writings related to 
investor-state dispute settlement is also linked to this 
page.554
4.6.5.2 UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub
UNCTAD has by far the most comprehensive publicly 
available resources on investment policy-making and 
disputes. In addition to UNCTAD’s investment-policy 
resources and services, including the Investment Policy 
Framework and Investment Policy Review program 
described in Section 4.2.1, UNCTAD’s Investment 
Policy Hub makes publicly available a wealth of policy 
tools and resources.555 
UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Monitor includes 
information that has been collected by UNCTAD on 
changes in national FDI policies on an annual basis 
since 1992, and which provides input into UNCTAD’s 
annual World Investment Report, its quarterly 
Investment Policy Monitor, and the UNCTAD-OECD 
Reports on G20 Measures.556 The Investment Policy 
Monitor provides country-specific, up-to-date 
information about the latest developments in national 
foreign investment policies.557
UNCTAD’s Investment Laws Navigator is a 
comprehensive and regularly updated collection 
of national investment laws that includes tools for 
searching and filtering.558 It is designed to provide 
information that can contribute to international policy 
discourse and to help advise and provide technical 
assistance to countries interested in reviewing or 
reforming their regulatory frameworks.559
UNCTAD’s International Investment Agreement 
Navigator includes all publicly available IIAs.560 Users 
can browse by country, country grouping, recently 
concluded, or use an advanced-search function to 
find more specific agreements.561 Relatedly, the IIA 
Mapping Project maps the content of IIAs and the 
database can help to understand trends, approaches, 
and examples.562
Finally, UNCTAD’s Investment Dispute Settlement 
Navigator contains information and filings of known 
international arbitration cases initiated under IIAs.563 
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This site also permits searching by various categories, 
including respondent state, sector, treaty, breach, 
among others, and includes an advanced-search 
function.564 
4.6.5.3 PluriCourts Investment Treaty 
Arbitration Database 
Outside of intergovernmental efforts at transparency 
and disclosure of information, the PluriCourts 
Investment Treaty Arbitration Database (PITAD) is a 
comprehensive, regularly updated and networked 
overview of all known international investment 
arbitration cases.565 The database contains more than 
1000 ISDS cases, coded with a series of searchable 
variables, and raw and analyzed data.
4.6.5.4 italaw 
italaw is a comprehensive, regularly updated, and 
completely free database on investment treaties, 
international investment law, and investor-state 
arbitration.566 It is searchable and contains links to 
cases and other information.
4.6.5.5 Jus Mundi 
Jus Mundi is a search engine that aims to empower 
lawyers worldwide to conduct comprehensive and 
efficient research on international legal matters.567 
While its most comprehensive services are on a 
paid basis, it also provides open and free access 
to international law through the light version of its 
search engine.568
4.6.5.6 International Arbitration Case Law 
International Arbitration Case Law (IACL) is a not-
for-profit project that aims to disseminate at no cost 
summaries of important ISDS decisions relevant 
to legal practitioners and scholars.569 IACL aims to 
summarize, edit, and coordinate the publication of 
awards and decisions in international arbitration. 
It also seeks to eliminate language barriers and 
to facilitate the content of decisions in various 
languages.570
4.6.5.7 TradeLab
TradeLab, discussed above in Section 4.4.2 is a global 
network of universities and training centers that conduct 
pro bono projects for developing countries, SMEs, civil 
society organizations, or other stakeholders.571 Tradelab 
posts research memoranda and other non-confidential 
output on its website,572 thereby seeking to achieve three 
objectives: (i) help beneficiaries build capacity; (ii) train 
students; and (iii) inform and create awareness for the 
wider public.573 TradeLab sees potential to democratize 
legal education and the legal profession in the field 
of international economic law by spreading learning 
and expertise beyond a handful of highly specialized 
universities and large law firms.574
4.7 Legal assistance and resources 
clearinghouse
As described in this Scoping Study, there is already a 
wealth of resources available to states to assist with 
investment-law related issues. A very basic form of 
Assistance Mechanism may provide great value by simply 
compiling, organizing, and disseminating information 
about existing resources to relevant government 
officials.575 
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During the course of CCSI’s analysis of issues 
described during interviews and regarding Assistance 
Mechanisms, several thematic, cross-cutting,
substantive areas of consideration emerged that are 
agnostic to the eventual institutional or ad hoc form 
that an Assistance Mechanism may take. We set forth 
thematically these cross-cutting areas for further 
consideration.
5.1 Quality, reliability, reputation, trust
Multiple interviewees from governments, existing 
Assistance Mechanisms, academia, and civil society 
highlighted that key factors determining the success 
of any Assistance Mechanism would be perceptions 
regarding its quality, reliability, credibility, and 
trustworthiness, as well as its actual performance in 
these areas (which are distinct, but not unrelated.
Quality, reliability, reputation
Government officials stressed that the crucial factors 
in any decision to use an Assistance Mechanism, 
particularly in the context of dispute settlement, are 
the quality, reliability and reputation of the support 
provider. These factors were of greater importance 
than cost.576
Interviewees familiar with the establishment or 
operations of existing Assistance Mechanisms 
stressed that ensuring that a mechanism is able to 
provide the highest quality of advice to clients, and 
that it has a stellar reputation, are critical. According 
to several such interviewees, “public relations” efforts 
are essential and building trust takes time.577 It is one 
thing for a state to sense an insurmountable capacity 
challenge or even to decide that it needs assistance, 
but it is entirely a different thing for a government to 
put its reliance in an outside mechanism. Government 
officials must be confident in the utility, the advice, the 
quality of the service, and the long-term sustainability 
of the mechanism. 
Quality, reliability and reputation matter to 
government officials on several different levels. At the 
broadest level, governments are responsible for, and 
answerable to, their populations.  According to one 
official, 
[i]f we have a WTO dispute and we say, ‘we’re
hiring ACWL,’ we can point to their experience,
pedigree, and general reputation. They’re used
by pretty much everybody in the developing
world, so we can sell that counsel to policy-
makers and the public. If we hire more expensive
counsel, we have to be able to point to their
accomplishments and reputation to justify
their retention. Unfortunately, the well-reputed
external counsel is extremely expensive because
of their reputation. What developing countries
need, I think, is a “rubber stamp” of sorts on the
lawyers, so that we can pick them without any
worry. I think that’s our biggest concern, to be
honest.578
Similarly, individual officials within governments are 
subject to immense political pressure in choosing 
legal counsel. 
If you are an agency director and lose a case, there 
is political pressure and responsibility. You have 
to hire the best, most well-respected lawyers. The 
political implications of hiring a small firm can be 
large. If the case does not go well, people will 
ask why that firm was hired rather than the most 
well-known. With an advisory center that was of 
high quality and trusted, it would make it easier 
for states to migrate away from large, expensive 
firms.579
In the context of IIAs and ISDS, this means that 
states will need to be convinced that any Assistance 
Mechanism operates at the same level as private 
practitioners – obtaining the best representation will 
often be prioritized over cost, particularly when public 
interests are at stake.580 One government interviewee 
noted that attention to reputation should not be 
underestimated as the first reaction of any country 
facing an ISDS dispute, which in most cases are 
infrequent but of the highest stakes, will be to turn to 
a well-established law firm.
SCOPING STUDY
Quality will need to be demonstrated. Leadership and 
institutional placement can also help. Having strong 
and well-respected leadership at the beginning 
can be critical to putting an organization on the 
map. Such leadership must be viewed as legitimate 
in the eyes of all stakeholders in any Assistance 
Mechanism (beneficiaries, donors. One interviewee 
noted that some attention should be given to the 
extent to which an Assistance Mechanism will need 
to “weather political storms,” and how it should be 
established institutionally to ensure the greatest 
success in this regard.581 The ability to benefit from 
the reputation of an existing institution as, for 
example, the ALSF benefitted from its affiliation with 
the AfDB, and the ISP/LDCs program has benefitted 
from its affiliation with IDLO, and by extension, the 
United Nations, can be beneficial to an Assistance 
Mechanism in both of these respects.
Trust
Closely related to issues of quality, reliability, and 
reputation is the issue of trust. Interviewees 
stressed that with any legal service, trust is 
a necessary component.
Trust is essential to be able to provide effective 
representation. Interviewees stated that a support 
provider’s credibility and trustworthiness were 
crucial for government clients to be candid and 
open with the support provider. Many government 
and other interviewees stressed that trust must 
be built over time; that the financial and policy 
interests of support providers must be understood, 
and ideally aligned, with that of the government. 
They stated that during their internal procurement 
process, great attention is paid to the interests and 
perspectives of outside legal assistance. Explicit 
consideration is given to which counsel they can 
trust to handle politically, economically, socially, or 
otherwise sensitive legal matters and truly represent 
the country’s interest.582 If an Assistance Mechanism 
were constructed to be attuned to the perspective 
and interest of states and, according to some 
interviewees, to not have a financial interest in the 
claim or the ISDS system more broadly, it would be 
easier for governments to engage such a mechanism 
for direct representation.583  
86 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
The sensitivity to alignment of perspectives and 
avoidance of even perceptions of conflicts of interest was 
stressed not only with respect to direct representation 
in claims, but also with respect to more general policy 
advice or discrete questions.584 One government 
would value a neutral place for a “second opinion” 
with respect to what had been suggested by outside, 
private sector legal counsel because this official has in 
the past had doubts about whether such advice is truly 
in the legal (and social and political) interest of a state.585 
Another interviewee stated that it would be helpful for 
a center to be affiliated with an existing international or 
other organization that the government already trusts, 
as this would build on an existing relationship.586 One 
interviewee with experience working for an Assistance 
Mechanism stressed that for certain tasks, even highly 
qualified private sector lawyers may not be appropriate 
because their experience and interest (financial or 
otherwise) is sometimes not truly and fundamentally 
aligned with that of a government and its interests.587
Some successful Assistance Mechanisms have built up 
significant levels of trust. With respect to the ACWL 
there is a generally high level of intimacy between it 
and its clients.588 They are close because they foster 
relationships that both predate and outlast litigation 
and are thus less ‘transactional.’589 Trust is built through 
hosting of trainings, other events, and personal 
relationships. Individuals familiar with the ACWL have 
found that governments are more willing to be candid 
and open, and that trust is a huge advantage.590 
The ALSF has similarly, through years of work, built up 
trust relationships. As noted earlier, key traits that were 
noted by one interviewee as contributing to the ALSF’s 
success were also that it was a regional initiative, and 
not something that came from the G20, G7, or other 
organizations outside of the region, and that it started 
with African institutional support (the AfDB), and thus 
benefitted from trust relationships that were already 
established.591 
5.2 Scope of services and funding
The scope of services an Assistance Mechanism can 
provide will be entirely dependent on and interrelated 
with available funding – the more money available, 
the more services can be provided. There will also be 
tradeoffs in the nature and breadth of services offered 
and depth in the number of countries to whom those 
services might be offered. Thus, comparisons in this 
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section to existing Assistance Mechanisms will 
attempt to incorporate contextual comparisons to 
the investment law context. This section primarily 
discusses comparisons with the ACWL, but also 
incorporates references to other funding and support 
mechanisms. 
5.2.1 Scope of services
This section first focuses on the most robust form of 
service provision, that of the ACWL-model, but moves 
on to discuss more discrete areas. 
With respect to the ACWL, this mechanism plays 
a valuable role in the WTO context, but differences 
between these two legal systems, and the role that 
the ACWL plays in one versus what an investment law 
assistance mechanism could play in the other, should 
not be underestimated. 
One major difference between the ACWL and service 
provision in ISDS cases is that the time and cost 
budgeted by the ACWL for any given WTO dispute 
seem to be dramatically lower per case than is 
common for ISDS disputes. This issue is addressed in 
more detail in the following Section 5.1.2.2.
A second difference relates to the nature of WTO law 
as compared to investment law, where in the former 
firmer lines may be drawn between legal and policy 
assistance and advice.  Particularly if an investment law 
assistance mechanism were to engage in negotiation 
assistance and other training and capacity building 
work, one issue that might arise is whether it is feasible 
(and/or desirable to maintain a line between the 
provision of legal and policy support in the IIA context. 
As noted routinely by interviewees discussing 
the ACWL, key to its success is its focus on legal, 
and not policy, input. While that line is not always 
clear – and, indeed, some users have reported 
particularly valuing the ACWL’s services because of 
a development lens applied to its work592 – it may 
be even more difficult to maintain in the investment 
law context where the standard-based nature of core 
IIA obligations provide a greater space for integrating 
policy considerations into those obligations’ 
interpretation and application.593 While private 
sector law firms currently advise states on legal 
matters, where and how these issues stray into 
policy questions is not as closely scrutinized as 
such advice may be if delivered by an ACWL-
like mechanism. While the ACWL notes its 
avoidance of 
policy issues in the WTO area as key to its legitimacy 
and acceptance, this distinction may be more difficult 
to draw in investment arbitration.
Another issue that may arise is whether and 
how negotiation, training, and legal support or 
representation in the IIA context might need to look 
and be structured differently than for WTO-focused 
activities, or where cost implications may arise. In 
contrast to WTO negotiations and disputes, where 
the hub of activity and relevant delegations are in 
Geneva, IIA negotiations take place around the world 
and are not tied to any particular existing institution, 
secretariat, or negotiating framework or agenda. 
WTO disputes similarly occur in Geneva whereas 
IIA-based disputes have several hubs. In addition to 
raising logistical challenges regarding where and how 
to provide support, it may also be harder for support 
providers to know, and be known to and trusted by, 
potential users, and to keep abreast of the relevant 
developments in the different spheres of activity.    
With respect to the issue of litigating position, one 
commonly cited benefit of the ACWL is that it enables 
developing countries to better advance and enforce 
the rules of the multilateral trading system and helps 
open global markets. With ISDS support, however, 
this function and role is not present. An Assistance 
Mechanisms that participated in ISDS defense may 
help states avoid or minimize liability and/or reduce 
their defense costs, and could potentially increase the 
legitimacy of the ISDS system; but the overarching 
aim of supporting client states as rule-enforcers and 
market-openers, which helps generate buy-in for 
the ACWL even among developed country funders 
who may be respondents in cases they financially 
support,594 does not appear to be similarly present for 
ISDS defense. Rule enforcement arguably exists when 
states employ legitimate defenses, but proactive 
action to maintain the integrity of the investment legal 
system is not typically taken up in a state-state context 
available under treaties. 
Not unrelatedly, one interviewee who had worked at 
the ACWL noted that much of the ACWL’s early work 
in dispute settlement had almost exclusively been 
focused on supporting claimants (with a view toward 
assisting developing countries help to maintain the 
integrity of the WTO system), and that the subsequent 
rise of respondent-side support raised issues as that 
work “is more difficult in many ways.”595
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Of course, short of legal representation in disputes, 
various services could be offered in different 
combinations that could be explored. For example, 
some Trust Funds also facilitate matching beneficiaries 
to lawyers who have agreed to be available at below-
market fees. An Assistance Mechanism may be 
employed to facilitate knowledge-sharing among 
government officials and may organically expand to 
fill other roles as time, and trust in and demand from 
such a mechanism, grew. A mechanism may start 
by simply acting as a resource for governments to 
better understand where, from whom, and at what 
cost, existing mechanisms are available to assist in 
specific contexts. The various models of existing 
Assistance Mechanisms described in Section 4 are 
useful to consider how an Assistance Mechanism 
may best been the needs of states (and other 
potential beneficiaries) for the least cost.
5.2.2 Required resources, cost allocation, 
funding sustainability 
5.2.2.1 Person-hours and associated resources
Relating to costs, the expenses associated with any 
Assistance Mechanism will vary based on the type of 
service being offered and the nature of the service 
provider. For example, full support for prosecution 
or defense of an ISDS arbitration averages $5 million 
per case.596 While costs could be lower in a given 
case, they could also be multiples of that sum, 
reaching into the tens of millions of dollars. Even if 
low probability events, such exceptional costs are 
high-impact events that would need to be planned 
for to help ensure quality and sustainability of 
defense are not sacrificed due to financial and other 
resource constraints.
Other services can be provided at lower cost. 
Interviewees in CCSI’s consultations suggested, for 
example, that support could be limited to discrete 
aspects of ISDS litigation (e.g., provision of memos 
on particular legal issues; access to information 
and advice on counsel and/or arbitrator selection; 
support on retaining and using experts for valuation 
and damages; support on gathering and managing 
documentary evidence). It was also suggested that 
if resource constraints arose, support could be 
directed to activities other than arbitration, such as 
for provision of low- or no-cost access to databases 
and research tools; development of specialized online 
course content; development of user-driven capacity 
building workshops and peer exchanges; and support 
for investment policy development, and as relevant, IIA 
negotiation, review, and implementation. 
For some types of expenditures, there will likely be 
associated economies of scale enabling services to reach 
a wider set of potential beneficiaries. Development of 
training courses could, for instance, be reproduced and 
replicated at relatively low marginal costs (although 
this may address a different capacity need than more 
tailored and unique capacity interventions would); and 
special rates for or open access to online resources and 
databases (along with a wider translation of relevant 
materials) could support a relatively large number of 
users. Costs of database and other subscriptions can 
easily reach into the tens of thousands of dollars per year, 
in aggregate, making it costly for a single government 
to procure.
In contrast, it is unclear that litigation support in discrete 
cases will have such economies of scale. If a service 
provider expends $5 million in one case, it is uncertain 
that that will mean the service provider can litigate the 
next case for another client at a lower cost (though it 
could potentially litigate another case for the same 
client at a lower cost, especially if the facts are similar). 
Even when arbitration involves repeat players, it does 
not appear that that translates into reduced legal fees, 
as has apparently been the case with the introduction 
of the ACWL into the WTO context. Spillovers could be 
generated, however, if work on individual ISDS cases 
by an Assistance Mechanism was also used to train 
lawyers for the respondent state as well as lawyers for 
other governments, enabling more officials to gain skills 
and experience necessary for handling disputes. To 
the extent an Assistance Mechanism set a substantial 
market bar on pricing or permitted states to credibly use 
its pricing scale as a point of negotiation, it could also 
introduce broader spillover impacts.
Of course, the services provided must respond to and 
address the specific “capacity” gap that is being targeted 
and must be appropriately narrow, or broad, to fulfill its 
mandate. These issues of costs - and efficiency - are key 
for understanding what types of Assistance Mechanisms, 
if any, are desirable in response to identified concerns 
and feasible with respect to resources.
Comparisons with the ACWL 
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As noted above in Section 4.1.1 the ACWL uses 
time budgets for its cases, estimating the resources 
necessary and capping the fees that can be 
charged. 597 This budget is crucial for estimating 
staffing needs and associated costs. Table 9 below 
shows the current time budget for ACWL work.598 As 
noted, interviewees acknowledged that the ACWL 
often exceeds its budgeted time for any given 
case, so numbers below are indicative based on the 
information that the ACWL makes publicly available.
Table 9, for comparison purposes, also illustrates the 
number of hours required in an ISDS proceeding. 
While it is difficult to find publicly available data 
regarding the number of hours spent on legal 
defense in ISDS cases, the information available 
suggests a reasonable estimate of 20,000 hours per 
case, although this number could, of course, vary 
greatly depending on the complexity, duration, and 
other unique attributes of any given case.599 
Comparing a WTO panel phase with an ISDS 
proceeding reveals that the ISDS proceeding may 
require 40-50 times more hours worked. 
Furthermore, over the past ten years, the ACWL has 
handled between 0 and 5 new requests for dispute 
settlement assistance each year. Notwithstanding 
the ways in which an Assistance Mechanism in 
investment law may craft rules to broaden or narrow 
eligible beneficiaries, one could imagine a broader 
desire for support in ISDS disputes, capacity building, 
and other areas than in the WTO context given the 
larger number of overall disputes. 
Comparisons with other Assistance Mechanisms area 
also useful. For example, as discussed in more depth 
in Section 4.3.1.5, under the ICTY’s legal aid system, 
monthly, lump-sum payments were made to counsel 
for representation. Trials were assigned a complexity 
level of 1-3 which was a proxy for hours required. For a 
Complexity level 1 case, maximum amounts that would 
be paid to legal counsel appearing on the ICTY “Rule 
45” list were €151,786, for a complexity level 2 case, 
€260,895, and for a complexity level 3 case, €424,731.600 
For other legal counsel appearing before the 
ICTY, maximum hours that could be submitted for 
reimbursement were, in the pre-trial phase, a maximum 
of 150 hours per month per team member, of two, three 
or five persons, depending on the complexity of the 
case, and a total of 3,000, 4,500 or 6,000 (respectively) 
hours total could be remunerated.601 For the trial phase, 
a maximum of two, three or five team members may 
be remunerated for up to 150 hours per person, for a 
total of 300, 450 or 700 (respectively) hours total, and at 
the appeals phase a maximum of 600 to 900 hours total 
could be billed for the entire phase, with up to 100 hours 
per defense team member per month.602
Depending on whether an investment law Assistance 
Table 9 Time budgets - WTO and ISDS
Proceeding Hours Cost to beneficiary of legal 
services
WTO Consultations 147 CHF47,628 (max charge)
WTO Panel 444 CHF143,856 (max charge)
WTO AB 263 CHF85,212 (max charge)
ISDS Case (Eli Lil-
ly)764 20,142.71 CAD4,579,260.92
ISDS Case (Mesa 
Power)765 19,616.00 CAD4,225,547.67
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Mechanism also engaged in other activities of the 
ACWL, such as capacity building or providing opinions 
(among others that have been discussed in this Scoping 
Study), the financial and personnel resources required 
by an investment law Assistance Mechanism may 
need to be greater by an order of some magnitude 
when compared to the ACWL (or other Assistance 
Mechanisms, such as the ICTY’s fund) to provide the 
desired level of support in the investment law context.
Another interesting comparison between the ACWL 
and investment law is the relative impact of the cases 
that are supported. The ACWL’s work at the pace 
described has enabled it to be involved in nearly 20 
percent of all WTO dispute settlement proceedings 
to date. In contrast, support at a roughly equivalent 
pace (assuming three cases per year over the past ten 
years) in ISDS would, based on the number of claims 
over the past ten years (615), be closer to 5 percent.603 
The value of an Assistance Mechanism to the overall 
legal system and “rule of law” is also an area for 
consideration. In the context of WTO law, there may 
be low-value cases in which developing countries 
participate that are nevertheless high in systemic 
importance because WTO law is based on one set of 
common treaties and, while a system of stare decisis 
is not employed, reports issued by the Appellate 
Body can be persuasive with respect to later disputes. 
The ACWL may be especially important in providing 
support for those types of disputes. In contrast, in 
ISDS, cases are often high value for the parties to 
the dispute but low value in terms of systemic effect 
because of the thousands of different treaties forming 
the basis of disputes, and the ad hoc nature of dispute 
settlement (although in practice many arbitrators are 
persuaded by earlier awards, but not in a predictable 
nor systemic way). A state win in one ISDS case under 
the present arbitration system, for instance, will 
not produce systemic gains. It is possible that state 
support by an Assistance Mechanism may produce 
more frequent state “wins” on issues of substance or 
procedure, and that those decisions may have spillover 
effects in other ISDS cases arising under the same or 
other treaties, but systemic impacts are less likely. This 
is a notable contrast to the WTO, and the potential 
impact and perceived benefits of the ACWL. 
 
5.2.2.2 Costs of support and who bears them
There are three general models for allocation of costs:
Legal service providers bear the costs of services 
provided to users: In some cases, service providers 
facilitated by an Assistance Mechanism bear the costs 
of their services: Law firms and university-based legal 
clinics or other non-governmental organizations may 
provide pro bono support on discrete legal issues 
relating to IIA policy, treaty negotiation, or dispute 
management. This support is available at no cost to 
beneficiaries. While these Assistance Mechanisms are 
not cost-free, the direct costs of services are often 
borne by the service providers (e.g., the law firms, 
universities, or non-profit organizations) and the 
overhead costs of the mechanism through external 
donations.604 The existing ISP/LDCs program, for 
example, fits this model.
Service users pay for (all or some of) the costs 
of services provided to them: In other models the 
service users may pay for the service provider at market 
rates (which could be, for instance, based on the 
market for the particular type of case, or on the market 
for legal services in the host state), pre-set rates, or 
negotiated rates. This is currently done, for instance, 
in connection with the services provided (or, in the 
case of engagement of external counsel, facilitated) 
by the ACWL, and in connection with services 
provided by the ALSF. While Trust Funds engage in 
varying levels of pairing beneficiaries with actual legal 
counsel, in some cases Trust Funds do have approved 
counsel lists and/or specified rates that counsel may 
charge. Another example in this category is the use 
of third-party funding (which, for various reasons is 
in practice largely limited to claimant-funding and is 
discussed in Section 6.3.2.3.5) or other contingency fee 
arrangements. Although third-party funding and/or 
contingency arrangements do not involve the service 
user paying money up-front to the service provider (or 
funder of the service provider), the service user, in the 
case of a financial upside, would commit to share a 
portion of a favorable award or outcome. 
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Third-parties (i.e., neither the service 
provider nor the service user) pay for costs 
of services: Other models may rely more heavily 
or even exclusively on third-party donors to fund 
assistance. Those donors can be public (like 
national government aid agencies), or private (like 
Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation) and can potentially support a 
range of activities from assistance with reviewing 
and formulating IIA policy (as organizations such as 
UNCTAD already do) to defense of particular ISDS 
disputes. Different approaches can be taken with 
respect to issues of:
• who can contribute (e.g., just governments, or 
also philanthropic foundations, private donors, 
etc.); 
• to what can they contribute (e.g., to specific 
cases, general funds, or only to core funding); 
• on what terms (e.g., in exchange for rights 
to participate in management meetings, to 
receive reports on work conducted, and/or to 
also obtain services); and
• with what degree of transparency.
 
Different rules may apply to different 
types of donors. Assistance Mechanisms 
may develop comprehensive ex-ante rules 
covering all permitted funding sources and 
arrangements or build in flexibility to develop 
new funding relationships and terms over time.605 
Another approach under this category is the use 
of fee-shifting, whereby the costs of services used 
by client governments would be paid by their 
adversaries in the dispute. A fee-shifting model 
could provide that, if a state were to prevail in its 
defense of an ISDS case, the investor would pay 
for those defense costs. This fee-shifting can be 
limited to certain contexts (e.g., when claims are 
considered frivolous or abusive), certain amounts 
(e.g., reasonable fees in a particular market), or 
certain activities (e.g., for legal fees, but not expert 
fees). A support provider could potentially be the 
beneficiary of such fee-shifting awards in the client 
government’s favor, while the client government 
could potentially retain liability for fee-shifting in 
an investor’s favor. Such an arrangement, however, 
may raise concerns among client governments that 
litigating parties would not have incentives to keep 
costs low. 
Another approach involving contributions by investor/
claimants and potentially other litigants was suggested 
by one interviewee. This proposal was for a novel, tax-
like financing mechanism that could be explored to 
fund an Assistance Mechanism.606 A fee that would be 
paid as an element of jurisdictional requirements could 
be built into treaties. For example, 1% of the amount 
in controversy of any case could be paid to finance an 
Assistance Mechanism.607 An economic assessment 
would need to be conducted as to what percentages 
(and if desirable, for all or a subset of kinds of claims) 
would be sufficient to cover the expenses, or supplement 
other financing, of an Assistance Mechanism. 
These three general categories of cost-bearers– legal 
service providers, beneficiary/uses, and third-parties -- 
are not mutually exclusive: A law firm may, for instance, 
agree with a respondent state to provide defense 
at a fee that is lower than it normally charges, and to 
also build training for government attorneys into its 
services contract; and a third-party donor may agree 
to pay a portion of the relevant defense costs, with 
the respondent state paying the remainder. At least 
one arbitral institution also is willing to help negotiate 
arbitrator fees or waive some of its own administration 
fees for certain governments.
Not all models are desirable or viable for all types of 
services, service providers, or service users. Several 
private-sector providers indicated, for instance, that 
while law firms may be able to provide legal services 
at discounted or negotiated rates, and may be able to 
do pro bono work on discrete tasks, they would not be 
able to commit to fully support ISDS defense on a pro 
bono basis. The time required and revenue forsaken 
would be too great, as would the risk that the pro bono 
work would give rise to conflicts of interests preventing 
the firm from taking on other, paying, clients. Similarly, 
it is questionable whether philanthropic foundations or 
other donors would be able to support defense at a scale 
desired by potential users.608 Likewise, potential service 
users may not be able -- as a legal or policy matter -- to 
equally employ those different cost-allocation models. 
Some potential users noted that entering into pro bono 
arrangements with private sector law firms may not be 
possible due to procurement and anti-corruption laws 
and policies. Others indicated concerns about whether 
a lack of control over funding would translate into a lack 
of control over policy or litigation strategy.
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5.2.2.3 Funding sustainability – different 
models, approaches, and considerations 
The long-term financial sustainability of an Assistance 
Mechanism is important to its quality of its work, 
impact, and reputation (and those factors, in turn, also 
affect its financial sustainability). 
The funding sustainability of an Assistance Mechanism 
should be a major focus of any real effort to create 
such a mechanism. Lessons and insights from some 
existing Assistance Mechanisms may be useful in this 
consideration. Some comparisons and experiences are 
highlighted below. While the section above discussed 
three main potential cost-bearers of support – service 
providers, user/beneficiaries, and third-party donors 
– this section focuses primarily the latter two since 
contributions by service providers alone (e.g., through 
ad hoc pro bono assistance) seems unlikely, under 
current circumstances, to meet the demand sought by 
respondent states.  
5.2.2.3.1 Funding sustainability – support by 
third-party donors
In a model that relies upon support from third-
party donors, achieving financial sustainability will 
require various ingredients, including securing (and 
maintaining) buy-in from donors, having the trust of 
beneficiaries and understanding their needs and 
priorities, achieving desired outcomes, effectively 
managing relationships and resources, and anticipating 
and mitigating risks.609   
Table 10 highlights some data on donor support 
provided to other relevant initiatives. The text below 
provides additional detail.
Example: ACWL
As noted in greater depth in Section 4.1.1.4, the ACWL 
operates on a mix of user fees and donations to its 
Endowment Fund with a view of becoming financially 
independent, although a 2006 task force report 
concluded that it was doubtful that the Endowment 
Fund would ever reach a size necessary to ensure the 
ACWL’s self-sufficiency.610 The ACWL’s Endowment 
Fund is funded by developed country Members and 
contributions count as official development assistance. 
Each has contributed at least $1,000,000. At the end of 
2005, the Endowment Fund stood at CHF18,000,000, 
and at the end of 2015 at CHF26,000,000. 
While, as discussed further below, the ACWL also 
charges user fees for support in litigation, those fees 
have been a relatively minimal source of revenue for 
the Centre. They amounted to CHF300,000 for 2015, 
and from 2002-2014 averaged only CHF161,000 per 
year.611 Legal fees have constituted on average roughly 
4 percent of the ACWL’s annual revenues.612 
In 2016 the ACWL’s annual budget was roughly 
CHF4,300,000;613 and for 2019, it was estimated at 
roughly CHF4,700,000.614 The budget for the 2017-2021 
period is estimated at CHF23,548,000 million in total. 
Taking into account revenue from the Endowment 
Fund that can be withdrawn to fund the ACWL over this 
five-year window, CHF20,000,000 million in additional 
voluntary contributions will be necessary to cover the 
ACWL’s financial needs through 2021.615 These figures 
illustrate that although the ACWL is extremely highly 
regarded by users and commentators, it has not 
achieved the financial sustainability anticipated and 
must engage in ongoing quests for additional funding 
to sustain its work. 
Example: IDLO’s ISP/LDCs Programme
With respect to IDLO’s ISP/LDCs program, the program 
is aiming to raise €2 million in its initial phase, a large 
portion of which has been pledged.616 With a fully-
funded €2 million in donations, ISP/LDCs envisions 
that it would be able to cover operational expenses 
and make about twelve interventions of medium size, 
which could take the form of arbitrations or large-scale 
trainings.617 Unlike the ACWL, the ISP/LDCs program 
provides all services to beneficiaries free of charge to 
the beneficiary.
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Despite having received pledges of funding, 
it is unclear to CCSI how much of ISP/LDCs’ 
pledged money has actually been received by the 
program. At the IDLO ISP/LDCs kickoff event at 
UN Headquarters in September 2017, for example, 
the Director General for International Cooperation 
and Development of the European Commission 
announced a decision to set aside €1 million for the 
ISP/LDCs program.618 The program finally received 
those funds in December 2019.619
Example: Various trust funds
While the total amount in the PCA Trust Fund is 
not known to CCSI, it is not at a scale that would 
permit it to make grants to cover private sector legal 
costs.620 Rather, grants tend to be sufficient to cover 
institutional and arbitrator costs of disputes.621 
While the PCA Secretary General appeals every 
year to PCA members, varying levels of fundraising 
success are realized. When a high profile public 
international law, state-state arbitration is before 
the PCA, the PCA has found that members are willing 
to donate funds toward legal assistance.622 However, 
the PCA struggles to a greater extent to maintain a 
consistent flow of funds to generally upkeep the Trust 
Fund. 623 One interviewee stated that in this interviewee’s 
experience, states are not unwilling to donate, but 
general “rule of law” objectives tend to be insufficient 
to permit states to muster the political will to do so on a 
large or sufficient scale.624
The ICJ Trust Fund, which helps states to offset expenses 
of appearing before the ICJ as well as to execute ICJ 
judgements, has never been known to have funds 
exceeding $2 million.625
The ITLOS Trust Fund, despite repeated entreaties to 
the UN General Assembly, has never reached amounts 
considered sufficient in light of the mandate and need. 
The most recent balance CCSI could locate was a 2006 
balance of $70,621.17.626
Table 10 Budgets and Expenditures for Assistance Mechanisms: Select examples
ACWL ALSF ICC Legal Aid for Defense
Annual budget CHF4.5 million (2018) $25 million estimated 
for 2020
€3.5 million estimated for 
2020766




- 5 new disputes (17 
ongoing or new 
disputes in total that 
year)
- 237 legal opinions
- 39 certificates for 
training course
- 4 participants in a 
secondment pro-
gram
Support provided by 
12 lawyers, 3 adminis-
trative staff, and 4 par-
ticipants in secondment 
program
40-60 percent of time is 
on activities other than 
litigation
The “bulk” of funding 
for 2020 is estimated for 
supporting fair commer-
cial negotiations.767 
From 2010-2018, $74.5 
million of expenditures 
approved. Of those 
funds:
- 64% for advisory 
services, 22% for 
capacity building
- 10% for litigation
- 4% for knowledge 
management.  
As of 2018, there were 
33 in-house members 
of staff
The 2020 budget estimates 
this will support payment for 
up to 11 external defense 
teams at capped rates
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With respect to the International Criminal Court, 
its budget for legal aid in 2016 was €4,521,000.30 
(up from €2,355,600 and €2,866,400 in 2015 and 
2014 respectively), representing 3.25% of the total 
ICC budget.627 This is less than 10% of the budget 
allocated to the Office of the Prosecutor.628 The legal 
aid budget is a part of the ICC’s overall budget, which 
is funded by ICC member states. The contribution 
of each state is determined in the same way that its 
UN dues are determined, which is roughly based on 
income, population, and debt burden. Additional 
funding is provided by voluntary contributions from 
organizations, corporations, or other entities.
5.2.2.3.2 Funding sustainability – user fees
Any Assistance Mechanism providing support in 
dispute settlement, negotiations, and other training/
capacity building could charge some or all users fees 
for some or all services in order to cover costs and/or 
discourage users from filing frivolous claims or raising 
frivolous defenses. 
ACWL experience discussed above, however, 
highlights the trade-offs between charging fees 
and encouraging/discouraging use of the services 
provided, as well as the difficulties in charging fees 
adequate to sustain such an Assistance Mechanism, 
especially when services provided free of cost 
constitute the bulk of demand for that Mechanism’s 
time.629 
It is uncertain that patterns experienced by other 
Assistance Mechanisms, and namely the ACWL, will 
apply in the investment law context – for instance, 
how the demand for legal opinions (provided free of 
charge by the ACWL) would relate to the demand for 
direct representation (provided at staggered rates by 
the ACWL) in ISDS. Thus, it is difficult to predict the 
contributions of a user-fee model, but likely realistic 
to assume that user-fees would represent only a small 
share of overall funding. 
Another distinction from the ACWL is that part of 
the motivation of charging user fees is to discourage 
frivolous claims. This rationale does not equally apply 
in the context of ISDS defense given that states 
currently do not make the choice to file the dispute. 
Other existing Assistance Mechanisms also provide 
certain services based on a user fee model. For 
example, as described earlier, the ICTY caps user 
fees at levels that are based on case complexity. 
Defendants in cases before the ICTY can benefit from 
reduced and/or capped fee legal representation. In 
these criminal defense contexts, notions of frivolous 
claims do not arise, and the rational for reduced fee 
services is one based in international human rights 
and the right to legal defense.
Overall, considerations regarding the appropriateness 
of user fees may differ depending upon such factors 
as whether the user is a state or private investor, 
respondent or claimant, the policy rationales 
for providing the assistance and the unintended 




Another cross-cutting theme relates to the actual, 
apparent, or possible conflicts of interests that can 
arise in the relationships between and among donors, 
support providers, client governments, private- and 
government-owned investors and investments, and 
other stakeholders.  Many of these types of issues are 
not unprecedented, arising in other areas of domestic 
and international law. As described further below 
in connection with discussing various existing legal 
support mechanisms, there exist myriad lessons and 
tools for trying to avoid and address these challenges, 
including care in establishing independent governance 
mechanisms for legal support institutions; clear and 
transparent rules on allocation of decision-making 
authority; and appropriate, comprehensive, and 
effective rules regarding professional responsibility. 
5.2.3.1 Tensions between client governments 
and donor governments 
Various concerns have been raised regarding potential 
tensions or conflicts, perceived or actual, that could 
arise between, on the one hand, client governments 
of an Assistance Mechanism and, on the other, donor 
governments (funders) of the Assistance Mechanism. 
The extent of conflicts would in many ways depend on 
the scope of an Advisory Center. Conflicts may include: 
• General conflict of interest in outcomes: 
Funders (and/or their stakeholders) may have an 
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interest in the content of the law generally,630 in 
the outcome of negotiations (between states 
and between investors and states), and/or in 
the outcome in a particular case (state-to-state 
or investor-state).631 One interviewee familiar 
with ALSF’s work stated that, “[f]or investor-
state disputes, I can see [managing conflicts 
of interest between donors and beneficiary 
governments] being a large challenge -- I 
would probably emphasize the independence 
of the management structure and make sure 
that developing country governments have a 
voice in the governance structure” in order to 
alleviate conflicts and tensions surrounding 
donors and specific cases. 
• Justifications for providing funding: Even 
within donor countries, there may be different 
perspectives regarding the objectives of the 
funding and the Assistance Mechanism it 
supports. Development agencies, for instance, 
may view funding for Assistance Mechanisms 
as important for supporting substantive and 
process-related development objectives;632 
and economic or trade ministries may view it as 
being important for supporting and legitimizing 
a system of international investment 
liberalization and protection,633 and for 
advancing their interests within that system.634 
Those several objectives of donor governments 
may, but do not necessarily, align. Moreover, 
client governments may have a different view 
from each of those donor country perspectives, 
valuing the funding and Assistance Mechanism 
based on the ability of such support to 
empower them to make their own decisions 
regarding objectives, formulation, use, and 
application of international investment law.  
• 
Funding states may face 
political difficulties supporting an Assistance 
Mechanism focused on dispute settlement 
because the general or specific support of 
respondent states may be, or perceived to 
be, at odds with those states’ support of their 
outward investors. If an Assistance Mechanism 
were supporting a respondent state’s defense 
in a claim brought by a donor-state’s investor(s), 
those tensions may be high.635 Additionally, 
it may be difficult for states to fund defense 
Support in conflict with internal 
stakeholders: 
of claims that donor-governments’ stakeholders 
do not believe should be claims at all. Some 
examples of such claims could be the particularly 
controversial cases targeting countries’ health 
measures (e.g., the Philip Morris cases) or limits on 
fossil fuel extraction. Rather than strengthening 
support for international investment treaties, the 
involvement of government-supported/taxpayer-
funded Assistance Mechanisms may instead 
generate additional awareness of and critiques 
regarding the costs of the system. 
• The nature of the respondent government: 
Funders may face political or policy difficulties 
supporting some potential beneficiaries. In the 
context of support for investor-state disputes, for 
instance, these issues could arise due to concerns 
about the conduct or nature of the respondent 
host government (e.g., if there is evidence of 
government corruption;636  if the government’s 
leadership is contested;637 or if the government is 
put on a sanctions list before or during a case638). 
• The nature of the claim: Funders may face 
political or policy difficulties supporting the defense 
some types of cases. If, for instance, the case 
relates to direct nationalization of an investment 
by a government, there may be concerns about 
the use of public funds to support defense of such 
conduct. These tensions may be exacerbated if the 
expropriation is of (or has negatively affected) an 
investment of a private or state-owned investor of 
a donor country. They might also be triggered if 
the expropriation is of (or has negatively affected) 
the contributions of an international financial 
institution.    
Interviewees experienced with existing Assistance 
Mechanisms stated that in this context, real or perceived 
conflicts, and even the “optics” of who is financing an 
Assistance Mechanism and where and under what 
circumstances support is provided are critical issues that 
should not be underestimated. 
 
To the extent that funding from development agencies 
is anticipated, it is important to consider whether and 
what tensions may arise among, for instance:
• those agencies’ needs to be able to monitor and 
evaluate the use of public funds and ensure funding 
aligns with their broader policy aims, 
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• the needs and priorities of client governments, 
including the client governments’ interests in (1) 
confidentiality and (2) avoiding circumstances of 
tied aid,639 and
• the needs of an Assistance Mechanism to secure 
funding while also maintaining its reputation as 
an independent provider of legal advice free from 
political sway.
Governance documents relating to the ACWL suggest 
that these issues can be navigated but are complex. 
Developed country donors have emphasized in 
ACWL General Assembly meetings, for instance, 
that “the majority of the ACWL’s funding originates 
from development agencies of developed country 
Members that now have come to consider the ACWL 
as a development organization, rather than a trade 
organization,” and that, consequently, they needed 
“real” and “results-based reporting” on relevant 
performance indicators in order to justify their funding 
decisions.”640 Developing country governments and 
ACWL management, however, counseled against 
reporting requirements that could impair the ACWL’s 
independence, impartiality, and confidentiality.641 
While a number of donor development organizations 
have determined that their respective missions 
align with the ACWL’s – particularly in supporting 
developing countries and LDCs to understand, 
advance, and defend their rights as litigants in a rules-
based multilateral trading system – the reluctance of 
some developed countries to provide support, and the 
interactions between existing donors and other ACWL 
members on performance indicators, suggest that it 
is important to carefully assess whether and to what 
extent various stakeholders’ objectives may diverge 
and create a governance structure able to manage 
those issues. Such frictions could potentially arise out 
of the users of the system, the identity of the parties 
adverse to the funded litigants,642 the types of cases 
being handled, and the outcomes of the disputes on 
litigants and beyond.643
It is also useful to bear in mind the challenges the 
ACWL has reportedly had with securing funds from 
non-Member sources, including private foundations, 
due to concerns about the conditions that such 
funders might seek to place on those funds. It would 
be important to consider whether and how those 
types of potential conflicts between funders and 
funded organizations might be different in relation 
to work on IIAs/ISDS (including any potential work for 
claimants), and how those conflicts can be avoided 
and/or addressed.  
5.2.3.2 Tensions between client governments 
and support providers
Other concerns raised in interviews and in literature 
relate to potential tensions between client governments 
and support providers (e.g. in clearinghouse models 
where a support provider is an entity other than the 
Assistance Mechanism’s own staff). Support providers 
may have a financial interest in the contours of the 
system and, in particular, a continuous flow of cases 
providing revenue-generating opportunities. It was 
noted by several interviewees, including existing 
support providers, that this, in turn, could inform how 
the providers 
• advise on the content of investment policies and 
issues relating to IIA negotiations (e.g., whether 
to negotiate investment treaties with ISDS, and 
whether and how to regulate third-party funding); 
and
• argue (or not) certain issues of law in the context 
of disputes.644 
Any misalignment of perspective and interest between 
a support provider and the beneficiary, or questions 
on the part of the beneficiary that the advice is not in 
its best interest, were noted as key causes for concern 
among government official interviewees.645 
Relatedly, it was noted that support providers may 
have a financial interest that informs their case strategy 
and tactics. If they are paid by hours worked, they may 
have an incentive to raise even frivolous arguments 
or engage in other actions that prolong or drive up 
hours worked in proceedings. If they are paid based 
on a flat fee, they may be reluctant to incur costs that 
would result in their running the case at a loss or shrink 
their profit. If they are paid based on a contingency 
fee arrangement, they may push for (or against) any 
pre-award settlement or other outcome that affects 
their returns. The involvement of third-party funding 
can further complicate these issues, exacerbated by 
the fact that such funding and terms thereof are not 
transparent, making it unclear whose interests are 
driving decisions made by the disputing party.
Existing Assistance Mechanisms have, and continue 
to, navigate ethical conflicts. The ALSF, for example, 
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reports applying the stricter of jurisdictional or support 
provider ethical obligations when more than one set 
of rules may apply; but as stated by one interviewee 
familiar with the ALSF, “ethics conflicts are a huge 
nightmare.”646 In this context, tools such as the use 
of advance waivers may be important to consider 
for some Assistance Mechanism models, as would 
be any treaties or other instruments establishing 
the legal structure, governance, and liability of the 
Assistance Mechanism(s). In this context, complex 
issues arise regarding the appropriate protections 
to be afforded, respectively, to users of Assistance 
Mechanisms and to their support providers.
5.2.3.3 Tensions between donors and support 
providers
Another set of tensions relates to those between 
donors to any Assistance Mechanism and external 
support providers, which can arise from mismatches 
between each actor’s objectives and incentives, and 
which may change over time. Questions may arise 
regarding, for instance, the appropriate role of the 
donor, its ability to control the type and content 
of services provided by support providers, and 
proper methods for exercising such control. This 
control may be direct (e.g., by donors specifying 
who or what is/is not eligible for support, shaping 
the contents of training agendas, and/or approving 
the types of arguments being raised in disputes); 
or it can be indirect (through decisions to increase 
or decrease funding for an Assistance Mechanism, 
to designate certain support providers as eligible 
or not to provide assistance or due to power over 
staffing decisions). 
5.2.3.4 Internal Assistance Mechanism 
tensions arising from the scope of its 
mandate
One interviewee with experience working for an 
Assistance Mechanism raised the issue of internal 
conflicts of interest that can arise when an Assistance 
Mechanism tries to do both policy formulation 
and legal defense.647 While bringing together 
governmental officials working on these topics 
makes sense, and the lack of cross-governmental 
discussion and application of lessons learned was 
an intra-governmental capacity challenging raised 
by government officials in interviews, tensions may 
arise to the extent an Assistance Mechanism tries 
to provide substantive guidance in both of these areas. 
The reasons for this go to the same issues that were 
raised by a wide variety of government officials during 
consultations related to issues of trust and alignment of 
perspectives. 
5.2.4 Identifying the client/beneficiary
Another cross-cutting consideration is how to identify 
relevant beneficiaries of an Assistance Mechanism. 
Determination of beneficiaries should be closely tied to 
decisions about what concerns an Assistance Mechanism 
is intended to address, and how its objectives are 
framed.
5.2.4.1 Investment policy formulation and 
implementation – potential beneficiaries
To the extent an Assistance Mechanism is intended to 
address issues and capacity challenges related to IIA 
policy formulation and implementation, beneficiaries 
could be limited to investment treaty negotiators; or 
they could be a wider set of stakeholders in domestic 
jurisdictions, including national parliamentarians or 
ministry/agency officials, state/provincial or local-level 
government actors, and civil society organizations all 
engaged in efforts to understand how to attract, retain, 
and benefit from inward investment, and whether, how, 
and when to promote outward investment. In CCSI’s 
consultations one low-income government official 
stressed that for this official’s government, many concerns 
arise from the fact that only a handful of individuals 
within the government have a deep understanding of 
international investment law. This official sees it as critical 
that much broader capacity across the government be 
developed, prioritizing this capacity-building objective 
over assistance with defense of ISDS claims.648
Decisions regarding intended beneficiaries in this context 
will naturally depend on broader decisions regarding 
what kind of capacity, if any, an Assistance Mechanism 
is intended to address (e.g. narrow technical capacity, 
or broader or longer-term organizational, institutional 
and cross-sectoral capacities) and the nuanced context 
of capacity needs and gaps experienced by and within 
particular states. 
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5.2.4.2 ISDS disputes – respondent states as 
clients
5.2.4.2.1 Eligibility, entitlement, and 
prioritization
In the context of investment treaty disputes, the 
beneficiary most commonly identified for additional 
support from Assistance Mechanisms is the respondent 
host state (investors as beneficiaries are discussed 
in Section 6). This category of beneficiary could and 
would likely need to be further defined. 
One commonly stated view is that is that services would/
should be provided to LDCs or developing countries 
more broadly. Eligibility could be based, for instance, 
on the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s 
list of countries eligible for Official Development 
Assistance or other economic development indicators.
Eligibility for all or some services (or tiered fees for 
those services, discussed further below) could also be 
based on factors such as:
• whether the beneficiary had already received 
support from the Assistance Mechanism and, if 
so, how much,
• the conduct of the potential beneficiary (e.g., 
whether a state would be barred if it had not 
paid awards rendered against it in other disputes 
or if it had not paid past amounts due in a 
membership or fee-for-services based model),
• the nature and implications of the claim (e.g., 
whether support would be conditioned on 
the size of the claim relative to the GDP of the 
country),
• whether the claim arises in particularly complex 
industries tending to make the cost of litigation 
high (e.g., whether support would be limited to or 
focused on energy-related disputes), and
• the merits of potential claims or defenses (and 
ability of the Assistance Mechanism to recover 
costs).649  
Related to eligibility are also important questions 
about whether all eligible beneficiaries are entitled 
to services provided by the relevant Assistance 
Mechanisms, or whether service providers (or 
funders) can decline to provide all or some services 
requested and, if so, on what grounds, under what 
circumstances, with what opportunities to challenge 
those decisions, and to whom. For example, could 
the Assistance Mechanism decline a case if a state 
wished to defend and staff in or management of the 
Assistance Mechanism perceived the state’s defense 
as unsound or otherwise thought the state should 
settle? Could it decline to accept a case if it perceived 
that the case would require too much in terms of 
time and resources? Would it be required to prioritize 
requests for assistance based on the time when they 
were received and/or the development status of the 
requesting country?
These decisions on eligibility, entitlement, and 
prioritization likely depend on, or will shape decisions 
regarding, scope of available services, costs of 
providing those services, and decisions regarding 
who will bear the costs of services provided. 
If, for instance, an Assistance Mechanism were to 
handle respondent state defense, the resource-
intensive nature of ISDS defense could make it unlikely 
that such a Mechanism would, at least in its initial 
years, be able to handle more than one or two new 
cases per year. This makes decisions on eligibility (and 
prioritization) extremely important. Only a handful of 
current respondent states would potentially be able 
to directly benefit from this type of support. 
Not all services, however, are as costly to provide as 
ISDS defense. Thus, an Assistance Mechanism could 
adopt a broader approach to eligibility and place 
less emphasis on prioritization if it were to focus on 
providing lower-cost services (such as legal opinions 
or support with adjudicator appointment) or services 
with a broader reach (such as providing access to 
resources or a knowledge-sharing platform).
Other issues intertwined with eligibility and 
prioritization are those related to user fees. An 
Assistance Mechanism could, for instance, take 
a broad approach to eligibility but employ tiered 
fee structures for access to all or some its services. 
Fees may be up-front membership fees, and/or fees 
based on the services used. Any fee could further be 
tailored depending on factors such as the economic 
development of the host state, or the number of 
times the respondent state had used the relevant 
services. (These issues of costs are discussed further in 
Section 5.1.3). In this context, however, it is important 
to balance tensions between ensuring the financial 
sustainability of any Assistance Mechanism dependent 
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(at least in part) on user fees, and ensuring that 
such Mechanism is able to serve the needs of those 
countries that need it most and are least able to pay.
5.2.4.2.2  Identifying the government client
Another set of considerations relating to the 
beneficiary of any Assistance Mechanism involve 
the question of who is the actual client. In domestic 
contexts when the government is party to the 
dispute, the client of any government lawyer could 
be viewed in various ways, including as: 
(1) the public interest; (2) the government as a 
whole; (3) the branch of government in which the 
lawyer is employed (e.g., executive, legislative, or 
judicial); (4) the particular agency or department 
in which the lawyer works; and (5) the responsible 
officers who make decisions for the agency. 
Another possible answer exists where the lawyer 
is employed by a different agency from the one 
that is represented as a party to the litigation; 
for example, where a lawyer who works for the 
Department of Justice or a state attorney general’s 
office provides legal representation to another 
executive branch agency that is a party to a lawsuit. 
In such circumstances, the client might be viewed 
as being the employing “legal” agency rather 
than the agency party to the case. Additionally, 
it has been suggested that the President might, 
in fact, appropriately be viewed as the client 
whenever a federal agency is involved in litigation. 
… Indeed, one commentator has effectively 
argued that the question of who is the client of 
the government lawyer has obfuscated, rather 
than clarified, the important issues surrounding 
attorney representation of government entities.650 
The answer to the question of who is (are) the 
government attorney’s client(s) can have important 
implications for process-related issues such as who, 
ultimately, will be able to make decisions on whether 
and on what terms to settle a dispute. It also can 
shape the content of advice and argumentation. If 
there is a conflict within a respondent government 
on the relevant positions that should be taken in 
litigation, which branch or agency will be able to 
resolve that? What happens if there is an apparent 
tension between the government’s interest in 
avoiding liability, and the public’s interest in not 
funding pursuit of meritless positions and/or in 
ensuring appropriate mechanisms for accountability? 
Will the lawyer’s duty be to vigorously advocate for 
the interests of its client irrespective of the nature of 
the client’s position, or will there be some limits on the 
bounds of arguments to be raised?
In the domestic contexts, rules of professional conduct, 
law, and government policy will likely inform answers to 
these questions. The questions and answers are likely 
different in international investment law, and also may 
vary depending upon whether the relevant lawyer is 
a member of a firm or is employed by an Assistance 
Mechanism. The nature of the Assistance Mechanism, 
and policies and practices of funders, may further seek 
to inform the answers to these questions regarding who, 
precisely, is the attorney’s client, and to whom and what 
principles the attorney owes its duties.
5.2.4.3 Other potential beneficiaries
In addition to the respondent host state in ISDS 
proceedings, other beneficiaries for dispute-settlement 
related services could be:
• claimant or respondent states in state-to-state 
proceedings;
• non-disputing state parties seeking to provide 
input into disputes filed under their treaties (but not 
against them);651
• amicus curiae;652 and/or 
• other potential intervenors.  
5.2.5 Location, Staffing, Remuneration
The location and staffing of an Assistance Mechanism 
can be critical decisions with respect to which finding 
consensus may be challenging.653
5.2.5.1 Location
The location, or locations, of an Assistance Mechanism 
could depend on a range of factors, including the form 
that such mechanism takes, its mandate and roles, the 
identity and preferences of its beneficiaries and funders, 
its legal needs, and its budget. For example, with respect 
to an Assistance Mechanism that is solely focused on ISDS 
disputes using in-house counsel (such as the ACWL), it 
may make sense to locate such a mechanism near major 
dispute centers, such as Washington D.C. or Paris.654 
However, some interviewees noted that this would place 
the center physically distant from many countries and 
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government officials that would be expected to use its 
services: “[I]f the center is in DC, that will mean a lot of 
hurdles for developing countries; however if you were 
to establish a center in, for example, Addis Ababa, 
that is also difficult to access for many countries.”655 
It was stated during CCSI’s interviews that travel 
costs are often prohibitive for developing countries, 
and visas take time to obtain.656 If building trust and 
relationships is a priority, it may prove more difficult 
and less desirable in a decentralized system (such as 
the current system of ad hoc arbitration) to have a 
single location for an Assistance Mechanism.
It was suggested during CCSI’s consultations that 
an Assistance Mechanism may have several offices, 
located in different regions of the world, although this 
may raise costs and associated funding challenges. 
It was stated that physical proximity to an Assistance 
Mechanism would be of the highest priority for 
potential state users. One low-income government 
official stated that if the objective of an Assistance 
Mechanism is to help countries, it must be placed 
in a location where they can fairly easily interact and 
get advice.657 Moreover, this official felt that unless 
a mechanism is physically located in various areas 
of, in particular, the developing world, it would be 
impossible for the staff of such a center to truly 
understand the perspective of those regions.658 This 
official felt strongly that regional centers are necessary 
because, while some broad issues are common to many 
countries, the experiences and needs of, for example, 
West African countries vary greatly from those of East 
Asian countries, Latin American countries, or indeed, 
even East African countries.659
It was suggested that an Assistance Mechanism 
may benefit from being housed within an existing 
institution, which could help not only with institutional 
resources but also to build on existing trust and 
relationships. World Bank Group institutions were 
suggested, including both ICSID and MIGA, although 
others felt that any Assistance Mechanism affiliated 
with the World Bank Group would raise actual or 
perceived conflicts of interest, particularly with respect 
to disputes at ICSID. In some consultations regional 
development organizations were suggested, noting 
that the ALSF is housed by the African Development 
Bank. 
It was clear in CCSI’s consultations that preferences 
differ regarding the location(s) of an Assistance 
Mechanism, and that consideration of these issues 
will be highly interrelated with questions of funding. 
Notably, even with respect to the unsuccessful 
UNCTAD-IADB-OAS-VCC regional effort, the location 
was a serious negotiation challenge, with an interim 
location in Washington D.C. agreed, to be followed 
by a permanent location in Panama City (see Section 
3.1). 
5.2.5.2 Staffing
It was also stated that any institutionalized Assistance 
Mechanism would need to have a diversity of staff, 
including many staff from developing countries. This 
was not to suggest that lawyers from the developed 
world are incapable of adequately advising developing 
countries, but that a wide variety of legal, social and 
governmental backgrounds would be helpful to the 
actual defense, as well as with respect to building trust 
and legitimacy of such a mechanism: “it is important 
for any [Assistance Mechanism] to understand the 
perspectives of different systems, or else it is difficult 
to adequately represent those interests.”660 All staff 
must have a reputation as being high-quality lawyers, 
equivalent to the top firms in the private sector. This 
was directly related to perceived reputation and 
quality that was widely regarded as critical in CCSI’s 
consultations.
The kind of staff will also depend on the breadth, 
scope, and mandate of an Assistance Mechanism. 
Staff dedicated to investment policy formulation 
and implementation can have a greater diversity of 
backgrounds than staff focused only on disputes. The 
diversity of staff also has budgetary implications.
It was stated during consultations that even an 
Assistance Mechanism intended only to support 
disputes should not focus solely on hiring the best 
investment arbitration lawyers, but that it also 
requires lawyers and other staff who have a deep 
understanding of how international investment law 
impacts the development objectives of states. For one 
government official this was a critical issue of trust. For 
this official, there was recognition that procedural and 
technical expertise will be essential for an assistance 
mechanism, and that many lawyers who have this 
expertise are currently from or working in developed 
countries, but this official stated that any staff of a 
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mechanism should have experience actually working 
in and with the countries that such individual is being 
asked to advise.661 But on any advisory team, this 
official also would seek individuals with a broader 
focus on development impact (specifically naming 
CCSI and IISD, along with other intergovernmental 
or development organizations such as UNCTAD) in 
order to have full trust in what was being advised.662
Great emphasis was placed on the senior staff of the 
center. With respect to existing mechanisms, such as 
the ACWL, ISP/LDCs, and ALSF, the original directors 
and senior staff are widely credited as having been 
essential to the development and success of the 
center. In CCSI’s consultations, several participants 
noted that any Assistance Mechanism director 
would need to be someone who could command 
and attract the attention of the existing “investment 
law” community,663 but also someone who is seen 
to represent the interests of the developing world. 
It was stated that any Assistance Mechanism will 
need to have a well-respected “champion” from 
a developing country who is viewed as able to 
“get other developing countries” on board, and 
“imbue the center with legitimacy in the eyes of the 
developing world.”664 The issue of trust was widely 
stressed in this context.
5.2.5.3 Remuneration
Most interviewees felt that working with an 
Assistance Mechanism would generally be viewed 
as an attractive early or mid-career option, even 
if remuneration were less than the private sector 
because they offer other benefits that the private 
sector does not. The two benefits most cited 
were a better “work-life” balance and greater 
responsibilities for junior lawyers. The ACWL, for 
example, offers exposure and experience that is 
typically not available to junior lawyers in law firms 
– even junior counsel at the ACWL run cases, argue 
cases and have more control of their own cases, than 
a comparable private-sector associate.665 
Existing Assistance Mechanisms pay less than the 
private sector. ACWL salaries, for example, are 
on a scale comparable to the WTO Secretariat.666 
The WTO had historically followed the United 
Nations Common System of Salaries, Allowances 
and Benefits, but recently broke away from the UN 
Common System because it wished to operate more 
competitively (from a hiring perspective) against certain 
international financial institutions (e.g. the IMF and the 
World Bank Group), which employ markedly higher pay 
scales than other intergovernmental institutions in order 
to ‘permit recruitment and retention of the highest 
quality, multinational staff – including personnel from 
countries with the highest internal pay rates.’667 
Considerations surrounding payment of staff will depend 
on whether such staff are largely helping a beneficiary 
to coordinate with external counsel (i.e. a clearinghouse 
role), or directly acting as legal counsel. With respect 
to the latter, it was stated by one interviewee that 
the kind of people you want to work at an Assistance 
Mechanism are the kind of people that would be willing 
to forego some of the salary anyway.668 However, another 
interviewee who had worked at an assistance mechanism 
and has subsequently joined the private sector stated 
that his earlier assumptions that highly qualified senior 
counsel would accept the financial trade-off were “a 
bit naïve” in in some respects, but as long as the salary 
remains respectable it will still likely attract certain highly 
qualified senior lawyers.
Options for an Assistance Mechanism include the UN 
Common System scale, the WTO scale, the approach 
of IFIs, or another approach or benchmark. Much will, of 
course, depend on the role of an Assistance Mechanism, 
the perceived “competition” from a hiring perspective, 
and the personnel budget (which involves trade-offs 
against other areas of an Assistance Mechanism budget). 
It will also depend, to a certain extent, on whether the 
Assistance Mechanism’s primary mandate is in capacity 
building or actual legal representation in claims.
5.2.6 Institutionalized vs. ad hoc mechanisms
The degree of institutionalization of an Assistance 
Mechanism will, naturally, be dependent on choices 
regarding the services provided, to whom, ideal 
governance of the Mechanism, and how funding and 
finances are to function. Generally speaking, high-level 
thoughts on the level of institutionalization were raised 
by several interviewees. 
For example, it was noted that negotiation of a formal 
institutional, treaty-based Assistance Mechanism would 
be quite a challenge and would take years. It was 
suggested that a preliminary, and more informal, model 
may be an interim solution. 
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One interviewee with experience attempting to 
establish an investment law advisory center noted that 
the more formal and more political the establishment 
of a center becomes, the more people become 
involved, and the more difficult it becomes to achieve 
consensus.669 This interviewee suggested that narrow, 
technical solutions are easier to accomplish.
One government official suggested that building 
upon existing mechanisms could help to build up 
support where it is needed more organically and avoid 
political challenges.670 Others suggested that regional 
mechanisms, perhaps building on existing and trusted 
institutions, may be well-received by states.
5.2.7 “Politics” surrounding the role of an 
Assistance Mechanism
The creation, or expansion, of any Assistance 
Mechanism cannot be removed from the geopolitical 
and socioeconomic realities in which it has been 
conceived, discussed, and may be placed. 
In the context of IIAs and ISDS, one element of 
that context is ongoing reform discussions. It was 
expressed that any Assistance Mechanism should be 
conceived as a flexible mechanism that could adapt 
to eventual changes in underlying treaty and dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
5.2.7.1 ISDS reform discussions
More specifically, the desirability of an advisory 
center has specifically been included for further 
consideration on the agenda of UNCITRAL’s Working 
Group III.671 Perspectives expressed in consultations 
on the value of discussing an Assistance Mechanism 
in the context of the other reform solutions being 
considered by the Working Group were mixed. On the 
one hand, it was noted that ideally discussions of an 
advisory center would not be considered an element 
of reform discussions because it could easily become 
integrated into trade-offs, and could become a carrot 
that is given to developing countries in exchange for 
support of something else that is not necessarily the 
most useful to them.672 Some noted that this risk could 
be lessened if reform solutions were all opt-in.673 
On the other hand, one low-income country stated 
that placing an Assistance Mechanism on the 
UNCITRAL reform agenda is viewed as a win.674 This is 
an immediate need that will (if done correctly) benefit 
developing countries participating in this system, 
whereas it is unclear (at this time) to what extent 
the other reforms being discussed will have actual 
benefits.675
Some interviewees felt that an Assistance Mechanism 
should be embedded in a larger package of structural 
reform solutions to make it more feasible to develop. 
Others noted that it would be important, for various 
reasons, to ensure that discussions in Working Group 
III surrounding an advisory center not be pegged to 
any specific structural reform. This is both because 
Assistance Mechanisms could be useful immediately, 
and to peg them to a specific reform solution could 
mean an extended period of time while such solutions 
were negotiated, and also because an Assistance 
Mechanism could be developed in a way that could 
be entirely independent of any particular institutional 
form.
5.2.7.2 Private practitioner perspectives
Of course, interest groups outside of states will also 
be paying attention to the formation or expansion 
of an Assistance Mechanism, including its intended 
role and beneficiaries. For example, in the context 
of other (unsuccessful) efforts at establishing an 
Assistance Mechanism in the investment law context, 
the opposition of private practitioners has been 
noted. However, “private practitioners” do not have 
uniform interests or perspectives. For example, while 
some have advised that any Assistance Mechanism 
should avoid direct competition with the services of 
private sector law firms,676 others did not see private 
sector opposition as an overwhelming concern. From 
one private practitioner’s perspective, most firms that 
represent states still make most of their money from 
representation of claimants, as state-representation 
is typically billed at a lower rate and also forms a 
smaller percentage of the overall client base, so the 
development of an Assistance Mechanism will, in 
reality, not be real economic competition for these 
firms.677 
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According to several private practitioner 
interviewees, with respect to the small number of 
firms that only represent states, they would expect 
such firms to attempt to differentiate themselves 
from any Assistance Mechanism based on value, 
service, and reputation, but not to be openly 
opposing any competition from an Assistance 
Mechanism.678 However, it was also stated that “firms 
can be very jealous about the information that they 
handle because, in the end, information is power. 
A process intended to democratize information, 
and thereby take power from law firms, means less 
capacity to bill clients.”679 Greater transparency and 
wider available services to government officials are 
already making information about investment law 
available to a much greater extent, but “if you put 
into place an advisory center, that is just another 
source of competition.”680 
5.2.7.3 Civil society perspectives
With respect to NGOs, there were mixed perceptions. 
All interviewed NGOs emphasized that to the 
extent an Assistance Mechanism is developed or 
expanded it should respond to needs and concerns 
that have been identified from the perspective of 
intended beneficiaries, in actual coordination with 
and leadership by such beneficiaries.681 
NGOs interviewed recognize that there are 
systematic inequalities between and among 
respondent states in their ability to participate in 
the IIA/ISDS system, but some want to ensure that 
the structure, goals, and funding of any mechanism 
would not simply make a flawed system work more 
smoothly, permitting more cases to be brought 
and entrenching asymmetry by making defense 
less costly, while at the same time not addressing 
the actual causes of the systemic inequalities 
experienced by developing states (which NGOs 
view as not being primarily at the defense phase, 
but much earlier in the negotiation, implementation, 
and dispute prevention processes).682 
Some NGOs see an Assistance Mechanism as a band-
aid, noting that the focus of efforts to assist respondent 
states should focus on the cause of the wound - the 
flawed substantive and procedural elements of IIAs and 
the existing ISDS mechanism.683 NGOs recognize that 
states need help with respect to current investment 
policy challenges and defending against existing 
claims, which will inevitably continue to occur until more 
fundamental changes are made. 
Some NGOs are more supportive of ad hoc mechanisms 
to assist states in the interim, while broader reforms 
occur, rather than a fully institutionalized Assistance 
Mechanism that further legalizes and entrenches 
the current ISDS mechanism.684 As such, they advise 
separating any Assistance Mechanism from any 
particular reform solution, and also ensuring that it is 
flexible to respond to other IIA/ISDS reforms advanced 
by states.685
5.2.8 Intersections with other reforms
Consideration of the desirability, role, and mandate 
of an Assistance Mechanism should also consider the 
extent to which other reform efforts (particularly those 
proceeding multilaterally through UNCITRAL’s Working 
Group III) may interact. For example:
• other efforts to reduce costs may mitigate some of 
the need for expanded low-cost options;
• the introduction of counterclaims may make more 
market-based financing products available to 
respondent states;
• inclusion of domestic exhaustion requirements 
may make the anticipation and prevention of ISDS 
disputes more manageable; or
• more robust state filters on certain kinds of claims 
may similarly make prevention of unwarranted 
disputes easier to achieve. 
 
104 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
SCOPING STUDY
Section 6. 
Investors as Assistance Mechanism Beneficiaries
SCOPING STUDY
6.1 What is an “SME”?  106
6.2 What are SMEs’ experiences with ISDS?  107
   6.2.1 Are they using it (more/less  107
   than other firms)?  
   6.2.2 Do SMEs need ISDS (more  107
   than other firms)?  
   6.2.3 What hurdles to accessing  108
   international arbitration do SMEs face?  
6.3 Ways forward regarding investor beneficiaries 109
   6.3.1 Which investors should benefit from  109
   what services?  
   6.3.2 Types of Assistance Mechanisms  110
   for investors  
   6.3.3 Interaction with other reform proposals 113
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 105
SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY
Many of the models of Assistance Mechanisms 
discussed in this Scoping Study could be adapted to, 
or indeed already do, provide services to investors. 
Indeed, certain of them, such as third-party funding, 
contingent fee arrangements, and political risk and 
other forms of insurance, are already available to 
investors on a much greater scale than they are to 
respondent states. Depending on the services offered, 
role, and mandate of any Assistance Mechanism, it 
could provide certain services to states and investors 
(e.g., capacity building), but certain services only 
to states (e.g., direct representation in defending 
claims).686 
Whether or not, and to what extent, states, as the 
creators of an Assistance Mechanism, would desire to 
include investors as beneficiaries will largely depend 
on the nature and scope of concerns that an Assistance 
Mechanism is intended to address, and also will likely 
depend on a state’s role as primarily capital-exporting, 
-importing, or both (particularly vis-à-vis its treaty 
partners). Overall, there were significant differences 
of opinion among states and other interviewees 
regarding whether and under what circumstances 
additional assistance should be provided to investor 
claimants. 
Some interviewees, for instance, considered 
beneficiaries to be deserving claimants akin to those 
in international human rights fora in which indigent 
claimants may have access to services or funds that 
permit them to bring international legal claims.687 The 
ability for investors who cannot otherwise afford to 
bring ISDS claims to secure support for such cases was 
likened, in this context, to ensuring “equality of arms” 
on both sides of an ISDS dispute. Similarly, a high-
income government official indicated openness to the 
idea of including support for investors in the context 
of an Assistance Mechanism, stating that “the focus 
should be on ensuring [IIA] obligations are respected 
on both sides, so assistance in helping small and 
medium-sized enterprises determine whether their 
claims should be brought might be helpful as well.”688
However, most interviewees either had certain 
hesitations, or opposed, the provision of Assistance 
Mechanism services to investors, and did so for varying 
reasons. 
One interviewee with experience working for an 
arbitration center, for example, expressed caution. The 
interviewee felt that in theory it is absolutely necessary 
to provide services to at least SMEs because the inability 
of SMEs to access ISDS impacts the credibility of the 
ISDS system as a whole, and lamented a system that 
only benefits larger MNEs. However, this interviewee 
went on to say that “there are already complicated 
conflict of interest problems in the system; an advisory 
center would have its own and adding in SMEs would 
complicate it even more.”689 
In consultations with some states, similar sentiments 
were expressed. One upper middle-income state 
official supports “justice for all” but felt that “because 
[an advisory center] is so complex, and there are a 
number of extremely difficult issues involved, adding 
SMEs into the equation might overburden any kind 
of institution. A center for states alone is already 
extremely difficult, and I don’t really foresee any 
practical benefit of including SMEs.”690 This official is 
not opposed to adding services for SMEs at a later 
date, once an Assistance Mechanism for states is 
functioning and deemed sustainable. 
Other governments were much more categorically 
opposed to inclusion of investors as Assistance 
Mechanism beneficiaries. Several reasons were given. 
For one, in several consultations it was noted that while 
SMEs, in particular, may need or benefit from certain 
services, most primarily capital-importing states 
would not seek to assist SMEs in bringing more claims 
against them and thus any Assistance Mechanism that 
did benefit investors may need to be designed to not 
increase the absolute number of claims by an order of 
magnitude.691 It was questioned whether benefits to 
investors translated into benefits for governments. In 
the words of one upper middle-income government 
official, “we are not very happy with the idea of service 
provision to SMEs. I think I speak for all developing 
countries - we don’t really have SMEs as international 
investors around the world, so that would not serve 
our interests at all.”692 Even were developing countries’ 
outward investors to expand in number, it was unclear 
to interviewees whether those investors would benefit 
from treaty protections in a way that would outweigh 
the country’s position as a capital-importing country 
vis-à-vis other treaty partners.
106 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
SCOPING STUDY
Additionally, states expressing opposition to SMEs 
as beneficiaries of an Assistance Mechanism felt 
that ISDS should be an extraordinary remedy, and 
not a default dispute settlement mechanism. It 
was noted that domestic mechanisms, alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, and commercial 
arbitration are typically also available to investors, 
including SMEs, often at much lower cost.693 One 
official felt that granting easier access to ISDS would 
make ISDS more of an ordinary recourse, and that 
such an outcome was a possibility that governments 
must consider when considering how and under 
what circumstances to ease access by claimants.694 
It was also noted that it would be politically difficult 
for governments – particularly poorer governments 
– to say that they are funding claims against 
themselves (for example, by contributing to an 
Assistance Mechanism through membership fees) 
from foreign investors. “That would be the headline 
of every newspaper”695 if the state were to be sued 
by an investor benefitting from the services of an 
Assistance Mechanism.
Some interviewees also felt that supporting SMEs 
would potentially be the fatal blow to efforts to 
establish an Assistance Mechanism for states. 
In several consultations it was stressed that 
past experience demonstrates that advancing 
a comprehensive, defense-oriented Assistance 
Mechanism is extremely challenging, and questions 
of how much a center should try to take on, at least 
in the beginning, should be high on the list of issues 
to address, as taking on SMEs could sink the project 
before it floats.696 Several interviewees noted that 
inclusion of SMEs would be highly controversial 
with some states, with one interviewee stating that 
however much sense it would make to provide 
services to SMEs, a center is going to extremely 
challenging in and of itself, and including SME’s 
“fractures different support groups”.697
A final set of concerns related to the particular 
needs of SMEs and how an Assistance Mechanism 
would purport to resolve any capacity challenges 
experienced by SMEs. For example, some NGOs 
wished to understand more information about 
hurdles and issues that SMEs are experiencing 
and whether there is an actual access to justice 
issue, and how access to ISDS fits into that broader 
picture.698 As a general matter, representatives of 
NGOs interviewed did not support provision of services 
to SMEs in the current ISDS system, particularly absent 
greater evidence of disputes evidencing actual access 
to justice (as opposed to ISDS) needs.
This section reviews in more detail current knowledge 
of SMEs’ use of ISDS, challenges those entities may 
be facing, and existing options for addressing those 
challenges. In light of the many unknowns about SMEs’ 
actual and potential experiences with ISDS, the following 
subsections a framed as a series of questions.
6.1 What is an “SME”?
A threshold issue to consider is what is an “SME”. There 
is no universal definition, and differences among the 
definitions that are used “can be substantial.”699 Those 
differences, which not only vary between countries and 
institutions, but also within them, arise from to the various 
objectives of and contexts in which each definition was 
crafted.700 
According to one comparative analysis of definitions 
used across the world, the definitions used are “generally 
exclusively quantitative,” with the “most unanimously 
accepted criterion being the number of employees.”701 
Other criteria, if used, include annual turnover, assets, 
and/or investments, again with different users commonly 
employing different quantitative thresholds (see, e.g., 
Table 11).702 Definitions also diverge in terms of whether 
and how other issues, such as the relevant sector of 
operations and ownership structure of the enterprise, 
are taken into account. While, for instance, the EU’s 
definition does not vary depending on the relevant 
sector, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, and the United 
States are among the countries that do have specific 
definitions for SMEs that are based upon relevant sector 
of the firm. 
These definitional issues complicate this Scoping Study’s 
analysis. While, for instance, there are some studies 
looking at SMEs’ experiences with ISDS, it is not always 
clear what definitions are being used, how rigorously 
they are being applied, and what the nature of the firm 
really is. Indeed, as one study noted, "Regarding IFC/
MIGA standard, 'The [United Nations development 
Programme] and World Bank [IFC] definitions would 
include the manufacturing subsidiaries of both Nestle 
and Unilever in Ghana, clearly not the intended objects 
of development interventions.’”703 
 
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 107
SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY
A deeper examination of these definitional issues 
would help better identify whether and what types of 
issues different types of SMEs are facing when seeking 
remedies for host-government-caused harm. To draw 
from a World Bank evaluation of its interventions to 
support SMEs, in order for the term to serve as a 
“meaningful category of enterprises, it should be a 
group of firms that is specifically differentiated from 
others by the way that it experiences particular policy, 
institutional, or market failures or the way it benefits the 
economy or the poor.”704 Once the relevant category 
is identified, it is possible to determine whether and 
what type of policy interventions are appropriate, and 
also assess the cost associated with them.
6.2 What are SMEs’ experiences with 
ISDS? 
6.2.1 Are they using it (more/less than other 
firms)?
There have been several efforts to look at whether and 
to what extent SMEs are using ISDS. They illustrate 
that conclusions regarding SME invocation of ISDS 
are hard to draw, and that data gaps are significant. 
Franck finds that the “median claimant was a privately 
held entity” of unstated size “that might – but also 
might not – be related to a publicly listed corporate 
entity.”705  Another study, published in 2015, found 
that two-thirds of 105 cases filed at ICSID by American 
investors were brought by individuals or SMEs. It does 
not, however, reveal the breakdown between those 
two categories of claimants.706 Bechky’s examination 
of ISDS disputes regarding “microinvestments” notes 
that data on the size of investors and investments 
is hard to access, and so analysis of cases by small 
investors may need to use amount of damages 
claimed as a proxy.707 Karl’s research on ISDS claims 
by SMEs uses UNCTAD data to conclude that those 
firms accounted for “approximately 15 percent of all 
disputes from 2008-2013.”708 There is no explanation 
of the dataset of cases used or of the definition of an 
SME employed for the analysis.709 Similarly, Gebert 
reviewed publicly available information about 70 cases 
filed in 2015, and found that at least 12 were filed by 
SMEs (using the EC’s definition) and 4 by individuals or 
groups of individuals.710 
These figures provide some insights but leave many of 
the important questions unanswered. Relative to the 
number of firms investing overseas, are SMEs over- or 
under-represented as claimants? And/or are they over- 
or under-represented in terms of the value of their 
investments? What are sectoral and country patterns? 
Once the answers to these and other questions are 
better known, more accurate answers can be obtained 
regarding why usage rates are where they are, what 
problems exist, and what solutions are needed.
6.2.2  Do SMEs need ISDS (more than other 
firms)?
In addition to the question of whether SMEs are using 
ISDS, and what their usage patterns are as compared 
to other firms, it is useful to understand whether 
they are facing more or fewer challenges in the host 
government (and whether those challenges are the 
types that ISDS is meant to address). Do they need 
ISDS, or improved access to ISDS, more than other 
foreign firms? 
Some have theorized about responses. It is often 
remarked, for instance, that larger companies may be 
able to protect themselves vis-à-vis the government, 
and can secure access to arbitration that can better 
insulate them from the risks of host-state courts, 
because they are more likely to have negotiating 
power and be in sectors and activities where it is 
possible to negotiate direct investor-state contracts.
Caplan has identified other reasons why larger foreign 
firms may be less needful of or interested in ISDS: 
While larger enterprises sometimes pursue 
arbitration, they may feel, as a general matter, 
that it is less necessary or even desirous to do so. 
Their stronger economic and political influence 
may bring host state governments to the 
negotiating table more readily and with better 
settlement terms … Because larger enterprises 
are typically more financially resilient than SMEs, 
they are likely to be in a better position to pursue 
a broader dispute settlement strategy that is less 
reliant on investor-state arbitration.711
Larger foreign firms may also be more likely to get 
the attention and support of their home governments 
when trying to resolve disputes with host countries.
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Karl has noted, however, how SMEs may be less at 
risk, and less likely to encounter situations in the 
host country that might cause them to turn to ISDS:
[B]eing small can also have some advantages. 
SMEs investing abroad may be less on the ‘radar 
screen’ of host country authorities, for instance 
in respect of national security concerns or with 
regard to potential ‘crowding out’ concerns 
of local enterprises. SMEs may therefore face 
less political opposition in host countries. SMEs 
may also be more flexible than TNCs in their 
business operations. This may allow them to 
react to regulatory or political changes in the 
host country more quickly, including through a 
possible divestment if the investment climate 
deteriorates substantially. 712 
Moreover, while SMEs may find certain aspects of 
operating in a foreign host country more challenging 
than larger counterparts – such as navigating foreign 
legal jurisdictions and identifying suitable business 
partners – it is unclear that the particular issues they 
are facing are the same as the challenges the treaties 
aim to address. This issue goes to the objectives of 
the treaties, and whether they are intended to be 
exceptional tools of last resort, or legal options 
enabling foreign investors to choose more favorable, 
less risky, and/or less unknown dispute settlement 
proceedings when they encounter issues in or with 
the host state.713  
6.2.3 What hurdles to accessing international 
arbitration do SMEs face? 
During CCSI’s consultations, interviewees 
highlighted several hurdles that companies, and 
particularly SMEs face when their investments are 
impacted by host-state action that may violate an 
investment treaty.
6.2.3.1 Evidentiary and reporting challenges 
In the experience of a C-level executive who has 
been involved in investment law matters and 
arbitrations in different states on more than one 
occasion, the early phases of company loss are 
critical, and many companies are not in a position to 
take advantage of this time.714 For example, when a 
company still has an office, is still operating, and/or 
when employees are still on the ground, it could be 
incredibly helpful to companies to collect evidence that 
could be validated for subsequent use. From a time and 
cost perspective, it is extremely time-consuming to track 
down evidence at a later time, and evidence (physical as 
well as memories) are often impaired. 
Relatedly, smaller, particularly non-public, companies 
may not have robust analysis and reporting systems in 
place that can easily assess damages.715 A mechanism 
that could help companies to view their records with a 
view toward understanding whether they have a claim, 
and if so, what kind, would, according to this interviewee, 
be extremely valuable.
6.2.3.2 Uncertainty in the law
In this C-level executive’s perspective, the uncertain 
legal standards in investment law create a wide variety 
of challenges that increase the risk and cost to investor-
users of this system. This makes it difficult for them to 
understand what protections may be due, whether there 
has been a breach, and whether to pursue a case. SMEs 
might be less able than other firms to understand this 
area of law and its implications for them. This uncertainty 
and lack of awareness may discourage investors from 
engaging with investment law and invoking it when 
warranted and appropriate; and it may cause them to 
waste resources by pursuing losing ISDS cases that 
ultimately only benefit the legal advisors involved.
According to one interviewee, it can often be difficult 
to determine what kind of claim a company may have, 
for example, whether a company is in a total loss 
situation (from an investment law perspective, indirect 
expropriation) or one of other damages. In this user’s 
experience, even the company’s own counsel may often 
be unwilling to give a clear answer on this threshold 
issue, and the company may spend a lot of time and 
effort to try to determine how to approach and formulate 
a claim.716 If a company is really in a total loss context, 
then pursuing an ISDS claim often makes sense from a 
cost-benefit perspective.717 But if lesser damages may 
be awarded, there may be a greater role for mediated or 
other alternative dispute resolution outcomes.718 Clearer 
law could greatly help in this area. 
Second, and relatedly, because of the web of treaties 
(along with other laws and contracts) and varying 
definitions of who may benefit under such treaties, it can 
be difficult for investors to properly identify the claimant 
and the investment.719 This can have serious implications 
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if a non-covered investor appears on a notice or filing, 
even if another investor in the corporate family may 
have met the jurisdictional requirements. Investors 
who do not hire counsel with experience in investment 
law can make these kinds of mistakes.720
Third, an executive felt that because of the lack of legal 
certainty in investment law, it is more “bespoke” and 
thus for any proceeding of consequence it becomes 
absolutely necessary to hire the best counsel because 
when compared to other legal areas, the outcome 
often will depend on the counsel rather than clear-cut 
law.721 If the law were more clear, it may be able to rely 
on regional or lower-ranked (and priced) firms. 
Fourth, it has been suggested that if and when tribunals 
apply one of the four so-called “Salini” criteria used in 
some ISDS disputes to determine whether a tribunal 
has jurisdiction over the investment dispute – namely, 
the criterion occasionally applied that looks at whether 
the investment has contributed to the economic 
development of the host state -- SMEs may be less 
likely than larger firms to pass the jurisdictional test.722 
To the extent jurisdictional questions arise, it could 
discourage SMEs from pursuing claims, and could 
discourage others (such as third-party funders) from 
investing in and supporting SME cases. 
A number of the Assistance Mechanisms discussed in 
this Scoping Study as useful for states may aid SMEs 
here. In particular, efforts to democratize the law 
(discussed in Section 4.5), and initiatives to support 
ongoing activities of engagement with IIA policy-
makers, negotiators, and implementers in home and 
host states are among those that can help increase 
understanding of what IIAs mean, and do not mean, 
in practice. Additionally, support in ongoing reform 
processes could help states engage with SMEs (and 
others) to craft solutions bringing more predictability 
and certainty regarding issues of treaty coverage and 
outcomes of adjudicative proceedings.
6.2.3.3 Costs of representation and arbitration
A more widely cited barrier is the costs and fees of 
arbitration. As discussed above, the costs of ISDS 
proceedings are well known and appear to be slightly 
higher on average for claimants ($6,000,000 according 
to one 2017 study) than for respondents ($4,850,000).723 
In addition to the costs of representation are costs 
of the arbitration. Those costs, which include the 
fees and costs of arbitrators and arbitral institutions, 
have been estimated by the same study as being on 
average $920,000 for ICSID disputes and $1,090,000 
for UNCITRAL cases. 
The costs incurred in pursuing ISDS claims have been 
cited as being particularly difficult for SMEs to fund. 
Some responses to that stated challenge can specifically 
target issues faced by SMEs (e.g., challenges SMEs 
face in accessing finance); other responses, such as 
efforts to reduce the costs of arbitration, are broader 
but can benefit SMEs (and other claimants). Further, 
some responses are more market-related, though they 
could also benefit from policy interventions designed 
to address market-related difficulties that SMEs may 
experience especially acutely.724 
 
6.3 Ways forward regarding investor 
beneficiaries
6.3.1 Which investors should benefit from what 
services?
To the extent an Assistance Mechanism supports 
investor claimants, questions may arise as to which 
investors it should support, and to what extent. 
First, the category of beneficiary could be defined by 
the identity of the claimant. For example, should only 
investors from certain countries benefit? And if so, 
how is the “nationality” of a company determined? 
What is the “nationality” of, for example, a Ghanaian 
company that is the subsidiary of a multi-billion dollar 
Delaware corporation with an intermediate holding 
company in the Netherlands? Does the constitution 
of the Board of Directors matter? Or percentage of 
Ghanaian management? Or the extent to which the 
Ghanaian company sources from local suppliers? Or 
the extent of profits retained in Ghana? Or where 
decisions are taken? Or whether the claim is being 
brought by the Dutch holding company on a reflective 
loss basis, or directly by the Ghanaian company with 
respect to its investment in, for example, Liberia?
Alternatively, should only investors of a certain size 
be eligible? Again, similar issues arise. Section 6.3.1 
discusses the various considerations that arise when 
determining what, exactly, is an “SME”, for example. 
Should limitations be placed around both size and 
“nationality”?
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The categories of investor beneficiaries could also 
be defined by the nature or size of the claim.725 For 
example, if investors are having financial difficulties 
advancing claims under a certain value threshold, 
should these smaller claims be eligible for Assistance 
Mechanism services? Would or should claims based 
on allegations of direct expropriation, for example, 
be prioritized over other categories of claims, 
particularly if resources of an Assistance Mechanism 
were limited? 
Finally, it could be that a limited category or 
other specific services could be made available 
to investors, but not others. For example, policy-
makers may decide that investors can benefit from 
certain capacity building support, but not from 
direct support in advancing specific claims.
 
6.3.2 Types of Assistance Mechanisms for 
investors
As with states, consideration of what would be the 
most appropriate solution to problems experienced 
by investors will largely depend on the intended 
beneficiaries, funding available, and prioritization of 
hurdles experienced.
6.3.2.1 Ombuds-type office
One potential solution to both pre- and post-
establishment hurdles experienced by investors 
could be the creation of an ombuds-type office. 
As described in Section 2.3.3.1.2, the Korean OFIO 
and Brazilian CFIA models are intended to prevent 
disputes by managing investor concerns before a full 
dispute has matured. They are intended to get the 
parties to the table and talking, and to attempt to 
find mutually beneficial outcomes. To the extent any 
third-parties are impacted by the investment and 
the concerns of the investor an ombuds-mechanism 
may also include such parties in its procedures.
One interviewee indicated that in some cases, 
governments may be politically challenged (e.g. 
when they have taken an action in response to 
domestic political pressure) to come to a discussion 
or negotiating table, so having a treaty or other legal 
obligation to engage in discussions in appropriate 
cases could help encourage governments to 
take these pre-dispute and/or alternative dispute 
resolution steps.726 
6.3.2.2 Pre-dispute assistance
Several interviewees stated that in most cases where 
they see investors, and particularly small investors, make 
mistakes it is in the early phases of crafting the details 
of the claim. Interviewees also noted that in many cases 
investors may simply not have adequate guidance as 
to how to participate. For example, if an investor has 
been dealing with the ministry of mines throughout the 
investment, it will probably be likely to send a notice of 
intent to that ministry as well, even if this would not be 
the most efficient approach. A mechanism that could 
assist SMEs to frame and engage at the initial phases of 
disputes was suggested as an area where there could be 
a lot of impact. 
6.3.2.3 Market-based assistance
The discussion below and in Table 12 note different 
potential market-based options for supporting SMEs 
in ISDS claims. The attractiveness and viability of these 
options depend on various factors, including the location 
of the SME, and its access to experienced counsel; the 
operational strength of the SME, which is relevant for 
its ability to secure loans; the strength of a claim, which 
can impact the ability to secure contingency-based 
representation and third-party funding; and the size of a 
claim, which can impact the SME’s ability to secure third-
party funding. 
6.3.2.3.1 Improving the market for counsel
A significant portion of SME costs in ISDS disputes relates 
to costs for counsel.727 The fees charged by the top tier 
international firms that often handle ISDS cases drive up 
those costs.728 Reducing the fees charged by and paid 
to counsel could, therefore, reduce overall costs and 
difficulties SMEs experience in financing claims. 
One option is for SMEs to rely more on lower-priced 
options. If, for instance, the dispute relates to actions 
taken by a developing host country, or is brought by a 
developing country investor, the investor could use firms 
in the host and/or home country charging local rates, as 
opposed to using international firms with rates based 
on the market in London, New York, Paris, etc. If more 
than one team is used,729 then the allocation of work and 
responsibilities between the higher and lower-priced 
teams could potentially be adjusted. Similar to the issues 
discussed in connection with the challenges states face 
in accessing low-cost support, barriers to entry for new 
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firms may not be high: Franck’s data indicates that 
the majority of firms in ISDS arbitrations have only 
handled one case each, another cluster a modest 
two to five, and there are important players in 
developing country markets.730 
6.3.2.3.2 Contingency fee arrangements
Another option for investors (including SMEs) is 
to pursue contingency fee arrangements in which 
attorneys only are paid representation costs (and 
potentially a premium) upon completion of a 
successful outcome. The meaning of a successful 
outcome, like other aspects of the contingency 
fee arrangement, would be defined on a case-by-
case basis subject to applicable law, regulation, 
and rules of professional conduct.  In general, these 
arrangements can be used to support resource-
constrained claimants (which may include SMEs) 
pursue a case they otherwise may not be able to 
advance or engage counsel they would otherwise 
not be able to afford.
Although helpful in principle, contingency fee 
arrangements may be of limited use in practice if 
counsel are unwilling to take the risk of loss. Short 
of a few firms, many firms may not have the financial 
capacity to provide a contingency arrangement 
Table 12 Market-strategies and links to characteristics of SMEs and SME claims
completely in-house, and thus may also need to 
supplement this arrangement with outside financing, 
which may, for example, take the form of “third-party 
funding” (as described below). With contingency fee 
arrangements, advisors will incur costs (e.g., staff time, 
travel costs, discovery-related costs, and opportunity 
costs) they may ultimately not be able to recover, 
although in some cases a claimant may pay a portion 
of these costs, or outside financing may also lessen the 
burden on both parties. The less risky the case – for 
instance, the lower the costs of pursuing it, the clearer 
the law, the more likely the victory – the more attractive 
it may be to contingency-fee-based service providers. 
6.3.2.3.3 Improved access to finance
One issue considered to be more frequently faced by 
SMEs, especially SMEs from developing countries, 
is access to finance. A large company without the 
immediate cash flow to fund litigation may nevertheless 
be able to rely on the strength of the company’s credit 
rating and its collateral to secure a loan and then pursue 
a dispute. SMEs, in contrast, may face a harder time 
doing so, especially when the value of their business or 
collateral is low relative to the cost of a claim. One investor 
interviewed stated that corporate lending is simply not 
available for these kinds of claims.731 Thus, in addition to 
ISDS-specific interventions, it may be useful to consider 
Option Significance for SME Constraints
Improving the market for counsel Linked to the market for legal services 
available to the SME
Use of contingency fee arrangements Linked to the strength of the SME’s claim
Improved access to finance Linked to the value & operating context 
of the SME
Use of litigation insurance Linked to the insurance market & litiga-
tion risk of the SME
Use of third-party funding Linked to the size of the SME’s claim
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what types of initiatives are being deployed to support 
SME access to finance more generally, and whether a 
concessional finance product (e.g. a first-loss position) 
could be used to assist investors in accessing liquidity.
6.3.2.3.4 Litigation insurance
To the extent that litigation/arbitration expenses are 
or are expected to be a significant business cost, 
firms may secure insurance to help cover those fees. 
This is distinct from, but can overlap with, other forms 
of insurance such as political risk insurance. The 
availability and attractiveness of this option depends 
on the relevant market and characteristics of the 
insured. 
6.3.2.3.5 Claimant-side third-party funding
Like definitions of SMEs, definitions of third-party 
funding vary. Broad versions overlap with some of 
the other options descried in this section addressing 
costs, such as options for loans, insurance, and 
contingency fee arrangements, discussed above, 
and other possible Assistance Mechanisms, such as 
pro bono support, discussed below.732 The narrow 
version used here is meant to exclude contingency 
fee arrangements and focus on funding provided to 
the claimant (or claimant’s counsel) on a non-recourse 
basis in exchange for a success fee or other form of 
monetary remuneration wholly or partially dependent 
on the outcome of the proceeding. 
This type of funding is currently being used in ISDS 
cases, but the lack of transparency surrounding 
it makes it difficult to know how prevalent it is, and 
whether and to what extent it is supporting SME 
claims. Reports that claim size must be multiples 
of expected litigation costs in order for funders to 
investment in claims seem to mean that it is unlikely, 
though not impossible, that smaller firms on the SME 
scale would be attractive candidates. Smaller claims 
that would otherwise not fit a single-claim third-party 
funding model, may, however, be more easily funded 
in the context of a portfolio of claims. Nevertheless, it 
is the size of the potential award, not the size of the 
business, that is the key determinant for third-party 
funders’ funding decisions (along with other factors 
such as the strength of the claim and recoverability of 
any award). 
In CCSI’s interviews, the ability of smaller companies 
to access third-party funding was questioned from 
a practical matter. According to one interviewee, 
sophisticated third-party funders tend to (if not 
almost exclusively) work with “magic circle” or other 
extremely exclusive law firms:733 
If you are an investor, how do you even access this 
well-connected professional advisory circle? This is 
not your typical law firm in Milwaukee. Wall street or 
magic circle firms must ply the space. Allen & Overy, 
Freshfields, they dominate the space for funded 
claims. You cannot find a lower rate regional firm 
that has this level of expertise. If you are looking 
for continuing practice exposure you have to pay 
these rates. This is where the expertise is residing. 
Whether there is a pricing model that is more 
accessible is an open question. 734
However, even if smaller investors are able to access 
reputable third-party funding sources, it is unclear 
that this option is going to be a panacea. Third party 
funders expect sizeable returns on their investment. 
According to one investor who is cautious of the 
opportunity cost of this kind of financing, “I have my 
antenna up for how much value of the potential claim 
is actually going to be available to the stakeholders 
of the enterprise from a successful arbitration – and 
this is real. Bentham and other classic funders take 30 
points in their traditional model – hedge funds take an 
even more onerous position. For an SME this is a real 
issue that a funder would take 30% or more.”735 Other 
preferred creditors of a claimant may include, for 
example, employees, local companies, local banks, 
and shareholders. It is a policy question where the 
value of financing should fall in this spectrum, and if the 
current model is inappropriate, how a different model 
may be crafted to better achieve policy objectives. 
6.3.2.4 Institutionalized multi-service center 
including legal representation of investors
6.3.2.4.1 Political tensions
As discussed in greater depth in Section 5.1.9, 
interviewees cited hurdles as to the political feasibility 
of creating (or expanding) an Assistance Mechanism 
that would benefit both states and investors. The 
importance of these perspectives should not be 
underestimated.
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6.3.2.4.2 Other stakeholder tensions
In addition to political challenges, certain other 
conflicts and tensions should be born in mind, 
including those that may arise as between an investor 
benefitting from an Assistance Mechanism and (1) 
donor governments and (2) support providers.
With respect to donor governments, to the extent 
an Assistance Mechanisms also supported claims 
by investors, there may be additional questions 
about tensions and conflicts that could arise due 
to relationships between investors and donor 
governments, such as circumstances in which:
• investors are investors of donor governments;
• investors are suing donor governments;
• investors are suing client/beneficiary 
governments; 
• investors are pursuing claims that are 
inconsistent with donor governments’ 
objectives for the dispute settlement system;
• investors are raising arguments of interpretation 
that are inconsistent with the relevant donor 
government’s interpretation of the treaty; or
• investors are pursuing claims that are 
inconsistent with donor governments’ 
objectives for providing funding support. 
 
Questions also arise regarding how to ensure proper 
alignment of interests between support providers 
(i.e. when not employed directly by an Assistance 
Mechanism) and client investors. These include the 
questions of:
• how to ensure support providers do not raise 
frivolous arguments or engage in other actions 
that prolong or unnecessarily drive up costs in 
proceedings in order to increase their bills;
• how to ensure support providers do not 
underspend or under-deliver (risks of which 
might be particularly acute if there is little 
competition for support, if support providers 
charge a flat fee for services, or if they are 
providing services for free or at a discount they 
deem too great); 
• how to ensure that the attorney-client 
relationship is not unduly harmed by 
relationships the support provider has with its 
funders or employer (if different from the client 
investor), and/or its other clients (which may be 
governments). 
 
6.3.2.5 Other Assistance Mechanism models
Many of the models of Assistance Mechanisms that were 
described in Section 4 in the context of states could also 
be considered for investors. 
For example, an Assistance Mechanism could focus 
on capacity building (e.g., for in-house teams or 
private firms in developing host countries, in order to 
try to lower costs of counsel). The ALSF, for example, 
opens its ALSF Academy to private sector lawyers from 
developing countries such that they may be better able 
to advise developing country governments. One could 
imagine similar support for in-house or outside-counsel 
that advises smaller investors. 
It was suggested that an Assistance Mechanism may 
help states to understand where to turn for available 
options, and such a mechanism could similarly benefit 
investors. For example, helping them to navigate 
mediation or conciliation, available domestic relief, 
identifying political risk insurance programs (including 
ones targeting SMEs), and seeking diplomatic support 
and protection. An SME may be less aware of and face 
more challenges in pursuing these alternative options 
than a larger firm. Thus, one set of options could be 
working with internationalized SMEs to identify, evaluate, 
and pursue these alternative paths.
Whether and to what extent each option is desirable and 
feasible, however, depends on a clearer articulation of 
the challenges facing different investors relating to the 
costs of ISDS, the evolution of those challenges due to 
other reforms and market patterns, and the objectives, 
advantages, disadvantages, costs, and benefits of the 
different policy interventions.
6.3.3 Interaction with other reform proposals
As with states, other proposed ISDS reforms, particularly 
in the context of UNCITRAL’s WGIII, may have an impact 
on the hurdles that investors are experiencing, or the 
way that assistance to such investors may be crafted. 
6.3.3.1 Using rules on cost allocation and fee 
shifting
Rules regarding cost allocation and fee shifting will not 
enable claimants (or their funders) to avoid incurring 
expenses when advancing an ISDS claim but can 
influence the claimant’s (and funders’) cost-benefit and 
risk analysis regarding the affordability and desirability 
of pursuing a case. The law and practice of cost-shifting 
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Table 11 Illustrative quantitative thresholds for SMEs
Criterion European
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(most retail and 
service indus-
tries)
< $31 million 
(most gener-








< VND 10 
billion
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in ISDS is presently complex. Treaties are often silent 
on the approach to be followed and, while some 
arbitration rules give guidance, that guidance is not 
a clear directive. Rather, it often provides tribunals 
significant discretion to determine the proper 
approach to cost-shifting based on factors such as 
the circumstances of the case. 
The different approaches to cost-shifting can have 
different implications for SMEs. Under a “pay-your-
own-way” approach, each side is able to better 
control its legal fees and costs. This can be useful 
for those SMEs that have identified quality, low-cost 
counsel and enable them to pursue a case. Another 
approach is the “loser-pays” approach, under 
which, generally speaking, the losing party pays its 
own as well as the winning party’s legal fees and 
costs.736 This increases the risks of pursuing claims. If 
SMEs are particularly unable to pay those fees and 
costs, and/or are particularly risk averse, it could 
disproportionately dissuade them from bringing 
cases.737 Like contingency funding arrangements, 
fee shifting may also have the effect of filtering out 
weaker claims. 
One commentator has suggested supporting 
claimant access to ISDS by using a one-way fee 
shifting rule. Schill contends that in order to 
appropriately facilitate and encourage claims, 
tribunals should (and do) shift costs in favor of 
successful claimants, but not require them to pay 
the state’s costs when they are unsuccessful. 738 CCSI 
has not identified any treaty, state, or arbitration rule 
calling for this approach. However, as Schill hinted, 
data indicates that there is in fact “a one-way loser-
pays rule that reliably operate[s] to investors’ benefit 
– rather than to the benefit of states or operating in 
a neutral way.”739 Tribunals do not always shift costs, 
but when they do, they more frequently shift them in 
favor of the successful claimant than the successful 
respondent. While such one-way shifting, and any 
ISDS reforms further solidifying that approach, would 
benefit SME (and other) claimants, its expressly 
imbalanced nature would likely exacerbate concerns 
among those states and other stakeholders already 
troubled by the asymmetrical nature and high costs 
of the ISDS system for states.740 
Overall, clearer rules on cost allocation could be one 
reform approach that would affect SMEs’ access to 
ISDS by improving the quality of calculation they (or 
their funders) would engage in when deciding whether 
to bring a case. Each approach will have different 
implications not only for the ability of SMEs to bring 
claims, but also on issues such as (dis)incentives to file 
frivolous claims, and (dis)incentives to control costs. 
6.3.3.2 Reforming ISDS procedures generally to 
reduce costs overall
There are various reform initiatives aiming to reduce the 
unjustified costs of ISDS. The outcomes of those efforts 
could potentially also lower the hurdles SMEs face in 
bringing claims.741  
6.3.3.3 Reforming ISDS or adopting specialized 
rules to reduce costs specifically for SMEs and/or 
small claims
In addition to general reform efforts relating to costs, 
there are some examples of initiatives aiming to make 
it easier for SMEs and/or investors with small claims to 
pursue cases.742 Interviewees suggested, for example, 
sole arbitrators, small claims-type courts, or expedited 
procedures for certain kinds of claims. Again, the 
outcomes of these initiatives will influence whether and 
what other interventions may be appropriate. 
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Section 7. Conclusion
This Scoping Study provides a broad and inclusive 
overview of issues, concerns, empirical evidence, 
opinions, lessons learned, and proposed solutions 
as they relate to a potential or expanded Assistance 
Mechanism for International Investment Law. 
This Scoping Study reflects input received on 
a confidential basis from: government officials; 
individuals who have experience establishing 
or working for existing or attempted Assistance 
Mechanisms; individuals who have experience 
working for an arbitral institution; academics who 
have written on and/or advised states with respect 
to international investment law; private practitioners; 
representatives of non-governmental organizations; 
and representatives of private sector foreign 
investors. While this study captures the perspectives 
of each and all of these categories of individuals 
(but is naturally reflective only of individuals actually 
interviewed, and insights provided through desk 
research), it is the perspective of those who are 
experiencing and articulating capacity challenges 
that should serve as the primary guide for both 
identifying critical areas where assistance is needed, 
and also in developing potential solutions. 
 
As an initial matter, IIAs, and the ISDS mechanism 
frequently provided for therein (which may also 
be provided for in domestic laws or contracts), 
have come under increasing levels of scrutiny, 
particularly as the expected benefits of the treaties 
and additional legal protections are not perceived 
to have materialized, and the number of claims 
against states, and defense costs incurred by them, 
have increased dramatically. Absent fundamental 
changes to these legal frameworks and/or the 
dispute settlement mechanisms contained therein, 
concerns regarding these costs show no signs of 
abating. 
 
CCSI’s consultations conducted for this Scoping 
Study revealed that the concerns about IIAs and 
ISDS are much more fundamental than only the 
financial costs of participation in this system. 
Interviewees relayed challenges from investment 
policy formulation at the domestic level through 
and including effective engagement in formal ISDS 
proceedings. As such, this Scoping Study considers 
the range of problems that states and other actors 
have in engaging with and benefiting from international 
investment law and in participating effectively in 
investor-state dispute settlement processes. The Study 
does so through the lens of “capacity challenges,” 
capturing different challenges related to: investment 
policy-making; IIA negotiation; implementation and 
management of their IIAs and associated policies; 
dispute prevention; and pre-dispute management and 
consultations. It then considers in depth the capacity 
challenges that arise in the context of managing actual 
ISDS disputes, including: case staffing; anticipating, 
and potentially resolving, ISDS cases at an early phase; 
appointing arbitrators; dealing with uncertainty and 
ambiguity; working with experts; and engaging in 
discovery of and managing information.
 
Some identified challenges are acknowledged and 
shared by all or many states, and some differ, based on 
a state’s economic development level, its experience 
with ISDS claims, and its role as a capital importer or 
exporter (or both) particularly vis-a-vis its investment 
treaty partners, among other factors. States expressed 
different priorities in addressing these challenges, 
some of which seem to be loosely held preferences in 
light of anticipated resource constraints, and some of 
which were more fundamentally held policy priorities or 
limitations.
 
The Scoping Study considers previous attempts to 
establish an advisory center on international investment 
law. A key theme that emerged from interviews with 
those involved in or knowledgeable about these efforts 
was that policy-makers should not underestimate large 
and, perhaps moreso, small policy differences among 
and between states, as an unanticipated difference of 
opinion can stall or halt efforts, even when the finish line 
seems near. 
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Following the identification (and prioritization) of 
capacity challenges, it will be necessary to consider 
the model(s) that an Assistance Mechanism could take 
in order to address them. The Scoping Study surveys 
a wide variety of models that Assistance Mechanisms, 
both with respect to international investment law as 
well as those employed in other legal fields, may take 
to address various concerns. Models that are explored 
in depth in the Scoping Study include: 
 
• Institutionalized, multi-service support 
including legal representation of client 
governments. Examples that are discussed 
in this category include the Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law, the African Legal Support Facility, 
and the International Development Law 
Organization’s Investment Support Programme 
for Least Developed Countries, as well as an 
investment law “hotline”. 
• Institutionalized, multi-service support 
not including legal representation of client 
governments. Examples that are discussed 
in this category include the kinds of support 
provided by international organizations (such as 
UNCTAD, the OECD, and the World Bank Group), 
arbitration centers (such as ICSID, the PCA, and 
the SCC), and academic and non-profit centers 
(such as CCSI and IISD). 
• Financial or in-kind inputs. Examples that are 
discussed in this category include arbitration trust 
funds (such as that provided by the PCA), third-
party funding for respondent states, contingent 
fee representation, insurance products, and loans. 
• Pro bono, ad hoc legal and expert support 
to respondent states. Examples that are 
discussed in this category include IDLO’s ISP/
LDCs program along with other NGO and 
university-based programs that deliver services to 
states on a no-cost basis. 
• Intergovernmental knowledge-sharing hubs. 
Examples that are discussed in this category 
include formal opportunities for government 
officials to share knowledge (e.g. IISD’s Annual 
Forum of Developing Country Investment 
Negotiators) as well as ad-hoc treaty-based or 
other networks.  
• Discrete capacity-building networks. 
Examples that are discussed in this section 
include trainings and discrete capacity building 
offered by various Assistance Mechanisms, 
academic and non-profit institutions, law firms, 
and other governments, as well as Massive Open 
Online Courses.  
• Legal assistance and resource 
clearinghouse. Finally, a very basic form 
of Assistance Mechanism may provide great 
value by simply compiling, organizing, and 
disseminating information about existing 
resources to relevant government officials.
 
Various cross-cutting issues emerged from analysis 
and experience with existing Assistance Mechanisms. 
These cross-cutting issues should be considered by 
policy-makers as they consider the breadth and depth 
of services as well as the model(s) that an Assistance 
Mechanism could follow. The cross-cutting issues that 
are explored in depth in the Scoping Study include: 
 
• Quality, reliability, reputation, and trust;
• Scope of services and funding;
• Costs of support and who bears them;
• Stakeholder tensions;
• Identifying the client/beneficiary;
• Location, staffing, and remuneration;
• Institutionalized vs. ad hoc mechanisms; 
• “Politics” surrounding the role of an Assistance 
Mechanism; and
• Intersection with other reforms. 
 
Interviews reflect a great diversity of perspectives 
as to how capacity challenges should be prioritized 
and addressed, and an even greater diversity of 
perspectives as to the feasibility and desirability of 
how cross-cutting concerns should shape outcomes. 
 
Finally, the Scoping Study includes a section devoted 
to investors, with a focus on small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) as potential beneficiaries of any 
Assistance Mechanism. The Scoping Study revealed 
that although SMEs and states face some of the same 
issues with respect to their participation in ISDS, the 
rationales for, considerations regarding, and optimal 
modes of supporting each group may vary significantly. 
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The Scoping Study explores evidence related to 
SMEs’ use of ISDS, as well as the hurdles that SMEs 
are having in effectively relying on IIAs and ISDS 
as a method to limit risk and resolve disputes. The 
Scoping Study explores how one might determine 
the scope of beneficiaries who may benefit from an 
Assistance Mechanism. 
 
Based on the hurdles experienced and concerns 
expressed, the Scoping Study considers the forms of 
an Assistance Mechanism that may best assist SMEs 
in overcoming ISDS access issues. These include 
an ombuds-type office, pre-dispute technical 
assistance, market-based Assistance Mechanisms, 
capacity-building models, and a model incorporating 
institutionalized defense and legal representation. 
Depending on the type of assistance that would be 
offered to investors, consultations suggested fairly 
widespread hesitation of, or even strong opposition 
to, also including investors as beneficiaries of an 
Assistance Mechanism that is created or expanded 
to benefit states. 
 
International investment law and ISDS are evolving, 
and outcomes of that evolution remain uncertain. 
Those developments must be kept in mind when 
assessing needs, and the options for addressing 
them, as each may change in the short-, medium-, 
and long-term. An Assistance Mechanism 
developed to be sustainable will need to be flexible 
to accommodate these developments. It will be 
important to consider whether and to what extent 
concerns regarding IIAs and ISDS are best resolved 
through reforms to treaties and dispute settlement 
thereunder, and whether and to what extent the 
costs of concerns that are not addressed should 
be shifted from beneficiaries of an Assistance 
Mechanism (e.g. certain respondent states and 
SMEs) to an Assistance Mechanism’s funders (e.g. 
other states). 
With respect to both states and investors, this 
scoping study has set forth a wide variety of existing 
capacity challenges and detailed existing Assistance 
Mechanisms that are available. Depending on the 
issue, robust, some, or no assistance is currently 
available. Any creation or expansion of an 
Assistance Mechanism should take into account 
existing support, building upon and using it, and 
complementing it as necessary and desirable. 
In UNCITRAL’s most recent 38th Session, government 
delegates commenced a substantive discussion on 
the contours of an Assistance Mechanism (referred to 
in that context as an advisory center).743 While general 
support was expressed for establishing an Assistance 
Mechanism, particularly as such a mechanism could 
complement other reform options being developed 
by WGIII, preliminary thoughts and consideration 
of questions regarding the establishment of such 
a mechanism revealed much work yet to be done. 
Delegates discussed a wide range of possibilities as 
they relate to: potential beneficiaries of a mechanism,744 
the potential scope of services that a mechanism could 
provide (with those outlined in Secretariat Note A/
CN.9/WG.III/WP.168 providing a good basis for further 
discussion),745 the possible structure of an Assistance 
Mechanism and how it could be financed,746 and other 
considerations and issues that must be born in mind 
(e.g. quality and reliability of services, staffing and 
remuneration, stakeholder tensions, a mechanism’s 
impact on the ISDS system as a whole, and long-term 
sustainability of an Assistance Mechanism).747
The Working Group provided guidance to the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat in conducting certain preparatory work to 
assist the Working Group in these considerations.748 
Requested information related to potential conflicts 
of interest and burdens on an Assistance Mechanism 
(particularly as they relate to the scope of its mandate),749 
information on Assistance Mechanisms that are already 
providing services,750 criteria that may be applied 
to determine beneficiary states and services,751 how 
capacity building may apply to various elements of 
investment treaty practice and dispute settlement 
proceedings,752 and options for financing and staffing an 
Assistance Mechanism.753
As the content and contours of any Assistance 
Mechanism take shape, the authors are grateful for the 
opportunity to contribute the evidence and perspectives 
in this Scoping Study to that discussion.
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I. Phase-Specific Questions 120
 A. COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES 120
  a. Formulation of IIA Policy. 
  b. Negotiation of IIAs 
  c. Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs 
  d. Initial notices and cooling off periods 
  e. Handling Disputes 
  f. Managing Post-Award Processes. 
 B. PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES 124
  a. Formulation of IIA Policy. 
  b. Negotiation of IIAs 
  c. Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs 
  d. Initial notices and cooling off periods 
  e.Handling Disputes 
  f. Managing Post-Award Processes. 
 C. CIVIL SOCIETY + ACADEMIC REPRESENTATIVES 129
  a. Formulation of IIA Policy. 
  b. Negotiation of IIAs 
  c. Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs 
  d. Initial notices and cooling off periods 
  e. Handling Disputes 
  f. Managing Post-Award Processes. 
II. Institution-Specific Questions 131
 A. INSTITUTIONAL FORMS 131
  a. Advisory Center for International Investment Law 
  b. Ad hoc Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance 
  c. Private-Sector Solutions 
  d. Direct Funding 
 B. SCOPE OF AID 134
  a. Negotiating IIAs & Developing IIA Policy 
  b. Pre-Dispute Management and Alternate Resolution 
  c. Handling Disputes 
  d. Post-Award Processes 
  e. Services for Investors 
III. General Questions 136




a. Formulation of IIA Policy.
(1) Does your country have a (formal or informal) policy towards international investment agreements? 
To what extent is this policy the result of binding legislation, and to what extent is it the result 
of policy discretion within administrations and civil service organizations? 
(2) Is this policy applied consistently in dealings with all counterparties, or are there certain 
regional neighbors, allied countries, rival countries, etc. who are negotiated with according to 
substantially different policies?
(3) Do you feel that the development and implementation of IIA policy is limited by financial, 
technical, or capacity constraints, or do you feel that such policies have been thoroughly 
developed and implemented? 
(4) Do you feel that policy support provided by another stakeholder in the international IIA regime 
(for instance, wealthier countries, international civil society organizations, arbitrators and arbitral 
council acting in a pro bono capacity, etc.) would be useful to the formulation of national IIA 
policy? Have you had experience with getting support from any of these groups?
(5) Would third-party advice or technical support raise conflict-of-interest or capacity concerns? 
How would those concerns differ depending on which parties were providing support? For 
instance, if attorneys providing advice on IIA policy also bring ISDS claims or otherwise benefit 
financially from the ISDS system, does that raise concerns? 
b. Negotiation of IIAs
(1) Do you feel that the international investment agreements your country has entered into are only 
entered into after a thorough and adequate assessments of impacts on domestic law, policy, 
and economic outcomes? Do you think more resources for conducting such assessments would 
be useful for negotiations (and subsequent ratification)?
(2) Are your country’s international investment treaties based on a model? 
a. If so, did you receive external support in preparation of that model? [explain]
b. Do your agreements otherwise take a similar form from one to the next? 
c. Are there some treaties that you believe represent your country’s interests better? Worse? 
d. What role did in-house capacity/external knowledge play in shaping outcomes?
e. What other factors are important in shaping outcomes? (e.g., strength of negotiating party, 
internal deadlines, trade-offs in terms of other issues being negotiated as part of an FTA)
(3) Do you feel that your country is well-positioned to negotiate equitable IIAs that serve its long-
term interests? If not, why not?
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(4) Would technical support help improve negotiating outcomes from your perspective?
a. If so, what kind of support?
b. Are there limits or concerns? 
c. Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs 
(1) Briefly describe where you see risks of claims arising – e.g., natural resource concessions, actions 
of local officials, etc.
(2) When and how do you become aware that there may be an ISDS claim against the country? 
(e.g., notices of intent from companies/their attorneys, other communications by companies, 
communications from relevant ministries or local government entities, diplomatic or other 
communications from the home state, other?) 
a. Are there variations based on the sector, size or home country of the investor, or other 
factors?
(3) What, if any, steps does your country take to (x) avoid investor-state disputes prior to their 
emergence, and (y) resolve disputes that have been identified. 
a. If there are steps, are these designed specifically to anticipate/avoid ISDS claims or do 
they exist as part of separate initiatives?
(4) If there are steps taken under #3, 
a. what organizations, including non-state organizations (for example, industry 
organizations, unions, etc.) are involved in the process of pre-dispute management?
b. To what extent does this dispute management happen at the national level versus the 
subnational level? Are there national-level procedures and resources in place to reduce 
conflict between investors and subnational government bodies?
c. How effective do you see these processes to be? 
d. What would make them more effective?
i. to what extent are these processes limited by resource constraints or technical 
capacity issues? To what extent are they limited by political constraints?
(5) If there are no existing processes under #3, to what extent do you think they would be useful 
to establish generally or for the purposes of managing/avoiding ISDS claims? What are the 
limitations to establishing such mechanisms?
(6) Do you believe there are any risks, concerns or limitations of these process (perceived or real?) 
(7) Do you see a role for supporting inter-state engagement on potential disputes (as opposed to 
just efforts relating to the host state and investor), such as good offices?
(8) Would external analysis of the IIA consequences of proposed activities by government or private 
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sector actors be valuable to the pre-dispute management of IIA obligations?
d. Initial notices and cooling off periods
(1) Is there an established and widely understood intergovernmental process to manage the receipt 
of the notice of intent and early steps to respond? Is it used? If not, what are the legal, technical 
or resource constraints to implementing fully this process? 
(2) What is your perspective of the utility of “cooling off periods”? Are there disputes that have been 
pursued against you that you believe could have been avoided with better dispute avoidance 
practices or better uses of cooling off periods? (If so, can you elaborate)?
(3) What could make cooling off periods more useful? Are there capacity or resource constraints 
that are preventing them from serving the role you envisioned when including these provisions 
in your treaties?
e. Handling Disputes
(1) What resources does your country apply towards IIA disputes? 
a. Legal: Are these disputes handled by in-house council, law firms, or some combination 
of the two?
i. If you use external counsel –
1. Why?
2. International and/or domestic?
3. How do you choose? (e.g., relevance of cost/quality)
4. For what issues? (e.g., do you use domestic for domestic law issues and 
international for treaty-related questions)
5. Have you adjusted practices over time? Do you foresee/would you like 
further evolution?
6. What have been your experiences?
ii. If you use domestic solely – 
1. Why did you choose that route? 
2. Can you explain your staffing (e.g., how many people are on staff, from 
what department, how do you accommodate ebbs and flows?)
iii. If you use a combination of both?
1. Why did you choose that route? 
2. Can you explain your internal staffing (e.g., how many people are on 
staff, from what department, how do you accommodate ebbs and flows?)
3. Can you explain the distribution of labor internally and externally?
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b. Technical/expert:
i. What is your perception of internal capacity on issues of valuation/damages?
ii. What is your perception of internal capacity on technical issues of discovery, 
evidence gathering and document management?
iii. Would you want additional support doing due diligence and discovery on 
claimant investors’, their conduct, claims, etc?
c.  (If relevant) On a scale of 0-5, with zero being very unsatisfied and 5 being extremely 
satisfied, how satisfied have you been with the –
i. Quality of external legal representation you have received
ii. Cost of external legal representation you have received
(2) Do you feel that the resources and legal and technical capacity your country has available to 
handle IIA disputes are sufficient? do you believe that you are at a disadvantage compared to 
other litigants within the IIA system?
(3) What additional resources or approaches do you feel would support your capacity to effectively 
handle active disputes? What are your perceptions of approaches such as:
· Access to capacity-building programs for internal staff.
· Access to specific technical assistance, like discovery related to investors/investments, and 
document management systems.
· Access to subscription services/databases (e.g., on arbitrators, investor-state law guide, iareporter)
· Access to special negotiated rates for private-sector assistance. 
· Pro-bono services. 
· Access to a dedicated advisory center. 




· Reducing costs, e.g.,
i. Better enabling identification and dismissal of frivolous claims.
ii. Capping of fees for arbitrators? Capping fees for counsel? Other?
· Any other (please specify). 
(4) How do your experiences with handling disputes under IIAs compare with handling disputes 
under other areas of international law (e.g., WTO, human rights) or other areas of domestic law? 
Are challenges of capacity and resources different? Why? How?
f. Managing Post-Award Processes.
(1) Do you feel that your government is well-positioned to challenge the results of adverse ISDS 
awards, resist enforcement? If not, what are the issues you face in this phase?
(2) Do you believe that your IIA counterparties consistently honor the results of ISDS awards, 
such an award for costs? If not, do you feel that this is the result of internal state enforcement 
capacity or is there another reason? What? 
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B. Private Sector Representatives
a. Formulation of IIA Policy.
(1) To what extent have you, either in a paid or pro bono capacity, participated in or assisted in the 
formulation of a sovereign state’s IIA policy?
a. What resources were required to thoroughly prepare for and conduct negotiations? 
i. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized 
experts, etc.)
ii. Financial resources (rough cost)
iii. Time (rough timeline)
b. Did you feel that your clients had adequate access to those resources?
c. What role did precedent documents and model legislation play in those negotiations?
i. What was the source of this precedent? (e.g., civil society groups, existing IIAs, 
internal state resources, proprietary private sector documents).
ii. How was this precedent adapted for the specific circumstances of your clients?
iii. Did the source and format of this precedent raise any conflict-of-interest concerns?
 d. What role did in-house capacity/external knowledge play in shaping outcomes?
(2) With respect to your sovereign clients, to what extent do they have a (formal or informal) policy 
towards international investment agreements?
a. Is this policy applied consistently in dealings with all counterparties, or are there 
certain regional neighbors, allied countries, rival countries, etc. who are negotiated with 
according to substantially different policies?
b. With respect to your sovereign clients, do you feel that the development and 
implementation of IIA policy is limited by financial, technical, or capacity constraints, or 
do you feel that such policies have been thoroughly developed and implemented? 
(3) Do you feel that policy support provided by another stakeholder in the international IIA regime 
(for instance, wealthier countries, international civil society organizations, etc.) would be useful 
to the formulation of national IIA policy? Have you had experience working alongside any of 
these groups?
(4) To what extent could third-party policy support raise conflict-of-interest concerns? How would 
those concerns differ depending on which parties were providing support? For instance, if 
attorneys providing advice on IIA policy also bring ISDS claims or otherwise benefit financially 
from the ISDS system, does that raise concerns? What steps could be taken to mitigate those 
concerns? 
b.  Negotiation of IIAs
(1) To what extent have you, either in a paid or pro bono capacity, participated in or assisted in the 
negotiation of IIAs?
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a. What resources were required to thoroughly prepare for and conduct negotiations? 
i. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized 
experts, etc.)
ii. Financial resources (rough cost)
iii. Time (rough timeline)
b. Did you feel that your clients had adequate access to those resources?
c. What role did precedent documents and model legislation play in those negotiations?
i. What was the source of this precedent? (e.g., civil society groups, existing IIAs, 
internal state resources, proprietary private sector documents).
ii. How was this precedent adapted for the specific circumstances of your clients?
iii. Did the source and format of this precedent raise any conflict-of-interest concerns?
 d. What role did in-house capacity/external knowledge play in shaping outcomes?
e. What other factors are important in shaping outcomes? (e.g., strength of negotiating 
party, internal deadlines, trade-offs in terms of other issues being negotiated as part of 
an FTA)
(2) Do you feel that the international investment agreements under which you practice were entered 
into after a thorough and adequate assessments of impacts on domestic law, policy, and 
economic outcomes?
(3) Do you feel that your sovereign clients are well-positioned to negotiate equitable IIAs that serve 
their long-term interests? If not, why not?
(4) Would technical support help improve negotiating outcomes from your perspective?
a. If so, what kind of support?
b. Are there limits or concerns? 
(5) To what extent could third-party negotiation support raise conflict-of-interest concerns? How 
would those concerns differ depending on which parties were providing support? What steps 
could be taken to mitigate those concerns?
c.  Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs 
(1) Briefly describe areas where you see risks of claims arising for your clients – e.g., natural resource 
concessions, actions of local officials, etc.
(2) When and how do you become aware that there may be an ISDS claim against a country? 
(e.g., notices of intent from companies/their attorneys, other communications by companies, 
communications from relevant ministries or local government entities, diplomatic or other 
communications from the home state, other?) 
a. Are there variations based on the sector, size or home country of the investor, or other 
factors?
b. To what extent does a pre-existing relationship with a country dictate at which stage 
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of the dispute you will be engaged?
c. What resources were required to thoroughly prepare for and conduct pre-dispute 
management? 
i. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized 
experts, etc.)
ii. Financial resources (rough cost)
iii. Time (rough timeline)
d. Did you feel that your clients had adequate access to those resources?
e. What role do resource constraints play in your clients’ decisions to engage you at one 
stage of a dispute versus another? 
(3) What, if any, steps do your sovereign clients take to (x) avoid investor-state disputes prior to their 
emergence, and (y) resolve disputes that have been identified. 
a. If there are steps, are these designed specifically to anticipate/avoid ISDS claims or do 
they exist as part of separate initiatives?
(4) If there are steps taken under #3, 
a. what organizations, including non-state organizations (for example, industry 
organizations, unions, etc.) are involved in the process of pre-dispute management?
b. To what extent does this dispute management happen at the national level versus the 
subnational level? Are there national-level procedures and resources in place to reduce 
conflict between investors and subnational government bodies?
c. How effective do you see these processes to be? 
d. What would make them more effective?
i. to what extent are these processes limited by resource constraints or technical 
capacity issues? To what extent are they limited by political constraints? 
e. To what extent have you or other outside experts been involved in formulating these 
steps?
(5) If there are no existing processes under #3, to what extent do you think they would be useful 
to establish generally or for the purposes of managing/avoiding ISDS claims? What are the 
limitations to establishing such mechanisms?
(6) What resources are required to thoroughly develop a pre-dispute management plan? 
a. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized experts, 
etc.)
b. Financial resources (rough cost)
c. Time (rough timeline)
(7) Do you believe there are any risks, concerns or limitations of these process (perceived or real?) 
(8) Do you see a role for supporting inter-state engagement on potential disputes (as opposed to 
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just efforts relating to the host state and investor), such as good offices?
(9) Would external analysis of the IIA consequences of proposed activities by government or private 
sector actors be valuable to the pre-dispute management of IIA obligations?
d.  Initial notices and cooling off periods
(1) With respect to your sovereign clients, do you see that there are established and widely 
understood intergovernmental processes to manage the receipt of the notice of intent and early 
steps to respond? Are they used? If not, what are the legal, technical or resource constraints to 
implementing these processes fully? 
(2) What is your perspective of the utility of “cooling off periods”? Are there disputes that have been 
pursued against you that you believe could have been avoided with better dispute avoidance 
practices or better uses of cooling off periods? (If so, can you elaborate)?
(3) What could make cooling off periods them more useful? Are there capacity or resource constraints 
that are preventing them from serving the role you envisioned when including these provisions 
in your treaties?
e.  Handling Disputes
(1) What resources do your sovereign clients apply towards IIA disputes? 
a. Legal: Are these disputes handled primarily by law firms, or some combination of in-
house counsel and private sector firms?
i. If primarily external counsel:
1. Why?
2. Do you clients primarily use international or domestic counsel?
3. For what issues? (e.g., do you use domestic for domestic law issues and 
international for treaty-related questions)
4. How have these practices changed over time, and do you foresee further 
evolution?
5. What have been your experiences?
ii. If your clients use a combination of both:
1. Why did they choose that route? 
2. Can you explain the distribution of labor internally and externally?
b. Technical/expert:
i. What is your perception of your clients’ internal capacity on issues of valuation/
damages?
ii. What is your perception of your clients’ internal capacity on technical issues of 
discovery, evidence gathering and document management?
iii. To what extent do you think sovereigns’ due diligence and discovery on 
claimant investors’, their conduct, claims, etc. is limited by a lack of expertise, 
manpower, or financial resources?
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(2) Speaking generally, what resources are required to thoroughly prepare for and conduct 
negotiations? 
a. Human resources (support staff, junior, mid-level, senior, partner, specialized experts, 
etc.)
b. Financial resources (rough cost)
c. Time (rough timeline)
(3) Do you feel that the resources and legal and technical capacity your sovereign clients have 
available to handle IIA disputes are sufficient? Do you believe that they are at a disadvantage 
compared to other litigants within the IIA system?
(4) What additional resources or approaches do you feel would support your clients’ capacity to 
effectively handle active disputes? What are your perceptions of approaches such as:
· Access to capacity-building programs for internal staff.
 · Access to specific technical assistance, like discovery related to investors/investments, and 
document management systems.
 · Access to subscription services/databases (e.g., on arbitrators, investor-state law guide, 
iareporter)
 · Access to special negotiated rates for private-sector assistance. 
 · Pro-bono services. 
 · Access to a dedicated advisory center. 




 · Reducing costs, e.g.,
i. Better enabling identification and dismissal of frivolous claims.
ii. Capping of fees for arbitrators? Capping fees for counsel? Other?
 · Any other (please specify). 
f. Managing Post-Award Processes.
(1) Do you feel that your sovereign clients are well-positioned to challenge the results of adverse 
ISDS awards? If not, what are the issues you face in this phase?
(2) Do you believe that your IIA counterparties consistently honor the results of ISDS awards, such 
an award for costs? If not, why not? 
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C. Civil Society + Academic Representatives
a.   Formulation of IIA Policy.
(1) Do you feel that states have clear and consistent policies towards international investment 
agreements? To what extent does the presence of a consistent policy seem to vary, and based 
on what factors? (e.g., capital importing vs. capital exporting states)
(2) Do you feel that the development and implementation of IIA policy is limited by financial, 
technical, or capacity constraints, or do you feel that such policies have been thoroughly 
developed and implemented? 
(3) Do you feel that policy support provided to sovereign countries by another stakeholder in 
the international IIA regime (for instance, wealthier countries, international civil society 
organizations, arbitrators and arbitral council acting in a pro bono capacity, etc.) would be 
useful to the formulation of national IIA policy?
a.  Do you have any experience working with sovereign states to develop IIA policy? If so, 
what were the results of that process? 
(4) Would third-party advice or technical support raise conflict-of-interest or capacity concerns? 
How would those concerns differ depending on which parties were providing support? For 
instance, if attorneys providing advice on IIA policy also bring ISDS claims or otherwise benefit 
financially from the ISDS system, does that raise concerns? 
(5) Do you think that formal mechanisms or institutions that provided financial or technical ISDS aid 
to poorer countries would result in systemic changes to ISDS mechanisms, or would it represent 
an international commitment to existing systems? How much do you think the governance and 
funding structures of such institutions would affect their role?
(6) If systemic changes to ISDS mechanisms are proposed, what role would you want to see an 
Advisory Center or other aid institution play? Would you be concerned that conflicts of interests 
between stakeholders might arise if the institution provided support during policy debates or 
state-state negotiations?
b.   Negotiation of IIAs
(1) Do you feel that the international investment agreements you have seen and worked with are 
only entered into after a thorough and adequate assessments of impacts on domestic law, 
policy, and economic outcomes? Do you think more resources for conducting such assessments 
would be useful for negotiations (and subsequent ratification)?
 (2) What is your perception of the usefulness of “model” IIAs in negotiation processes? 
a. How well-positioned are states to negotiate based on their preferred model?
b. What conflicts of interest might arise when third-party models are used or third-party 
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advisors assist states in developing a model?
c. What capacity issues would you expect to limit the usefulness of such models?
 (3) Do you feel that countries are well-positioned to negotiate equitable IIAs that serve their long-
term interests? If not, why not?
 (4) Would technical support help improve negotiating outcomes from your perspective?
a. If so, what kind of support?
b. Are there limits or concerns? 
c.   Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs 
(1) Briefly describe where you see risks of claims arising – e.g., natural resource concessions, 
actions of local officials, etc.
 (2) What is your perception of processes taken by states to (x) avoid investor-state disputes prior 
to their emergence, and (y) resolve disputes that have been identified? 
a. How effective do these processes seem to be at reducing the volume and cost of ISDS? 
b . What would make them more effective?
i. To what extent are these processes limited by resource constraints or technical 
capacity issues? To what extent are they limited by political constraints?
(3) Do you believe there are any risks, concerns or limitations of these process (perceived or real?) 
(4) Do you see a role for supporting inter-state engagement on potential disputes (as opposed to 
just efforts relating to the host state and investor), such as good offices?
(5) Would external analysis of the IIA consequences of proposed activities by government or private 
sector actors be valuable to the pre-dispute management of IIA obligations? What conflicts of 
interest can you foresee arising from external advice, and how do those conflicts change based 
on the parties providing support?
d.  Initial notices and cooling off periods
(1) What is your perspective of the utility of “cooling off periods”? Are there disputes that 
have been pursued against you that you believe could have been avoided with better dispute 
avoidance practices or better uses of cooling off periods? (If so, can you elaborate)?
 (2) What could make cooling off periods more useful? Are there capacity or resource constraints 
that are preventing them from being effective, or do they seem to function as intended?
 e.  Handling Disputes
(1) Do you believe that some countries are at a disadvantage compared to other litigants within 
the IIA system when addressing active ISDS claims? If so, what creates those disadvantages?
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 131
SECURING ADEQUATE LEGAL DEFENSE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS A SCOPING STUDY
 (2) Do you feel that the resources and legal and technical capacity countries have available to 
handle ISDS are sufficient? 
 (3) What additional resources or approaches do you feel would support countries’ capacity to 
effectively handle active disputes? What are your perceptions of approaches such as:
· Access to capacity-building programs for internal staff.
· Access to specific technical assistance, like discovery related to investors/investments, and 
document management systems.
· Access to subscription services/databases (e.g., on arbitrators, investor-state law guide, 
iareporter)
· Access to special negotiated rates for private-sector assistance. 
· Pro-bono services. 
· Access to a dedicated advisory center. 




· Reducing costs, e.g.,
i. Better enabling identification and dismissal of frivolous claims.
ii. Capping of fees for arbitrators? Capping fees for counsel? Other?
· Any other (please specify). 
 (4) How do your experiences with disputes under IIAs compare with disputes under other areas of 
international law (e.g., WTO, human rights) or other areas of domestic law? Are challenges of 
capacity and resources different? Why? How?
f.   Managing Post-Award Processes.
(1) Do you feel that governments well-positioned to challenge the results of adverse ISDS 
awards, resist enforcement? If not, what are the issues you see them facing in this phase?
 (2) Do you believe that IIA parties consistently honor the results of ISDS awards, such an award for 
costs? If not, why not? 
II. InstItutIon-sPecIfIc QuestIons 
A. Institutional Forms 
a. Advisory Center for International Investment Law
One institutional form that has been proposed to address capacity issues and disparities in ISDS is 
the “Advisory Center.” Such an Advisory Center would take the form of an independent institution 
dedicated to ensuring that less-well-resourced states have an equal opportunity to defend their 
interests in ISDS proceedings. Such a Center might give free legal advice and training on IIA law and 
provide direct support in ISDS proceedings for free or at discounted rates. 
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(1) Are you familiar with the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) set up to assist countries in 
international trade law and international trade disputes? 
a. Are you a member of the ACWL?
b. Have you used the services of the ACWL? (explain)?
c. What are the advantages/disadvantages of the ACWL from your perspective?
d. Do you think that support and assistance could be rendered through a centralized 
Advisory Center (perhaps patterned on the ACWL)? 
(2) Do you see any disadvantages of a centralized Advisory Center from the standpoint of 
participating governments? Of investors? 
(3) How would you rank (from 1: less important to 5: more important) the following criteria for set-
up and provision of services by an Advisory Center? 
· High standard of quality of services. 
· Governance of the Advisory Center. 
· Impartiality (i.e., not favoring any government, investor, or class of governments or 
investors). 
· Neutrality (i.e., not advocating for particular interpretation of existing laws). 
· Transparency (in terms of its policies and activities). 
· No competition with law firms. 
· Professional liability. 
· Accountability (if so, to whom?). 
(4) What other important criteria are there?
(5) Do you envision that the Center would, could or should have any restrictions in terms of the 
cases it could take, governments it could support, or arguments it could raise? 
(6) Do you think that an Advisory Facility should work with in-house experts only, rely solely on 
technical assistance from outside experts, or rely in part on in-house experts and in part on 
outside experts? 
(7) How do you see the relationship between an Advisory Center and academics/experts, arbitrators, 
counsels, other governments (non-beneficiaries)? What types of relationships do you believe 
would increase the Center’s legitimacy among both direct participants in the ISDS system, as 
well as other observers and stakeholders, and which would decrease it? 
a. Would affiliation with any of the aforementioned stakeholders raise concerns about 
organizational conflicts of interest? 
b. Do you have concerns that the funding source of any such Advisory Center could 
create (real or perceived) conflicts of interest (e.g., if the funds come from states whose 
investors are frequent claimants)? If so, what funding or governance structure do you 
believe would minimize these conflicts?
(8) How should an Advisory Center deal with possible cases involving supported States and/or 
SMEs as opposing parties? 
(9) Do you think that beneficiaries should pay for the services of an Advisory Center?
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b. Ad hoc Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance
Another possible solution could be to offer technical assistance and training to government officials 
on how to manage the investment dispute process. This capacity assistance could be delivered by 
a range of actors, from intergovernmental organizations to local civil society groups to professional 
associations. Such assistance might also be expanded to build capacity and technical competence 
within the private sector, potentially including companies based in less developed countries and small 
and medium-sized investors.
(1) What capacity-building tools and technical assistance projects do you believe would be most 
(from 1: least important to 5: most important)
· Model documents and training modules related to negotiating investor-State dispute 
settlement provisions in international investment agreements.
· Intensive training courses covering a range of technical topics relevant to investor-State 
dispute arbitration and managing investment disputes. 
· Seminars on emerging issues in investor-State dispute settlement. 
· Training for the national judiciary to create awareness among the judiciary at various 
levels about issues of international investment law, international arbitration or investment 
treaties. 
· Courses on ADR to create awareness about alternatives to investor-State dispute 
settlement, to develop an institutional/legal framework in the host country conducive 
to avoiding disputes and proposing alternatives, and to train conciliators in the host 
country. 
· Direct provision of technical experts and legal experts to support a government’s 
internal negotiation and policy processes.
· Any other (please specify).
(2) What institutions do you believe can deliver capacity-building assistance in a way that is seen as 
legitimate and unconflicted? (from 1: less legitimate to 5: more legitimate)
· Delivered by universities. 
· Delivered by private sector entities. 
· Delivered by governments. 
· Delivered by international organizations. 
(3) What types of assistance and capacity-building do you believe would be most valuable at each 
stage of the IIA cycle?
· Formulation of IIA Policy.
· Negotiation of IIAs
· Pre-Dispute Management of IIAs 
· Notices of Intent
· Handling Disputes
· Managing Post-Award Processes. 
c. Private-Sector Solutions
a. Access to subscription services/databases (e.g., on arbitrators, investor-state law 
guide, iareporter)
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b. Access to special negotiated rates for private-sector assistance. 
c. Pro-bono services. 




e. Reducing costs, e.g.,
i. Better enabling identification and dismissal of frivolous claims.
ii. Capping of fees for arbitrators? Capping fees for counsel? Other?
f. Any other (please specify). 
(4) What mechanisms 
(5) What role, if any, could fee award systems  
a. 
b. What conflicts of interest do you see fee award systems creating in  
d. Direct Funding
Yet another proposed mechanism to secure adequate defense for states in ISDS involves the direct or 
indirect funding of   
(1) What types of direct and indirect financial support do you think would best meet the needs of 
disadvantaged IIA participants? How does this change at different stages of the IIA cycle?
· Loans. 
· Grants. 
· Access to special negotiated rates. 
· Setting up a dedicated litigation fund. 
· Any other (please specify). 
B. Scope of Aid
a.  Negotiating IIAs & Developing IIA Policy
(1) What role could, and should, an aid institution play in supporting the negotiation and development 
of specific IIAs? Does that role change based on the institutional form (e.g., direct financial aid 
being used to hire third-party experts vs. institutional experts being provided by an Advisory 
Center)?
(2) Would substantive policy advice and capacity-building programs be within the appropriate role 
of such an organization? 
(3) Would the generation of model interpretive statements or declarations be within the appropriate 
role of such an organization?
(4) Could a single organization effectively provide negotiation and policy support for both/all states 
negotiating an IIA with each other? What types of internal “firewalls” would be needed to 
enhance the legitimacy of such support? If support could only be provided to one side, what 
would be the criteria for determining who gets such support?
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b.  Pre-Dispute Management and Alternate Resolution
(1) Would external analysis of the IIA consequences of proposed activities by government or 
private sector actors be valuable to the pre-dispute management of IIA obligations? Would such 
analysis be tainted by or taint the legitimacy of subsequent support activities of the institution?
(2) Could an aid institution serve as or provide access to third-party mediators? What do you see 
as the advantages and disadvantages of such support?
(3) Could /should an aid institution help with state-state engagement, e.g., by providing “good 
offices” to facilitate conclusion of joint interpretations, pre-dispute filters, state-to-state 
resolution of disputes?
c.  Handling Disputes
(1) Legal opinion. An aid institution could provide analysis and legal opinions and expert reports 
to arbitral tribunals on all aspects of international investment law and jurisprudence. What do 
you think should be the range of such services? 
a. If an aid institution were to remain at arm’s length to the litigation, would this be useful 
and sufficient? 
b. Do you see any problem or possible conflict of interest arising from an aid institution 
providing legal opinions while also representing (or supporting the representation of) 
ISDS parties? 
c. Could these problems be addressed if said aid institution created a “fire wall” and if 
so, what kind would be required? 
(2) Public Party Defense. An aid institution could provide specific assistance to resource-
constrained governments, either directly or by retaining third-party experts and private-sector 
law firms. What do you think should be the range of such assistance? 
· Practical issues relating to setting up an international arbitration defense. 
· Advice about the internal organization of government defense efforts (cost estimates, 
technical ability requirements, staffing considerations, etc.).
· Selection of procurement procedures and selection of counsel or arbitrators.
· Technical assistance at various stages of the procedure. 
i. Discovery (e.g., to understand corporate value chain, identity of investors)
ii. Valuation and damages
iii. Due diligence on counsel/arbitrators
· Direct legal representation.
i. Shaping/informing arguments and strategy
ii. Doing legal research sought by the state
iii. Writing briefs
iv. Reviewing/editing briefs written by state counsel
v. Arguing motions or hearings
· Should the institution be able to assist in inter-state disputes? 
· Should the institution be able to assist in the pursuit of counterclaims?
· Any other (please specify). 
(3) What would be the key factors or criteria that must be addressed to ensure that the results of 
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services undertaken by an aid institution that performs direct representation are equivalent in 
quality to those performed by private sector practitioner? 
(4) Do you see questions re quality? If so, how could those questions be resolved?
(5) Do you see possible conflicts of interest for an aid institution to provide the services detailed 
above? If so, how could these conflicts be avoided? 
(6) Would you be willing to pay to use such a institution? (e.g., if rates were tied to prevailing rates 
for legal services in your country) Would you be willing to contribute to the cost of running such 
a center? 
d.  Post-Award Processes
(1) Do you see a role for an aid institution to be involved in post-award processes (e.g., collecting 
on adverse cost awards)? If so, what types of support would be useful after the conclusion of a 
dispute process?
(2) Should recipients of service from an aid institution be bound to accept and enforce the results 
of ISDS awards? Would any such requirement decrease the legitimacy and usefulness of the 
institution?
e.  Services for Investors
(1) Do you believe that an aid institution should make available services for small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs)? 
(2) What do you think about an aid institution providing any of the following to SMEs? 
· Specific technical assistance (e.g., providing a hotline for answering idiosyncratic 
questions about IIA obligations). 
· Access to ADR (e.g., providing mediation services). 
· Access to legal training and capacity-building services provided by the Facility. 
· Legal assistance in the pursuit of claims
· Legal assistance in the defense of counterclaims. 
· A small claims facility to help fund cases by SMEs for low damage amounts 
· Specific rules for small claims to help speed processes. 
· An SME-specific facility to help fund cases for low damage amounts. 
(3) Would you be comfortable with an aid institution providing assistance to both States and SMEs 
that bring claims against those States? If so in what contexts? And if not, why?
III. General QuestIons
(1) Outcomes of Negotiations
a. Do you feel that outcomes in negotiations are good and fair? 
b. If you see issues, do they arise due to a lack of capacity of/support for one or more of 
the negotiating states?
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(2) Outcomes of ISDS
a. Do you feel that outcomes of ISDS are good and fair?
b. If you see issues, do they arise due to a lack of capacity of/support for one of the 
disputing parties? 
(3) If the answer to 1(b) or 2(b) is yes, do you feel that issues would be best addressed by (1) directly 
assisting disadvantaged parties (e.g., through external advice), or (2) building in-house capacity 
in affected nation-states. (Solicit other thoughts here?)
(4) How do you feel about the current situation regarding international investment agreements? 
Do you think that the current international investment regime is fair?
 
(5) What do you think about legitimacy challenges that international investment treaties, international 
investment law and the investor-State arbitration system are currently facing? 
(6) What do you feel are the primary legitimacy challenges international investment agreements 
face? 
(7) Do you feel that your country receives benefits from IIAs?
a. What benefits do you feel your country receives?
b. Do you feel that the resources and technical capacity your country has devoted towards 
IIA disputes are proportionate to the benefits of international investment agreements 
that your country and its residents receive?
(8) Do you believe that ISDS procedurally disadvantages any of the following stakeholders (e.g., 
lack of technical or financial capacity to use ISDS mechanisms, lack of access to impartial 
arbitrators, conflicts of interest between arbitral counsel and clients, etc.)? If so, what are the 
procedural mechanisms (including costs, forum selection, etc.) that you believe generate this 
disadvantage?
a. Sovereign countries (either developed or less developed)
b. Citizens of sovereign countries
c. Subnational government entities, like municipalities 
d. Domestic companies
e. Foreign investors
(9) Do you believe that the substance of IIAs disproportionately disadvantage any of the following 
stakeholders? If so, what are the substantive rules (arbitral definitions of “takings,” for example) 
that generate this disadvantage?
a. Sovereign countries (either developed or less developed)
b. Citizens of sovereign countries
c. Subnational government entities, like municipalities 
d. Domestic companies
e. Foreign investors
(10) What changes to either the procedure or substance of IIAs do you believe would have the 
greatest impact on the concerns that you have expressed about the IIA system? 
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